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CITY OF LEWISTON/ a municipal corporation of the 
State of Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, 
City of Lewiston Engineer, 
Defendants-Respondents 
and 
JACK JOSEPH STREIBICK, a single man, and Personal 
Representative of THE ESTATE OF MAUREEN F. 
STREIBICK 1 deceased, AND DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
VOLUME V 
Appealed from the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Nez Perce 
Th e Honorable CARL B. KERRICK 
Supreme Court No. 39685 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 







JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J. ) 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF ) 
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of ) 
Idaho, and its employee, LOVlELL l CUTSHAW, ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Ronald J. Landeck, upon oath, deposes and says: 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD 
J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 
10/28/2011 FRI 16:46 F.I'.X 208 883 4593 
1. The statements contained herein are made of my own personal knowledge and are true 
and correct to the best of my information. 
2. I am a licensed attorney in the State ofidaho in good standing and am a p1incipal of the 
law fim1, Landeck & Forseth (the "firm"). 
3. The firm represents Plaintiff John G. Block in this action. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of portions ofthe Deposition of 
John Block taken October 14, 2010 and April 6, 2011, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy ofpmiions of the Deposition 
of Lowell Cutshaw taken September 21, 2010, at Bismarck, North Dakota. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition of 
Chris Davies taken October 12, 2010, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition of 
Eric Hasenoehrl taken April 8, 27 and 28, 2011, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a hue and correct copy of portions of the Deposition 
of Tim Richards taken September 12, 2011, at Boise, Idaho. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition 
ofTerry Rudd taken June 7, 2011, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition 
of Jolm Smith taken November 7, 2010, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and conect copy of portions of the Deposition 
of Shawn Stubbers taken October 12,2010, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
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12. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition of 
Jolm "Hank" Swift taken AprilS, 2011, at Lewiston, Idaho and September 14, 2011, at Moscow, 
Idaho. 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition 
of Bud Van Stone taken October 14,2010, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of portions of the Deposition 
ofWarren Watts taken AprilS, 2011, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 28th day of October, 2011. 
( '\ ' 
\ AujJ:_ ~1\ ':~"C w\LitzA~ 
Rontd J. Landeck 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 28th Jay of October, 2011. 
\ 
( ri~~:-·. ,. fJ c: 
-.'---c/\:f:/!AA, L · t:v/trtd 
NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
My commission expires: ---'-'--~---_c_::::-
!dlo35/116 
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10/28/2011 FRI 16:46 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of October, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the mam1er indicated below: 
BRIANK. JULIAN 
STEPHEN L. ADAMS 
ANDERSON, JULIAN &HULLLLP 
C. W. MOORE PLAZA 
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700 
POST OFFICE BOX 7426 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email 
[ ] FAX (208) 344-5510 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] email to sadams@ajloJaw.com 
[ ] email to bjulian@ajhlaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
VS 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single 
man, JACK STREIBICK, as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. 
Streibick, deceased, CITY OF 
LEWISTON, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employee, 
LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City of 
Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 
1-20' 
Defendants. 
Taken at 141 Ninth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 
Thursday, October 14, 2010 - 9:46 a.m. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






) Case No. CV 09-02219 
vs 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single 
man, JACK STREIBICK, as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. 
Streibick, deceased, CITY OF 
LEWISTON, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employee, 
LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City of 




















Taken at 1134 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 
Tuesday, November 16, 2010 - 9:08 a.m. 
C 0 N T I N U E D 
D E P 0 S I T I 0 N 
OF 
JOHN G. BLOCK 
Cleartwater Re~ON TO RECONSIDER ME~~l! OPI}..TION AND ORDER ON Lewiston, ID 83501 
ofWA & ID LLCsECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT bud@clearwaterreportingic~~ 
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factors. Another one was to put piling all the way down 
to bedrock and create some type of cormection between 
all of these. Well, these pilings would have to be on 
the order of every six to ten feet apart, at a fairly 
high price per pile--
Q. Sure. 
A. -· to accomplish this. And at v,rhat point do I 
you do it? Do you do it over the entire face of this 
fill or this area, or do you do it-- which we came down 
to that being cost prohibited - do you do it just for 
the one remaining house, the 155 house. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. And that was estimated to cost I think about 
five hundred thousand just to protect one stmcture that 
at the time wasn't, it was probably only worth five 
hundred thousand. So, to me it didn't make sense to do 
the study if the study is going to come out with that 
type offlx. 
Q. Gotcha. 
A. So that's why we didn't do it. 
Q. And to your knowledge, no one else has done a 
study to conclude specifically what's caused the slope 
instability on these three properties? 
A. As far as I'm aware, that's right. 



























Q. So, Exhibit 219, tell me what that is. 
A. Okay. Tius is the contract between myself and 
Catlow house movers to move the main floor of the 159 
Marine View Drive house. 
Q. And, John, did you move 159? 
A. We moved the main floor of that house !o 
another lot that I mvned. 
Q. Where is that lot? 
A. It's lot number three of Canyon Greens Court. 
It's now addressed as 106 Canyon Greens Court. 
Q. Okay. And so, did you have Catlow Professional 
Movers do that work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did they charge you forty-t\vo thousand 
dollars to do it? 
A. I believe they charged a little bit extra. We 
had to do a little extra but, yes, it's proximate to 
that. !; 15. 
Q. Okay. John, who owns Canyon Greens Court, 106 ~~ 
Canyon Greens Court? 'f, 
A. The current owners are Lisa and Dave. I'm not I~ 
sure of Lisa's name. They're not married, but Dave, I t 
think it's Huntsman (phonetic), or something like that. ~ 
~ I can get that information. ~ 
Q. Okay. And how long have the Huntsmans lived ~ 



























the Strata prices that they were asking for for these 
phases were consistent with what's indicated on 244, 
which is phase one of five thousand, eight hundred 
ninety-five dollars, and phase two, anywhere from 
twenty-one thousand to twenty-five thousand? 
A. I assume so. 
Q. You don't have a recollection of a different 




(Deposition Exhibit No. 219 marked for 
identification.) 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) Okay. John, we've talked in 
little bits and parts about what took place on this 
property, and I'm sorry to do that, but sometimes it 
just has to be with how I came across the documents, in 
that order. And I'm going to give you a chance. We're 
going to eventually get to your, your interrogatory 
answer--
A. Ub-huh. 
Q. ·- and I think that lays out your damage 
claims. A.nd, but I need to go through some of these 





























A. I believe they purchased in June of this year. 
Q. Who did they buy it from? 
A. Me. 
Q. Did you own it from the time it was moved in 
2006? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the sale price? 
A. Three hundred twenty-five thousand. 
Q. And, what's its assessed value? 
A. You know, 1 believe it's assessed right about 
three hundred twenty-five thousand. 
Q. Okay. Do you have the purchase and sale 
documents from that sale? 














Q. Would you supply those to your counsel, please? ~ 
A. Yes. ~ 
Q. Tell me bow many square feet the house is ! 
currently, on 106. ! 
A. I think twenty-two hundred and forty, say, i 
square feet, roughly, twenty-two hundred. 
1
J 
Q. So tell me about that move and the subsequent, 
if you will, reconstruction. What did you do? 
A. Okay. On the move, we had to basical1y tear 
dov.'Il the 153 house, build an access road in between 
Page 287 
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where the 153 house was and the 155 house. We had to 1 
lift that structure up off the foundation. It was 2 
daylight basement, so we had to demolish the entirety of 3 
the daylight basement. We had to detach the stmcture j 4 
from the garage, and we ended up doing the 5 
reconstmction of the garage on site, just to protect it 6 
because one of the walls -- 7 
~ru~ a 
A. -- went with the house. So we transported that 9 
up the street We had to take down two stone and brick 10 
mailboxes that were in the way, and we had to take out, 11 
I believe it was two trees, that were in the way. We 12 
excavated. This was a lot that I had available. 13 
Excavated the lot, had to over-excavate the lot to get 14 
the home in there. We had to over-excavate the depth of 15 
the lot, because it went from a daylight structure to a 1 6 
crawl-space structure. So we had to have a higher than 17 
nonnal foundation for it, and we had to install more 18 
stem walls and bearing walls underneath the home to 1 9 
support the home other than it would have been. There 2 0 
was a stairway in the home that had to get sealed off 21 
and reconstructed. 2 2 
Q. A stairway that went down to the daylight 2 3 
basement? 2 4 
A. Yes. 25 
Page 288 
Q. Okay. 1 
A. We built a brand-new garage onto the, the moved 2 
structure in the new location and all the related work 3 
That would be the porches, the patios, site work, the 4 
driveway, the landscape, the sprinklers, anything 5 
associated with getting the house ready for sale. The 6 
interior we had to do some remodel and repair fi·om 7 
cracking. The outside of the house was completely 8 
repainted. 9 
Q. Uh-huh. 1 0 
A. The stone columns in the front were completely 11 
redone. The old house location had a large covered 12 
patio that had to get tom off. It couldn't be moved. 13 
And instead of building a covered patio, we did a 14 
pergola over the patio, so it was a different 15 
configuration. And that's about it. 16 
Q. Okay. Do you keep prqject files for 106 -- and 17 
I'm just going to call it a project file. Do you keep a 18 
file that would show the expenses that you have into the 19 
property? 2 0 
A. Probably the better would be the summary of 21 
infonnation that I do for my taxes. That would probably 2 2 
be the better way of doing it, because it's all 2 3 
checkbook register stuff. I don't have it in a project 2 4 
fil~ 25 
Page 289 
Q. Do you know how much-- what costs you had into 
it before you sold it for three hundred and twenty-five 
thousand? 
A. I do. That's a part of my tax return. 
Q. Okay. As we sit here today, you're not able to 
pull it off the top of your head, are you; or are you? 
A. Oh, it would have been- now, that's not 
counting my lot value. That's just the cost to -
Q. Yeah. I'm not talking dirt, just the 
structure. 
A. A hundred and seventy-five to two hundred 
thousand dollars. 
Q. Okay. Would you have the specific numbers that 
you could, documents that would back. up those numbers, 
that you could provide to your lawyer? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CASEY: We haven't seen those, have we yet, 
Ron? 
MR. LANDECK: No. l haven't seen them yet. 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) Okay. Would you provide those 
to him, please? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you know how much the lot was valued 
at, at the time that you put this new house on it? 
A. I believe sixty-five thousand comes to mind, 
Page 290 
but I believe there is a, an appraisal. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. Of that house that I did prior to, to help me 
figure out how to price it, for one. So, that appraisal 
would have some data. 
Q. Would you supply that appraisal to your la-wyer 
also, please? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, so, then you've done all that work that 
you talked about after the move, and I appreciate you 
going through that for me. And then you put the house 
on the market, and you sold it to the Huntsmans? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was the realtor? 
A. The listing agent is the one I've used for many ~~ 
years. What- oh, Marilyn Flatt, with Century 21. And •~ 
the sales agent was, I think her name is Ma..rilyn. I'm 
not going to remember, but that will be in the sale 
document, I'm pretty sure. 
Q. Yep, that's fme. 
A. That's a different company. 
Q. I meant your realtor, and that's Ms. Flatt, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And have the Huntsmans been happy with 
Page 291 
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man, JACK STREIBICK, as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. 
Streibick, deceased, CITY OF 
LEWISTON, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employees, 
LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City of 



















Taken at 1134 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 
Tuesday, April 6, 2011 - 2:16p.m. 
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Clearwater R~~[h!fJN TO RECONSIDER ME~~f)~OPINION AND ORDER ON Lewiston, !D 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE 
BLOCK, a single man, 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
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Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. 
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LEWISTON, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employees, 
LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City of 



















Taken at 1134 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 
Thursday, April 28, 2011 - 1:16 p.m. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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Deposition of Mr. Lowell J. Cutshaw 
September 2 l, 20 1 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
* * * * * * * * 




JACK J. STREIBICK, a 
single man, JACK 
STREIBICK, as Personal 
Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. 
Streibick, deceased, 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a 
municipal corporation 
of the State of Idaho, 
and its employee, 
LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City 
of Lewiston Engineer, 































* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
AUDIOVISUAL DEPOSITION OF LOWELL J. CUTSHAW 
taken by Mr. Ronald J. Landeck, Attorney At Law, 
pursuant to notice and pursuant to the Idaho Rules 
o~ Civil Procedure, before Lori L. Hauge, a Notary 
Public in 9.nd for the County of Williams and State 
of North Dakota, at the State Room of the Kelly 
Inn, 1800 North Twelfth Street, Bismarck, North 
Dakota, on Tuesday, the 21st day of September, 
2010, commencing at 9:09 a.m. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
*Appearances as noted herein. 
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Title 32 SUBDIVISIONS Page 1 of22 
Chapter 32 
SU8DIVlSIONS1 
Art. I Title and Purpose, §§ 32-1 32-3 
Art. II Definitions,§ 32-4 
Arl Ill Administration, §§ 32-5- 32-7 
Art. IV Preapplication Conference and Concept Plan,§§ 32-8- 32-9 
Arl V Development Master Plan, §§ 32-10- 32-12 
Art. VI Preliminary Plat,§§ 32c13- 32-20 
Art VII Final Plat, §§ 32-21 -32-26 
Art VIti Administrative Plats, §§ 32-27-32-30 
Art. IX Subdivision Design Principles and Standards,§§ 32-31 - 32-37 
Art. X Street and Utility Improvement Requirements, §§ 32-38 - 32-46 
Art. XI Guarantee of Construction, §§ 32-47- 32-48 
Art. XII Modification, § 32-49 
Art XIII Prohibition Against Circumvention of Chapter,§ 32-50 
Art. XIV Violations, Penalties, and Remedies,§ 32-51 
Arl XV Validity of the Chapter,§§ 32-52-32-53 
ARTICLE I TITLE AND PURPOSE 
Sec. 32-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known as the "Subdivision Ordinance of the City of Lewiston." (Ord. 
No. 4177, § i, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-2. Purpose and intent. 
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the orderly growth and harmonious 
development of the city of Lewiston, to insure adequate traffic circulation through coordinated 
street systems with relation to major thoroughfares, adjoining subdivisions, and public 
facilities; to achieve individual property lots of reasonable utility and livability; to secure 
adequate provisions for water supply
1 
drainage, sanitary sewerage, and other health 
requirements; to insure consideration for adequate sites for schools, recreation areas, and 
other public facilities; to promote the conveyance of land by accurate legal descriptions; and to 
provide logical procedures for the achievement of this purpose. 
(b) In its interpretation and application, the provisions of this chapter are intended to provide 
a common ground of understanding and a sound equitable working relationship between 
public and private interests to the end that both independent and mutual objectives can be 
achieved in the subdivision of land. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-3. Compliance with Idaho Code. 
All subdividers of land located within the city of Lewiston, or, pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Section 50-1306, within the area of city impact shall, prior to recording of a plat, submit all 
plats to the city of Lewiston for approval by its city council in the manner provided by this 
chapter, if the piece of land is subdivided as defined in section 32-4 of this code. (Ord. No. 
4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
ARTICLE II DEFINITIONS 
Sec. 32-4. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter, certain words, terms, and phrases an~ defined as follows: 
m 
~ '-"""'II S .C....-1-.._t_...., 
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Affected person: One having an interest in real property which may be affected by approval 
or disapproval of a proposed subdivision or development. 
Agricultural purposes: The use of land primarily for the commercia! production of plants, 
crops, animals, or livestock useful to man, including the ancillary activities essential to such 
production, and the preparation of the products for use. 
Architect: An architect licensed to practice in the slate of Idaho. 
Bfock: A piece or parcel of !and or group of lots. 
City engineer: The city engineer of public works of the city of Lewiston being licensed to 
practice in the state of Idaho. 
City master transportation plan: A part of the city comprehensive plan which provides for the 
development of a system of major streets and highways, including the location and alignment 
of existing and proposed thoroughfares. 
City suNeyor: The licensed land surveyor appointed or employed by the city. 
Commission: The city of Lewiston planning and zoning commission. as defined in chapter 
37 of the Lewiston City Code. 
Comprehensive plan: A comprehensive plan, or part thereof, providing for the future growth 
and improvement of the city of Lewiston and for the general location and coordination of 
streets and highways, public utilities, schools and recreation areas, public building sites, and 
other physical development, which shall have been duly adopted by the city council. 
Conditional approval: An affirmative action by the council that approval will be forthcoming 
upon satisfaction of certain specified stipulations. 
Construction plans: Plans, profiles, cross-sections, specifications, estimates, reports and 
other required details for the construction and acceptance of public improvements, prepared 
by an engineer and/or architect in accordance with the approved preliminary plat and in 
compliance with existing standards of design and construction approved by the council. 
Council: The city council of the city of Lewiston. 
Development master plan (DMP): A preliminary master plan for the development of a land 
area, the platting of which is expected in progressive stages. A DMP, if required, shall assess 
the feasibility of developing the land area and shall be designed by the subdivider and shall be 
subject to approval of the subdivision committee. 
Direct access: The access which serves as the principal access to the property and 
determines the street address of the property. 
Easement: A grant by the owner of the use of a parcel of land by the public, corporation, or 
persons for a specified use and purposes and so designated on a plat. 
Engineer: A professional engineer licensed to practice in the state of Idaho. 
Exception: Any parcel of land which is within the boundaries of the subdivision which is not 
owned by the subdivider. 
Final plat approval: Unconditional approval of the final plat by the council, as evidenced by 
certifications on the plat by the city attorney, city clerk, and city engineer, constitutes 
authorization io record the plat. 
Irrigation facilities: Includes canals, laterals, ditches, conduits, gates, pumps, and allied 
equipment necessary for the supply, delivery, and drainage of irrigation water. 
Lot: A piece or parcel of land separated from other pieces or parcels by descriptions, as in a 
subdivision or on a record survey map, or by metes and bounds, for purposes of sale, or 
separate use. 
(1) "Corner lot": A lot abutting on two (2) or more streets, other than an alley, at their 
intersection or upon two (2) parts of the same street forming an interior angle of less than one 
hundred thirty-five (135) degrees. The front of a corner lot shall be determined at the time of 
building permit application. 
(2) "Interior lot": A lot having but one side abutting on a street. 
(3) "Through (or double front) lot": A lot abutting two (2) parallel or approximately 
parallel streets or which fronts upon two (2) streets which do not intersect at the boundaries of 
the lot. 
(4) "Reverse frontage lot"; A through lot for which the boundary abutting an arterial 
route or major street is established as the rear lot line. 
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Lot width: The length of a line at right angles to the axis of the lot at a distance equal to the 
front setback required for the zone in which the lot is located. The axis of a lot shall be a line 
joining the midpoints of the front and rear property lines. 
Neighborhood plan: A plan designed by the subdivision committee to guide the platting of 
remaining vacant parcels in a partially built neighborhood so as to make reasonable use of all 
land, correlate street pattems, and achieve the best possible land use relationships. 
Owner: The person or persons holding title by deed to land, or holding title as vendees 
under land contract, or holding any other title of record. 
Pedestrian way: A dedicated public walkway. 
Planner: The community development director of the city of Lewiston. 
Plat: A map of a subdivision. 
(1) "Preliminary plat": A preliminary map, including supporting data, indicating a 
proposed subdivision development, prepared in accordance with Article VI of this chapter and 
1he Idaho Code. 
(2) "Final plat": A map of all or part of a subdivision providing substantial conformance 
to an approved preliminary plat, prepared in accordance with Article VII of this chapter and 
Idaho Code, Sections 50-1301 through 50-1329. 
(3) "Administrative plat": A plat of ten (1 0) or fewer lots, all of which are in conformance 
with the zoning ordinance, all of which have direct access to an existing improved publlc street 
and not requiring any major improvement. The construction of curb, gutter and sidewalk and 
street patchback needed for street widening shall not be considered major improvements. 
{4) "Recorded plat": A final plat or administrative plat bearing all of the certificates of 
approval required in this chapter and duly recorded in the Nez Perce County recorder's office. 
Private stree( or road: A road within a subdivision plat that is not dedicated to lhe public and 
not a part of a public roadway system, meeting the design requirements for fire access. 
Public improvement standards: A set of regulations setting forth the details, specifications, 
and instructions to be followed in the planning, design, and construction of required public 
improvements in the city of Lewiston, formulated by the state department of health and 
welfare, the North Central District Health Department, the city engineer, and other city 
departments. 
Streets: Any public way or other way which is an existing state, county, or municipal 
roadway; or a street or roadway shown on a plat heretofore approved pursuant to law or by 
official action; or a street or roadway, whether public or private; or a plat duly filed and 
recorded in the county recorder's office. A street includes the land between the right-of-way 
lines, whether improved or unimproved, and may comprise pavement. shoulders, curbs, 
gutters, sidewalks, parking areas, and lawns. 
(1) "Arterial route": A general term including freeways, expressways, and limited 
access streets; and interstate, state or county highways having regional continuity. 
(2) "Minor arterial": Provides for the general inter-neighborhood traffic circulation of the 
community, taking priority of movement over most intersecting streets, and minimizing direct 
access to abutting properties. 
(3) "Collector street": Provides for traffic movement within neighborhoods of the city 
and between major streets and local streets and for direct access to abutting properties. (Also 
called "secondary street.") · 
(4) "Local street": Provides for direct access to residential, commercial, Industrial, or 
olher abutting land and for local traffic movements and connects to collector and/or major 
streets. (Also called a "minor street.") 
a. "Marginal access street": A minor street parallel and adjacent to an arterial 
route which provides access to abutting property and intercepts local streets and controls 
access to an arterial route. (Also ca!Jed "frontage road.") ' 
b. "Cul-de-sac street": A short local street having one end terminated in a 
vehicular turnaround. 
c. "Dead-end street"; A short local street terminating at a property line, but 
capable of future extension. 
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(5) "Alley": A public service way used to provide secondary vehicular access to 
property otherwise abutting upon a street. 
(6) "Improved public street": A public street that has been paved with anal! weather 
surface. 
Subdivider: A subdivider shall be deemed to be the individual, firm, corporation, partnership, 
association, syndication, trust, or other legal entity that titles the application and initiates 
proceedings for the subdivision of land in accordance wrth the provisions of this chapter. The 
subdivider need not be the owner of the property as defined by this chapter. 
Subdivision: The division of a tract or parcel of land within the city or area of city impact inlo 
two (2) or more lots, tracts, or parcels of land; except !hal: 
(1) The sale or exchange of parcels of land to or between adjoining propeiiy owners 
where such sale or exchange does not create additional lots shall not be deemed a 
subdivision. 
(2) The allocation of property by court decree in settling the estate of a decedent or in 
partitioning land among owners shall not be deemed a subdivision. 
(3) The unwilling sale of land as the result of legal condemnation procedures, or the 
acquisition of street rights-of-way by a public agency in conformance with the comprehensive 
plan, shall not be deemed a subdivision. 
Subdivision committee: A committee established io review subdivision plats. 
Surveyor: Professional land surveyor licensed to practice in the state of Idaho. 
Tract or tract of land: A parcel of land which appears on the records of !he county as a 
single ownership as of August 23, 1971. Where two (2) or more parcels under the same 
ownership are contiguous, they shall be regarded for purposes of this chapter as a single tract 
except when no new lot lines are created for the purpose of sale. 
Usable Jot area: That portion of a lot usable for or adaptable to the normal uses made of 
properly consistent with the established or proposed zoning classification, excluding any 
areas which may be considered wetlands, are excessively steep, or are included in certain 
types of easements. 
Utilities: lnstallations or facilities, underground or overhead, furnishing public utilities 
including electricity, gas, steam, communications, water, drainage, solid waste disposal, 
sewage disposal, or flood control. Said utilities may be owned and operated by any person, 
firm, corporation, municipal department, or board duly authorized by state or municipal 
regulations. Utility or utilities as used herein may also refer to the operating persons, firms, 
corporations, departments, or boards. 
Wetlands: Those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a 
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, 
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands 
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97; 
Ord. No. 4405, § 1, 7-25-05) 
ARTICLE Ill ADMINISTRATION 
Sec. 32-5. Subdivision committee. 
(a) A subdivision committee is hereby established, to consist of the following members or 
their duly authorized representatives: 
(1) The administrator of public works or appointed alternate(s); 
(2) Community development director or appointed alternate(s); 
(3) Fire chief or appointed alternate(s); 
(4) Superintendents of water, sewer and streets. 
(b) The subdivision committee shall examine all plats of proposed subdivisions for 
compliance with applicable ordinances of the city of Lewiston. The committee shall report its 
findings and recommendations through the community development director to the 
commission or council. meeting as often as necessary to report within the time limits 
hereinafter prescribed. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
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Sec. 32-6. Outline of procedures. 
(a) The preparation, submittal, review, and approval of all subdivision plats of lands within 
the jurisdiction of the city of Lewiston shall proceed through the progressive stages, as 
described in Articles V, VI and VII ofthis chapter. 
(b) The preparation, submittal, review, and approval of all administrative plats shall proceed 
as described in Article VIII of this chapter. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-7. Fees. 
Fees for the processing of subdivision applications shall be required prior to review of plats. 
The fee shall be in accordance with the fee schedule adopted by resolution of the city council. 
(Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97; Ord. No. 4506, § 1, 5-12-08) 
ARTICLE IV PREAPPLICATION CONFERENCE AND CONCEPT PLAN 
Sec. 32-8. Purpose. 
The purpose of the preapplfcation conference and concept planning stage shall be to 
discuss the proposed subdivision concept, its conformity wrth the comprehensive plan, its 
relationship to surrounding development, any site conditions that may require special ,.,.._ 
consideration or treatment, and the requirements of this chapter. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-i 0-97) 
Sec. 32~9. Preapplication conference. 
(a) The preapplication conference stage of subdivision planning comprises an informational 
period which precedes actual preparation of preliminary plans by the subdivider. During this 
stage, the subdivider makes known his intentions to the city and ls'advised of specific public 
objectives related to the subject tract, and other details regarding platting procedures and 
requirements. 
(b) In carrying out the purposes of the preapplication stage, the subdivider and the city shalt 
be responsible for the following actions: 
(1) Actions by the subdivider. The subdivider and/or his agents shall meet with the cily 
at the preapplication conference to present a general outline of the proposed development, 
which shall include, but is not limited to: 
a. Sketch plans and ideas regarding land use, street and lot arrangement, and 
tentative lot sizes. 
b. Tentative proposals regarding required public improvements. 
c. Other information needed to explain the development. 
(2) Actions by tf7e city. TIJ_e city wfll discuss the proposal with the subdivider and advise 
him of procedural steps, design and improvement standards, an_g general plat requirements. 
Then, depending upon the scope of the proposed development~ the~ill proceed wj~..b.l~~ 
following actions: ~ ... ---
~--~.- a. Check existing zoning of the tract and make recommendations if a zone 
change is necessary or desirable or if other zoning action is necessary. If it is determined that 
zoning action is required or a permit is required for the subject tract or any part of it, the 
subdivider shall initiate the necessary rezoning or permit application. 
b. Check conformity with the objectives and policies of the comprehensive plan 
and for conformity to the city's master transportation plan. 
c. lnsnect thPo.J;ite or otherwise determine its n:?le1~~ streets, LJHliJy 
~ .//' 
systems, an~ adjacent land uses, and identify any unusual problems with regard to 
topography, utilities, flooding, or other conaltions.- -
~ d. Determmeff there ~the preparation and review of a development 
master plan before a preliminary plat can be considered. If the development master plan is 
required, the subdivider will be advised of this fact, and of the extent to which it should be 
prepared. · ··· ·· ···· ·· ··· ·· ·· ····· 
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e. Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies>-
which may inCJUaebut are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability, wetla~dations or· 
-otfier stud res that ma 5e re :ilJTi'8Cas a result of srte condrtions, and the implications ot tfie-
rndrngs o ose studies, if regurre . The requirement o satd spectal s u 1es s a l e 
determil1§.d by the city engineer. - -----. 
f. Advise tne su5aivlder of the results of these actions, and offer guidance as to 
any further actions which should be taken. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
ARTICLE V DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN 
Sec. 32-10. Purpose. 
A development master plan may be required by the subgivision committee whenever the 
tract is sufficiently large as to comprise a neighborhood; the tract initially proposed for platting 
is only a portion of a larger land area, the development of which is complicated by size, 
transportation or access, unusual topographic, utility, land use, land ownership, or other 
conditions. The entire land area need not be under the subdivider's control in this case. (Ord. 
No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-11. Contents of plan- Preparation. 
The development master plan (DMP) shall be prepared to a scale and accuracy 
commensurate with its purpose and shall include: 
(1) General street pattern with particular attention to collection streets and future 
circulation throughout the neighborhood and the goals and objectives of the city's master 
transportation plan. 
(2) General location and size of school sites, parks, or other proposed land uses. 
(3) Location of shopping centers, multifamily residential, or other proposed land uses. 
(4) Proposed improvements for sewage disposal, water supply, fire protection and 
storm drainage. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-12. Significance of development master plan approval. 
Upon acceptance of general design approach by the subdivision committee, the DMP shall 
be followed by the preparation of preliminary plat(s). If development is to take place in several 
parts, the DMP shall be submitted as supporting data for each part. The DMP shall be kept up 
to date by the subdivider and the committee as modifications take place. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 
2-10-97) 
ARTICLE VI PRELIMINARY PLAT 
Sec. 32-13. Purpose. 
The purpose of the preliminary plat is to allow for the detailed examination of lhe proposed 
subdivision, determine conformity to land use and zoning ordinances and applicable state 
laws and to determine and apply appropriate development standards in conformance with this 
code. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-14. Preliminary plat 
The preliminary plat stage of land subdivision includes detailed suqdivision planning, 
submittal, review, and approval of the preliminary plat. To avoid delay in processing the 
application, the subdivider shall provide the city with all information described in this article 
that is essential to determine the character and general acceptability of the proposed 
development. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
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Sec. 32-15. Conformance with zoning requirements. 
The subdivision shall be designed to meet the specific requirements for the zoning district 
within which it is located. In the event that an amendment or variance of zoning is necessary, 
said action shall be initiated by the property owner or his authorized agent. Processing of the 
preliminary plat shall not proceed until the subdivision committee has determined that the 
commission or council has made a favorable decision regarding any proposed zoning change. 
In any event, any such change required in relation to the preliminary plat shall have been 
adopted prior to preliminary plat approval. (Ord. No. 4177. § I, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-16. Preliminary plat submission. 
The following material and information shall be submitted by the subdivider in support of the 
request for preliminary plat approval. Review of the preliminary plat shall not commence until 
all required information is submitted. 
(1) Three (3) copies of the preliminary plat and reqwired data prepared in accordance with 
requirements set forth in Articles V, VI and IX of this chapter shall be filed with the community 
development department at least twenty-five (25) working days prior to the commission 
meeting at which the subdivider desires to be heard. In addition, the subdivider shall submit 
one (1) reduced copy of the proposed subdivision plat; said reduced copy shall be clear and 
readable and shall not exceed eleven (11) inches by seventeen (17) inches in size. 
(2) Reviewing fee. The subdivider shall, at the time of submitting the preliminary plat, pay to 
the city a reviewing fee in the amount set forth in section 32-7 of this chapter. The reviewing 
fee shall also cover the submittal of an amended or revised preliminary plat handled as the 
same case. If the preliminary plat approval expires before application for final approval, the 
plat shall be resubmitted for preliminary approval as a new case and the subdivider shall pay 
the required fee. 
(3) The submittal shall be checked by the community development department for 
completeness and assigned a case number. If incomplete as to those requirements set forth 
in section 32-20, the submittal shall be rejected and the subdivider notified in writing within five 
(5) working days. If the specified fee has been paid, scheduling of the case for commission 
hearing shall be dependent upon adequacy of data presented and completion of processing. 
(4) The subdivider shall submit a title report or a commitment for title insurance indicating 
the nature of the applicant's ownership of the land included in the preliminary plat. (Ord. No. 
4177, § i, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-17. Preliminary plat review, 
(a) The community development department shall distribute copies of the plat and 
supporting data to the following review offices: 
(1) City engineer; 
(2) City parks and recreation division; 
(3) City water and sewer divisions or the appropriate service provider; 
(4) City fire marshal; 
(5) City street superintendent; 
(6) North Central District Health Department for satisfaction of sanitary restrictions as 
required by Idaho Code, Section 50-1326; 
(7) Superintendent of the appropriate school district; 
(8) If the land abuts a state highway, to the Idaho Highway Department; if the land 
abuts a county road, to the county commissioners; 
(9) The city planner; 
(10) Public utilities: 
(11) State department of health and welfare, division of environment; 
(12) Soil and water conservation district. 
(b) The reviewing offices shall transmit their recommendations in writing to the community 
development department which receives and summarizes the recommendations and presents 
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them to the subdivision committee. The community development department prepares the 
report and recommendations of the subdivision committee, and forwards them to the 
commission. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-18. Preliminary plat approvaL 
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(a) The commission shall review the preliminary plat within forty-five (45) calendar days of 
the date a full and complete application was received. The commission shall recommend 
approval, denial or approval with conditions to the city counciL 
(b) If satisfied that all objectives of this chapter have been mel, and that it is in conformance 
with the comprehensive plan, the council shalf approve the preliminary plat, with such 
conditions as are appropriate. Among the conditions required by council shall be the 
submission of construction plans and specifications pursuant to section 32-40. 
(c) If the council finds the preliminary plat requires major revision, the council may reject the 
plat stating the reason for the rejection. Said reasons for rejection shall be transmitted in 
writing by the city clerk to the subdivider within five (5) working days following the rejection of 
the plat by the council. 
(d) If a plat is rejected by the council, the review of a new plat for the same tract or any pari 
thereof, if submitted within ninety (90) calendar days of the date of rejection, shall be 
considered under the original review fee. Should the plat be submitted to the city more than 
ninety (90) calendar days after rejection, the subdivider shall follow the aforementioned 
procedure and again shall be subject to the required fee. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-19. Significance of preliminary plat approvaL 
Preliminary plat approval constitutes authorization for the subdivider to proceed with the 
preparation of the final plat, and with the construction plans and specifications for public 
improvements. Preliminary plat approval is based upon the following terms: 
(I) The basic conditions under which approval of the preliminary plat is granted will not be 
changed prior to expiration date. 
(2) Approval is valid for a period of twelve (12) months from date of council action. Time for 
completion of improvements required by the preliminary plat may, upon application by the 
subdivider, and upon good cause showing, be extended for a period of six (6) months by the 
city council or as provided for in subsection (4). Should a final plat not be submitted to the city 
within the specified time period, the review process shall recommence as for a new 
subdivision and the subdivider shall submit to the city a new reviewing fee and, if necessary, a 
revised plat containing any revisions required by amendments in the city code approved since 
the date of the original submittal. 
(3) Preliminary plat approval, in itself, does not assure final acceptance. 
(4) However, if circumstances require, a final plat which includes only a part of the approved 
preliminary plat may be submitted and processed for council approval during the tvvelve (i 2) 
months time period. Approval of the entire preliminary plat shall remain active as long as final 
plats are submitted at a minimum of twelve (12) month intervals. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-20. Information required for preliminary plat submittal. 
(a) Form of presentation. The information required as part of the preliminary plat submittal 
shall be shown graphically or by note on plans, or by fetter, and may comprise several sheets 
showing various elements or required data. All mapped data for the same plat, except the 
vicinity map, shall be drawn at the same scale of one hundred (100) feet to an inch. Whenever 
practical, the drawing shall measure twenty-two (22) inches by thirty-six (36) inches and 
should not exceed forty-two (42) inches by sixty (60) inches. 
(b) ldentificatJ"on end descriptive data. 
(1) Proposed name of the subdivision, in accordance with Idaho Code, Section 50-
1307, and lts location by section, township, and range; referenced to a section corner, quarter-
comer, or recorded monun)ent. 
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(2) Name, address, and phone number of subdivider. 
(3) Name, address, and phone number of the person preparing the plat 
(4) Scale, north point, and date of preparation including dates of any subsequent 
revisions. 
(5) Vicinity map clearly showing proposed subdivision in relationship to adjacent 
subdivisions, arterial routes, major streets, collectors, and other important features. 
(c) Existing conditions data. 
(1) Topography by contours related to USCG survey datum, or other datum approved 
by the city engineer, shown on the same map as the proposed subdivision layout and showing 
proposed contours adequate to describe future grading. Contour interval shall be such as to 
adequately reflect the character and drainage of the land. 
(2) Soils stability anal sis when required by the city engineer. 
oca 1on of water wells, streams, cana s, irrigation aterals, private ditches, washes, 
lakes, wetlands or potential wetlands or other water features; direction of flow; location and 
extent of areas subject to inundation whether such inundation be frequent, periodic, or 
occasional. 
(4) Location, widths, and names of all platted streets, railroads, utility rights-of-way of 
public record, public areas, permanent structures to remain including water wells, and 
municipal corporation lines wilhin or adjacent to the tract. 
(5) Names, book, and page numbers of all recorded adjacent subdivisions having 
common boundaries with the tract. 
(6) By note, the existing zoning classifications of the tract. 
(7) By note, the acreage of the tract. 
(8) Boundaries of the tract to be subdivided shall be fully dimensioned. 
(d) Proposed conditions data. 
(1) Street layout, including location, width and proposed names of public streets, 
alleys, and easements; connections to adjoining platted tract. 
(2} Typical lot dimensions (scaled); dimensions of all corner lots and lots on curvilinear 
sections of streets; each lot numbered individually; total number of lots. 
(3) Location, width, and use of easements. 
(4) Designation of all land to be dedicated or reserved for public use within use 
indicated. 
(5) If plat includes land for which multifamily, commercial, or industrial use is proposed, 
such areas shall be clearly designated together with existing zoning classification and status 
of zoning change, if any. 
(e) Proposed utility methods. The subdivider shall address by note the proposed method of 
utility services including but not limited to: 
( 1) Sewage disposal. 
(2) Water supply. 
(3) Storm water disposal: Preliminary calculations and layout of proposed system and 
locations of outlets, in conformance with the city storm water management plan and subject to 
approval of the city engineer. 
(4) Fire protection: Preliminary evaluation by the fire marshal of available water supply 
and pressure and 1·equired spacing of fire hydrants. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
ARTICLE VII FINAL PLAT 
Sec. 32-21. Purpose. 
The purpose of the final plat is to consider and approve the necessary maps, plats and 
documents that demonstrate conformity to the approved preliminary plat and associated 
conditions of approval in accordance with provisions of this code and Idaho state statutes. 
(Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
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Sec. 32-22. Final plat. 
This stage includes the final design of the subdivision, engineering of public improvements, 
and submittal of the plat and construction plans by the subdivider. It includes review of the 
final plat by the appropriate agencies, and submission for final action by the council. 
(1) Zoning. Zoning of the tract shall regulate the proposed use, and any zoning amendment 
necessary shall have been adopted by the council prior to submittal of the final plat, and shall 
be noted thereon. 
(2) Easements. It shall be the responsibility of the subdivider to provide on the final plat 
such easements in such location and width as required for utility purposes. Prior to filing the 
final plat, he shall have submitted the plat to the person(s) authorized to perform plat review 
for the utility interests. Prior to final plat review by the city engineer, a letter shall have been 
received from said interested utilities signifying that easements shown on the plat are 
complete and satisfactory for utility purposes. 
(3) Fjna! plat preparation. The final plat shall be prepared in accordance with requirements 
set forth in section 32-26 of these regulations and shall conform closely to the approved 
preliminary plat. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-23. Final plat submittal. 
The subdivider shall submit the final plat map prepared in conformance with provisions of 
this chapter and that information required in section 32-26 of this code to the community 
development department at least twenty-five (25) working days prior to the council meeting at 
which the subdivider desires to be heard. The community development department, upon 
receipt of a complete plat submittal, shaH record the receipt and date of submittal and forward 
the submittal to the city engineer who shall then proceed with review action as specified in 
section 32-24 of this chapter. Should changes or corrections to the plat be found necessary, 
each resubmittal of the plat shalf require and additional twenty-five (25) working days for 
review. Following the final approval of the plat by the city engineer and city surveyor, the city 
engineer shall forward the plat to the city council along with his recommendation for action 
made in writing. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10..97) 
Sec. 32-24. Final plat review. 
(a) The engineer upon receipt of the final plat submittal shall immediately check it for 
completeness. If incomplete, the date of submittal shall be voided and the submittal shall be 
returned to the subdivider. If complete, the city engineer shall review drainage and flood 
control measures and review the plat for substantial conformity to the approved preliminary 
plat and refer copies of the submittal to the appropriate reviewing offices who will make known 
their recommendations in writing addressed to the city engineer. 
(b) The engineer shall assemble the recommendations of the various reviewing offices, 
prepare a concise summary of recommendations, and submit said summary together with the 
reviewer's recommendations to the council. 
(c) At the time of submittal of the final plat to the city, the subdivider shall pay a fee as se! 
forth in section 32-7 of this chapter. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32~25. Final plat approval. 
(a) If the engineer concludes that the final plat is not in substantial conformity with the 
preliminary plat, the engineer shall report hls findings to the planning and zoning commission. 
The planning and zoning commission shall then recommend approval or denial of the final plat 
to the city counciL The city council then shall consider the final plat. 
(b) lf in the opinion of the engineer, the final plat is in substantial compliance with the 
preliminary plat, the engineer shall recommend approval to the city council. Action by the 
planning and zoning commission will not be required_ 
(c) The council or planning and zoning commission shall review and act upon the final plat 
within twenty-five (25) working days of the date of receipt by the engineer. 
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(d) Upon approval of the plat by the council, the clerk shall transcribe a certificate of 
approval upon the plat, first making sure that the other required certifications (see section 32-
26(f)) have been duly signed, including letter of agreement between subdivider and serving 
utirities, that engineering plans have been approved by the engineer, the agreement between 
city and subdivider as provided in section 32-47(a) has been executed, and that an 
appropriate guarantee of construction from among those alternatives provided in section 32-
48 covering said approved plan improvements has been posted with the engineer. The city 
shall also record the final plat with the office of the Nez Perce County recorder. 
(e) Should the council reject the plat, in whole or in part, it shall advise the subdivider in 
writing of the reasons for the denial. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-26. Information required for final plat submittal. 
(a) Method and medium of presentation. 
(1) The subdivider shall provide a record copy of the final plat prepared as described in 
Idaho Code, Section 50-1304. 
(2) Copies of the recorded plat shall be reproduced in the form of blueline or blackline 
prints on a white background. 
(3) The plat shall be drawn to an accurate scale of one hundred ( 1 00) feet to the inch, 
or multiple thereof, unless a different scale is previously approved by the engineer. 
(b) Identification data required. 
(i) A title which includes the name of the subdivision and its location by number of 
section, township, range, and county. Titles shall comply with Idaho Code, Section 50-1307. 
(2) Name, address, and regis1ratfon number of the seal of the professional engineer or 
land surveyor, registered in the state of Idaho, preparing the plat. 
(3) Scale, north arrow, and date of plat preparation. 
(c) SuNey data required. 
(1) Boundaries of the tract to be subdivided which shall close within tolerances 
prescribed by Idaho Code, showing all bearings and distances determined by an accurate 
survey in the field. All dimensions shall be expressed in feet and decimals thereof. 
(2) Any excepted parcel(s) within the plat boundaries shalf show all bearings and 
distances determined by an accurate survey in the field. All dimensions shall be expressed in 
feet and decimals thereof. 
(3) Location and description, and Idaho State plane coordinates of cardinal points to 
which all dimensions, angles, bearings, and similar data on the plat shall be referenced; each 
of two (2) corners of the subdivision traverse shall be tied by course and distance to separate 
section corners, quarter-section corners, or to existing recorded monuments. 
(4) Location of all permanent physical encroachments upon the boundaries of the tract. 
(d) Descriptive data required. 
(1) Name, right-of-way fines, courses, length, width of all existing and proposed public 
streets, alleys, utility easements, radii, points of tangency, and central angles of all curvilinear 
streets and alleys, and radii of all rounded street line intersections. 
(2) All drainageways shall be shown on the plat. The rights-of-way of all major 
drainageways, as designated by the city engineer, shall be dedicated to the public. 
(3) All easements for rights-of-way provided for public services or utilities and any 
limitations of the easements. Construction within the easement shall be llmited to utilities and 
wood, wire, or removable section-type fencing. 
(4) Location and all dimensions of all lots. 
(5) Afllots shall be numbered by consecutive numbers throughout the plat. 
"Exceptions," "tracts," and "private parks" shall be so designated, lettered, or named and 
clearly dimensioned. 
(6) All sites to be dedicated to the public will be clearly indicated, the boundaries and 
dimensions accurately shown, and the intended uses specified. 
(7) Location of all adjoining subdivisions with date, book, and page number of 
recording noted, or; ifunrecorded, so marked. -
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(8) Any proposed private deed restrictions to be imposed upon the plat or any part or 
parts thereof pertaining to the intended use of the land shall be typewritten and attached to the 
plat and to each copy submitted. 
(9) Sanitary restrictions required by Idaho Code, Section 50-1326. 
(e) Dedication and acknowledgment. 
(1) Dedication: Statement of dedication of all streets, alleys, crosswalks, 
drainageways, pedestrian ways, and other easements for public use by the person llolding 
title as vendees under a land contract, and by spouses of said parties. If lands dedicated are 
mortgaged, the mortgagee shall also sign the plat. 
(2) Dedication shall include a written location by section, township, and range of the 
tract. If the plat contains private streets, public utilities shall have the right to install and 
maintain utilities in the street right-of-way. 
(f) Required certifications. 
(1) Certificate signed by the owner or owners, containing a correct legal description of 
the land, together with a statement of their intention to include the same in the plat, and 
making dedication of all streets and alleys shown on the plat This certificate shall be 
notarized. 
(2) Certificate signed by an Idaho-licensed engineer or surveyor that the plat is correct 
and accurate, and that the monuments described in it have been located as described. This 
certificate shall include the seal of the engineer or surveyor. 
(3) Certificate and seal of the city engineer and of the city or county surveyor that the 
plat complies with the requirements of Title 50, Chapter 13, Idaho Code, and with this chapter. 
(4) Certificate signed by the city clerk tha1 the city council has approved and accepted 
the plat. · 
(5) Certificate, signed by the owner or owners, on the provision of water service to the 
lots wiU1in the subdivision, as provided by Idaho Code, Section 50-1334. 
{6) CeJiificate of satisfaction of the sanitary restrictions, to be endorsed by !he county 
recorder at the time of filing, or subsequent thereto, when the sanitary restrictions shall have 
been satisfied as required by Idaho Code, Section 50-1326. 
(7) Certificate of recording, to be signed by the county recorder at the time of filing. 
(Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97; Ord. No. 4475, § 1, 7-9-07) 
ARTICLE Vlll ADMINISTRATIVE PLATS 
Sec. 32-27. Purpose. 
The administrative plat process is intended to provide a streamlined means of subdividing 
property in those instances in which no public improvements are required, all property fronts 
upon an improved, publicly dedicated street and ten (1 O) or fewer lots are being created in 
conformance with the zoning ordinance. Administrative plats may not contain more than one 
flag lot as defined in Lewiston City Code section 37-124. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-28. Administrative plat procedure. 
When the proposed land division includes ten (1 0) or fewer lots, all of which have direct 
access to a pre-existing improved public street, and not requiring any major improvements as 
provided in the definition of an administrative plat, the administrative plat procedure may be 
used. The procedure shall be as follows: 
(1) Preapplication conference as required by section 32-9 of this chapter. 
(2) The subdivider shall submit to the city a plat map prepared in conformance with 
provisions of this chapter and that information required in section 32-29 of this code to the 
community development department at least twenty-five (25) working days prior to the council 
meeting at which the subdivider desires to be heard. The community development 
department, upon receipt of a complete plat submittal, shall record the receipt and date of 
submittaland forward the submittal to the city engineer who shall then proceed with review. 
Should changes or corrections to the plat be found necessary, each resubmittal of the plat 
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shall require an additional twenty-five (25) working days for review. Following the final 
approval of the plat by the city engineer and city surveyor, the city engineer shall forward the 
plat to the community development department with his recommendation for council action 
made in writing. The community development department shaH forward the completed plat, 
along with the city engineer's recommendation to the city council for final action. 
(3) At the time of submittal to the city, the subdivider shall pay a fee in the amount set forth 
in section 32-7 of this chapter. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-29. Administrative plat submittal. 
(a) Administrative plat application and plat drawings: 
(1) The plat shall be eighteen (18) inches by twenty-seven (27) inches in size and shall 
comply with the other requirements of the Idaho Code, Section 50-1304. 
(2) The scale of the drawing may be either one (1) inch to fifty (50) feet or one (1) inch 
to one hundred (1 00) feet, as best suits the particular case. 
(3) The information required by subsections (b)(2) through (b)(4) and (b)(6) of this 
section shall be included on the plat. 
(4) The subdivider shall submit the reproducible plat .and three (3) copies of the plat. 
(b) In addition to the required subdivision plat map, the applicant shall submit the following 
material: 
(1) Request for administrative plat review and approval. 
(2) A statement from the state department of health and welfare that the volume and 
quality of the proposed water supply is adequate and satisfactory. 
(3) Letters from the serving utility companies as required by section 32-450) of this 
chapter. 
(4) Evidence from the city fire marshal that adequate fire protection is available within 
the distances required by the Uniform Fire Code and with adequate pressure for the uses 
intended on the property. 
(5) Acknowledgment that curbs, gutters and sidewalks are required pursuant to 
chapter 31. 
(6) The subdivider shall submit a title report or a commitment for ti!le insurance 
indicating the nature of applicant's ownership of the land included in the administrative plat. 
(c) For administrative plats that are located on existing public rights-of-way of less than fifty 
(50) feet in width, the subdivider shall be required to dedicate an additional five (5) feet along 
that existing right-of-way to the city. (Ord. No. 4177. § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-30. AdminfstraUve plat approval and filing. 
(a) The council, upon receipt of the plat and written recommendation of the city engineer 
and community development department, shall proceed as specified in section 32-25 of this 
chapter. 
(b) The city shall file the approved administrative plat with the county recorder. (Ord. No. 
4177, § 1. 2-10-97) 
ARTICLE IX SUBDIVISION DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS 
Sec. 32-31. General. 
(a) Every subdivision shall conform to the requirements and objectives of the city 
comprehensive plan or any parts thereof, as adopted by the commission and the city council, 
to the zoning ordinance, to other ordinances and regulations of the city, and to the Idaho 
statutes. 
(b) The subdivision shall include the entire tract of land unless an approved preliminary plat, 
planned unit development or approved development master plan shows development in 
phases. When development is planned in phases, a schedule will be submitted wlth the 
preliminary plat showing the anticipated completion time for each stage. 
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(c) Where the tract to be subdivided contains all or any part of the site of a proposed park, 
school, flood control facility, or other public area as shown by the city's comprehensive plan or 
future acquisitions map the city shall comply with the provisions of Idaho Code, Section 37-
6517. 
(d) Land which is within a known floodplain, land which cannot be properly drained, or other 
land which, in the opinion of the subdivision committee, is unsuitable for residential use shall 
not be subdivided; except that the subdivision of such land upon receipt of evidence from the 
North Central District Health Department and/or city engineer that the construction of specific 
improvements can be expected to render the land suitable; thereafter, construction upon such 
land shall be prohibited until the required improvements have been planned and approval 
gained from the Idaho Department of Water Resources and the Army Corps of Engineers and 
construction guaranteed in conformance with the provisions of Article XI of this chapter. 
(e) Where the tract to be subdivided is located in whole or in part in terrain having an 
average slope exceeding ten (10) percent, design and development shall conform to the 
findings of a suitability study as required by the city engineer. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-32. Street location and arrangement. 
(a) Whenever a tract to be subdivided embraces any part of a street designated in the 
adopted city master transportation p!an and/or bike and pedestrian way designated in the 
adopted comprehensive plan such street, bike way or pedestrian way shall be platted in 
conformance therewith. 
(b) Street layout shall provide for the continuation of such street as the subdivision 
committee may designate. 
(c) Whenever a tract to be subdivided is located within an area for which a neighborhood 
plan has been approved by the commission, the street arrangement shall conform 
substantialfy to said plan. 
(d) Certain proposed streets and utilities, as designated by the subdivision committee, shall 
be extended to the tract boundary to provide future connections with adjoining unplatted land. 
(e) Local streets shall be so arranged as 1o discourage their use by through traffic. 
(f) If a proposed subdivision abuts or contains an existing or proposed arterial route, the 
subdivision commtttee may recommend, and the commission may require, marginal access 
streets or reverse frontage with access control along the arterial route, or such other treatment 
as may be justified for protection of abutting properties from the nuisance and hazard of high 
volume traffic, and to preserve the traffic function of the arterial route. 
(g) If a subdivision abuts or contains the right-of-way of a railroad, a limited access road, an 
irrigation canal, drainage facilities or abuts a commercial or industrial land use, the subdivision 
committee may recommend location of a street approximately parallel to and on each side of 
such right-of-way at a distance suitable for appropriate use of the intervening land. Such 
distance shall be determined with due regard for approach grades, drainage, bridges, or future 
grade separations. 
(h) Streets shall be so arranged in relation to existing topography as to be in conformance 
with city standards. 
(i) Either alleys or utility easements along rear lot Jines may be required. The subdivision 
committee shall decide which is required in individual cases. Its decision shall be made in 
conference with the subdivider, and shall be based on all relevant circumstances such as 
topographic traits, lot sizes, and continuity of existing alleys and easements. 
U) Half streets within the subdivision boundarres shall be discouraged, except where 
essential to provide right-of-way, to complete a street pattern already begun, or to insure 
reasonable development of a number of adjoining parcels. Where there exists a platted half 
street abutting the tract to be subdivided and said half street furnishes the sole access to 
residential lots, the remaining half shall be platted within the tract. Where the half street has 
had no improvement or construction, the subdivision committee may recommend that the 
subdivider provide a full right-of-way to serve his development. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
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Sec. 32-33. Street design. 
Street design shall be in based upon the classification of the street and shall be in 
conformance with adopted city standards. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-34. Block design. 
Page 15 of22 
(a) The desirable maximum length of block measured along the center line of the street and 
between intersecting street center lines shall be nine hundred (900) feet; except that in 
developments with Jot areas averaging one-half (1/2) acre or more, or where extreme 
topographic conditions warrant, the maximum may be exceeded by four hundred twenty (420) 
feet. 
(b) Maximum length of cul-de-sac streets shall be six hundred sixty (660) feet measured 
from the intersection of right-of-way lines to the extreme depth of the turning circle along the 
street center line. An exception may be made where topography or property ownership 
justifies, but shall not be made merely because the tract has restrictive boundary dimensions, 
wherein provision should be made for extension of street pattern to the adjoining unplatted 
parcel and a temporary turnaround installed. 
(c) Bicycle and pedestrian ways. Bicycle and pedestrian ways with a right-of-way width as 
recommended by the city engineer may be required by the commission for circulation, or 
access to schools, playgrounds, shopping centers, transportation, and other community 
facilities. Pedestrian ways may be used for utility installation purposes. {Ord. No. 4177, § i, 2-
1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-35. Lot planning. 
(a)(1) Lot width, depth, and area shall comply with the minimum requirements of the zoning 
ordinance and shall be appropriate for the location and character of development proposed, 
and for the type and extent of street and utility improvements being installed. Side loi lines 
shall be substantially at right angles or radial to street lines, except where other treatment may 
be justified in the opinion of the subdivision committee. 
(2) Where steep topography, unusual soil conditions, or drainage problems exist or 
prevail, the commission may recommend special lot width, depth, and area requirements of 
the particular zoning district. 
(b) Proposed streets shall be arranged in close relation to existing topography and shall 
conform to adopted city standards. Where steep topography prevails, the design shall conform 
to the findings of any special study required by the city engineer. 
(c) Single-family residential lots extending through the block and having frontage on two (2) 
parallel streets shall not be permitted; reverse frontage shall be prohibited except where 
expressly permitted in accordance with section 32-32(f) of this chapter or where justified in the 
opinion of the subdivision committee. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec, 32-36. Easement planning. 
Easements shall be provided for all utilities and shall be in conformance with the standards 
of the utility providing service. 
(1) Easements for utilities shall be provided as follows: 
a. Where alleys are provided: Four (4) feet for aerial overhead on each side of alley 
shall be provided by dedication but need not be delineated on plat. 
b. Along side lot lines: Five (5) feet on each side of lot lines for distribution facilities and 
one foot on each side of lot lines for street lighting as may be designated. 
(2) For lots facing on curvilinear streets, utility easements or alley may consist of a series of 
straight lines with points of deflection not less than one hundred twenty (120) feet apart. 
Points of deflection should always occur at the junction of side and rear lot lines on the side of 
the exterior angle. Curvilinear easements or alleys may be provided, providing that the 
minimum radius for the alley or easement shall not be less than eight hundred (800) feet. 
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(3) Where a stream or surface water drainage course abuts or crosses the tract, dedication 
of a public drainage easement of a width sufficient to permit widening, deepening, relocating, 
or protecting said watercourse shall be required. 
(4) Land within a public street or drainage easement or land within a utility easement for 
major power transmission (tower) lines or pipelines shall not be considered a part of the 
minimum lot area except where lots exceed one-half (1/2) acre in area. This shall not be 
construed as applicable to land involved in utility easements for distribution of service 
purposes_ (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-37. Street naming. 
Subdivider shall propose the street names, subject to approval by the city council, at the 
preliminary plat stage. Street names shall conform to section 31-14 of this code. (Ord. No. 
4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
ARTICLE X STREET AND UTILITY IMPROVEMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Sec. 32-38. Purpose. 
The purpose of the article is to establish in outline the minimum acceptable standards for 
improvement of public streets and utilities, to define the responsibility of the subdivider in the 
planning, construction, and financing of public improvements, and to establish procedures for 
review and approval of construction plans. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-39. Developer's responsibility. 
All improvements required as a condition of preliminary plat approval shall be the 
responsibility of the subdivider. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-40. Construction plans and specifications. 
(a) The subdivider shall submit to the city engineer construction plans and specifications 
pursuant to the approved preliminary plat as required by Articles X and XI for his approval. 
Said construction plans shall be prepared by an engineer licensed to practice in the state of 
Idaho. 
(b) In the event the subdivider wishes to file the final plat prior to the construction of public 
improvements, the subdivider shall enter into a public improvement agreement with the city for 
the construction of the public improvements. The council's approval of the public improver-nent 
agreement shall constitute approval of the construction plans and specifications. 
(c) In the event the subdivider wishes to complete the public improvements prior to 
submitting the final plat for approval, the subdivider shalt submit the necessary construction 
plans and specifications to the city engineer for review and approval prior to commencing any 
construction. Upon completion of said public improvements in conformance with the approved 
plans, the subdivider shall submit the "as built drawings» of the improvements along with the 
final plat map for review and action by the city_ In this case, no public improvement agreement 
is necessary save for certification that the subdivider shall provide the city with evidence of 
compliance with the one year warranty period as required in section 32--42, Warranty of 
Improvements. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2~10-97) 
Sec. 32-41. As built drawings. 
Upon completion of the construction and prior to the acceptance by the city of the required 
public improvements, the developer shall submit to the city engineer a set of "as built 
drawings" which accurately depict the grade, alignment size and other pertinent features of 
the installation as actually constructed. Said ··as built drawings" shall be stamped by an 
engineer licensed to practice in the state of Idaho who shall certify that the drawings 
accurately depict the installation as actually constructed. The city of Lewiston shall not accept 
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the improvements for public maintenance or ownership without said "as built drawings." (Ord. 
No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-42. Warranty of improvements. 
Upon completion of the required public improvements and prior to the acceptance of said 
improvements by the city, the developer shall provide to the city as written warranty that the 
improvements shall perform as designed for a period of one (1) year. Any flaw or defect found 
or encountered within the year warranty period shall be the financial responsibility of the 
developer who shall promptly repair said flaw or defect to the satisfaction of the city and shall 
provide an additional warranty period for the repair as specified by the city engineer, said 
additional warranty period not to exceed one (1) year in duration. (Ord. No. 4 i 77, § 1, 2-10-
97) 
Sec. 32-43. Grading and erosion control during construction. 
Construction grading and erosion control during construction shall conform !o city standards 
as prepared by the city engineer and adopted by the city council. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-
97) 
Sec. 32-44. Construction and inspection. 
(a) Prior to the construction or installation of any required public improvements for water 
supply or sewerage systems, for any site grading, construction of storm water detention 
systems or parking areas, the developer shall apply for and receive the appropriate permits 
from the city of Lewiston for said improvements. 
(b) All relocation, tiling, and reconstruction of irrigation facilities shall be constructed to 
standards of the owning utility and the city engineer. 
(c) All improvements in the public right-of-way shall be constructed under the inspection and 
approval of the city department having jurisdiction. 
(d) All underground utilities to be installed in streets shall be constructed prior to the 
surfacing of such sireets. Service stubs to platted lots within the subdivision shall be placed to 
such length as not to necessitate disturbance of street improvements when service 
connections are made. If connected to a city-owned system, application and fee shaH be the 
responsibility of the subdivider in accord with city requirements. (Ord. No. 4177, § I, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-45. Required improvements. 
The subdivider shall design and construct all improvements in conformance with adopted 
city standards and codes. Should unique conditions exist such that these standards cannot 
reasonably be met, the subdivider may petition the council for amendments to the specific 
standard. Said request for amendment shall be accompanied by an engineering report which 
identifies the standard proposed and the reasons justifying such request. 
The subdivider is responsible for the design and installation of !he following improvements: 
(a) Streets and alleys. All streets and alleys within the subdivision shall be graded and 
surfaced to cross-sections, grades and standards approved by the city engineer. Where there 
are existing streets adjacent to the subdivision, subdivision streets shall be improved, and, if 
necessary, feathered to the center of such existing streets. Dead-end streets serving more 
than four(~) lots shafl be provided a graded and surfaced temporary turning circle. 
A traffic report may be required to document the traffic impacts of the subdivision; the 
subdivider shall be responsible for the installation of both off-site and on-site improvements 
recommended in the traffic report. 
(b) Curbs. Portland cement concrete curb and gutter or roll curb, as designated by the city 
engineer, shall be installed in accordance with approved city standards. 
(c) Sidewalks. Portland cement concrete sidewalks shall be required on all streets in all 
zones. They shall be constructed to a width, line, and grade approved by the city engineer in 
accordance with approved city standards. Where unique topographical characteristics exist 
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and the installation of sidewalks is not practical, the commission may recommend that certain 
portions of sidewalks within the subdivision be waived. 
(d) Pedestrian and bicycle ways. Pedestrian and bicycle ways shall be constructed to a line 
and grade approved by the city engineer. Paving, fencing, and/or landscaping may be 
required by the commission as recommended by the subdivision committee. Appropriate 
means shafl be provided to prevent the use of the pedestrian ways as thoroughfares for 
bicycles and motorcycles. 
(e) Storm drainage. Proper and adequate provision shall be made for disposal of storm 
waters; this shall apply equally to grading of private properties and to public streets. Existing 
watercourses shall be maintained and dedicated as drainage ways. The type, extents, 
location, and capacity of drainage facilities shall be determined for the individual subdivision 
by the engineer for approval by the city engineer and shaH be constructed in accordance with 
approved city standards. 
(f) Sanitary sewage disposal. Sewage disposal facilities shall be installed to serve each lot 
and shall be subject to the following standards and approvals: 
(1) Individual systems may be constructed only in areas not reasonably accessible to a 
public sewer system, and then, only when the following conditions are met, to the satisfaction 
of the state department of health and welfare and subject to the approval of the pubic works 
administrator: · 
a. Soil absorptivity is adequate for drainfields. 
b. Construction complies with approved standards for sewerage systems. 
c. Location of septic tanks and seepage pits or leach lines or disposal beds in 
relation to property lines, buildings. water supply wells and water lines are acceptable to the 
department. Location shall be such that efficient and economical connection can be made to a 
future public sewer. 
d. Lots of one (I) acre and larger. 
(2) Public sanitary sewers shall be installed in areas which are reasonably accessible 
to an existing sewer system and shall be constructed to plans, profiles, and specifications 
approved by the state department of health and welfare and city departments having 
jurisdiction. 
(3) ln areas where public sanitary sewers are not reasonably accessible, but where the 
city, or independent sewer district having jurisdiction, agrees to provide temporary disposal of 
sewage, or where an engineering design for a sewer system for the area in which the 
subdivision is located has been adopted by the city, the subdivider shall plan and construct 
sewers within and for the subdivision for connection with a future public system. 
(g) Water supply. Each lot shall be supplied with potable water in sufficient volume and 
pressure for domestic use and adequate water, in pressure and volume, for fire protection, in 
accordance with city standards. 
(h) Monuments. Permanent monuments shall be installed in accordance with current city 
standards at all corners, angle points, points of curve, and at all intersections. After all 
improvements have been installed, an Idaho registered land surveyor shall check the location 
of monuments and certify their accuracy and conformance to Idaho Code, Section 50-1303. 
(i) Lot comers. I ron pipe or pins shall be set at all corners, angle points, and points of curve 
for each lot within the subdivision prior to the recording of the plat in conformance with Idaho 
Code, Section 50-1303. 
0) Utilities. 
(1) The subdivider shall be responsible for the requirements of this section and shall 
make the necessa1y arrangements with each of the serving utility companies involved for the 
installation of underground utilities. Letters from each of the serving utility companies 
indicating that such arrangements have been made shall be submitted to the city engineer at 
the time the final plat is submitted for approval. 
(2) New utility lines, including, but not limited to, electric, communication, and 
television transmission lines, shall be installed underground in accordance with the standards 
of the current edition of the National Electric Safety Code. \/Vhen facilities are installed in the 
public right-of-way, the location shall be approved by the city engineer. 
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(3) When overhead utility lines exist within the property being platted, said existing 
lines shall be removed and replaced by new underground installations. 
(4) When overhead utility lines exist on the periphery of the property being platted, said· 
existing lines and any additions or improvements needed to increase capacity or improve 
service reliability may remain overhead. New service drops from said overhead lines into the 
platted area shall be placed underground. 
(5) When. as a result of the subdivision development. it is necessary to relocate, 
renew, or expand existing facilities within the platted area, the subdivider shall arrange with 
the serving utility for the installations to be placed underground. 
{6) The subdivider shall arrange with the serving utility for, and be responsible for the 
cost of. underground service lines to approved street light locations a specified in subsection 
(k) of this section. 
(7) When, due to subsurface soil conditions, rock. and/or other special conditions, it is 
determined by the city engineer that it is impractical to construct facilities underground, the 
planning and zoning commission may recommend approval of the overhead installation of 
facifities. 
(8) Those electrical transmission lines of greater than three thousand (3,000) kva 
(kilovolt-amperes), as rated by the American Standards Association, are excluded from the 
requirements of this section. 
(k) Street lights. 
(1) In all subdivisions or commercial or industrial developments, street lights and their 
required electrical service lines shall be installed as directed by the public works administrator. 
The street light type, size and locations shall be indicated on the approved construction plans 
and specifications. All fixtures, poles, conduit and other facilities shall meet the specifications 
and standards of the utility providing service. 
(2) If required, the developer will reimburse the city for all installation costs and 
monthly street light service fees in accordance with the current utility provider fee schedule 
and the subdivision improvement agreement, until such time as the subdivision or 
development is approved and accepted by the city council. 
(3) Once the subdivision or development has been approved and accepted by the city 
council. the monthly street light service cost wilt be borne by the city. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-iD 
-97) 
Sec. 32-46. Review fee and approval of construction plans. 
A fee for review of the construction plans shatl be paid to the city prior to the time review of 
the plans is conducted by city personnel. The review fee shall be in the amount set forth in 
section 32-7 of this chapter. {Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
ARTICLE XI GUARANTEE OF CONSTRUCTION 
Sec. 32-47, Public improvement agreement. 
(a) Agreement between city and subdivider. Prior to the approval by the city council of the 
final plat. the subdivider shall execute an agreement between himself and the city which shaH 
be revlewed and approved by the city attorney and shall address the following points: 
(1) Planned increments of improvements: The subdivision improvements may be 
constructed in practical increments of lots, as specified by the subdivider, subject to provisions 
for satisfactory drainage. traffic movements, and other services as determined by the city 
engineer. 
(2) Planned construction schedule: The improvements, including those specified in 
section 32-450) of this chapter, shall be completed wrthin an agreed upon time period for each 
increment, provided that an extension of time may be granted under such conditions as may 
be specified in the agreement. 
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(3) Adherence to approved plans and city construction standards: The improvements, 
except for those specified in section 32-45(j) of this chapter, shall be completed in accordance 
with the plans approved by the city engineer. 
(4) Abandoned or uncompleted improvements: Any work abandoned or not con!pleted 
by the subdivider may be completed by the city, and the city shall recover the costs thereof 
from the subdivider or his surety. 
(5) Inspection of completed work: Construction of all improvements within streets and 
easements, except those utility facilities specified in section 32-450) of this chapter, shall be 
subject to inspection by the city engineer. A fee may be charged for this inspection. (Ord. No. 
4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
Sec. 32-48. Financial guarantee of construction. 
(a) To reasonably insure construction of the required improvements, as set forth in Chapter 
32, Ariicle IX of this code, except for those utility facilities specified in section 32-450) of this 
chapter, the subdivider shall post with the city prior to the recording of the final plat, one or a 
combination of the following, which shall be subject to review and approval of the city attorney: 
(1) A performance and completion bond executed by a surety company authorized to 
do business in the state of Idaho; 
(2) Cash; or 
(3) An appropriate agreement between the applicable title insurance and trust 
company or a city-approved financial institution and the city of Lewiston committing the 
amount referred to in subsection (b) of this section for installing said improvements. 
(b) For each subdivision increment, the total amount posted by methods (1), (2), and/or (3) 
above shall be equal to one hundred thirty-five (135) percent of the entire estimated costs of 
installing the said improvements, the engineering and inspection costs for that increment, and 
the cost of replacement or repair of any existing streets or improvements damaged by the 
subdivider in the course or development of the subdivision, except for those utility facilities 
specified in section 32-450) of this chapter. All public improvements for which a financial 
security has been provided pursuant to this section shall be constructed within one (1) year 
after the city council approval of the subdivision improvement agreement. In the event the 
improvements are not constructed by the subdivider within one (1) year as herein provided, 
the city shall have the authority to execute on the financial security to construct the public 
improvements. 
(c) There shall be no lots released for sale from the indicated increment of lots until either 
the bond, cash, or agreement referred to above has been posted with and accepted by the 
city clerk and a written statement issued by the city clerk to the title company within five (5) 
working days of receiving the agreement that the requirements of subsection (b) of this 
section have been met. 
(1) No construction of residential units shall be permitted until all required public 
improvements have been accepted by the city and/or other serving utility and the approved 
plat has been filed by the city in the courthouse. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10~97; Ord. No. 4518, 
§ 1, 11-24-08) 
ARTICLE XII MODIFICATION 
Sec. 32-49. Modifications generally. 
(a) Where there exist extraordinary conditions of topography, land ownership, adjacent 
development, or other circumstances not provided for in these regulations, and where it can 
be shown that the public interest would be best served by such action, the council may modify 
the application of these regulations in a particular case in such a manner and to such an 
extent as it may deem appropriate for public health, welfare, or safety. 
(b) When modification of these regulations, as provided for in subsection (a), is considered 
necessary, the subdivider or the subdivision committee shall make application to the planning 
and zoning commission specifying the desired modifications and the reasons therefor. The 
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commission shall consider the application and justification and make a recommenda!lon 
!hereon to the council, who may approve, approve in part, or disapprove the request. 
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(c) In modifying the standards or requirements of these provisions as outlined above, the 
council may make such additional requirements as appear necessary, in its judgment, to 
secure substantially the objectives of the standards or requirements so modified. (Ord. No. 
4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
ARTICLE Xlll PROHIBITION AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF CHAPTER 
Sec. 32-50. Prohibition against circumvention of chapter generally. 
No person, firm, corporation, or other legal entity shall, for the purpose of circumventing any 
of the provisions of this chapte~. hereafter sell, or offer for sale any lot, piece, or parcel of iand 
which is within a subdivision as defined in section 32A of this chapter without having first 
recorded a plat thereof in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 
2-10-97) 
ARTICLE XIV VIOLATIONS, PENALTIES, AND REMEDIES 
Sec. 32-51. Violations, penalties and remedies generally. 
(a) Any person or any member or officer of any firm, corporation, or other legal entity who 
violates any provision of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction 
thereof, may be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars ($300.00) or by 
imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Each 
day that a violation is permitted to exist shall constitute a separate offense. The imposition of 
any sentence shall not exempt the offender from compliance with the requirements of these 
regulations. 
(b) The violation of any provision of this chapter is hereby declared to be a public nuisance. 
In addition to any other remedy, either criminal or civil, provided by this chapter or by the Jaws 
of the state of Idaho, any condition existing in violation of any provision of this chapter may be 
abated by action in law or equity before any court of competent jurisdiction. (Ord. No. 4177, § 
1, 2-1 0-97) 
ARTICLE XV VALIDITY OF THE CHAPTER 
Sec. 32-52. Validity of the chapter. 
Severability If any provision of this chapter is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any 
other provision which can be given effect wlthout the invalid provision, and. to this end, the 
provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-1 0-97) 
Sec. 32-53. Effective date. 
This chapter shall take effect and be ln force from and after its passage, approval, and 
publication. (Ord. No. 4177, § 1, 2-10-97) 
4:ditor's note- Ord. 4177, § 1, adopted 2-10-97, extensively renumbered this chapter. As a 
result, the following ordinances are still codified in this chapter but have been removed from 
the history notes: Ord. No. 3430, §§ 100- 900, adopted Mar. 20, 1978; Ord. No. 3472, §§ 1, 
2, adopted Nov. 6, 1978; Ord. No. 3474, §§ 1-5, adopted Nov. 6, 1978; Ord. No. 3555, § 1, 
adopted Dec. 8, 1980; Ord. No. 3736, § 1, adopted May 7, 1984; Ord. No. 3745, §§ 1- 12, 
adopted Feb. 19, 1985; Ord. No. 3772, § 1, adopted May 20, 1985; Ord. No. 3785, §§ 1 - 3, 
adopted July 15, 1985; Ord. No. 3980, § 1, adopted Sept. 10, 1990; Ord. No. 4057, §§ 1-4, 
adopted Dec. 7, 1992; Ord. No. 4070, § 1, adopted Apr. 19, 1993; and Ord. No. 4132, § 1, 
adopted June 26, 1995.Cross references- Buildings and bull ding regulations, Ch. 1 0; 
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erectricity, Ch. 14; fire protection and prevention, Ch. 15; flood insurance, Ch. 16; garbage, 
rubbish and weeds, Ch. 17; gas, Ch. 18; manufactured homes and tourist facilities, Ch. 23; 
oil burning equipment, Ch. 25; parks and recreation, Ch. 25; plumbing, Ch. 27; poles and 
wires, Ch. 28; signs, Ch. 30; public right-of-way, Ch. 31; swimming pools, Ch. 33; traffic, Ch. 
35; water and sewers, Ch. 36; zoning, Ch. 37.State law reference- Plats and vacations, 
Idaho Code, § 50-1301 et seq. 
This page of the Lewiston City Code is current through 
Ordinance 4546, passed May 24, 2010. 
Disclaimer: The Oty derk's Office has the official version of the 
Lewiston City Code. Users should contact the City Clerk's Office for 
ordinances passed subsequent to the ordinance cited above. 
City Website: http:(fwww.cityoflewlston.org/ 
(http: I jwww. cityoflewiston. org/) 
City Telephone: (208) 746-3571 
Code Publishing Company 
(http://www .codepublishing .com/) 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 




.0/28/201L FRI 16:55 FJ>..X 208 8 593 
EXHIBIT 3 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
10/28/2011 FRI 16:55 FAX 20ll 
Page 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single 









Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. ) 
Streibick, deceased, 
LEWISTON, a municipal 
CITY OF 
corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employee, 
LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City of 
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1 Lewiston? 
2 A. I don't know that 
3 Q. If, if it were true that Exhibit 125 is, in 
4 fact, a part of a subdivision file and was placed in 
5 that file by a former city engineer, whom I think name 
6 appears there, Tim Richard, city engineer, would you 
7 expect that that information would be helpful in the 
8 process of subdividing that particular lot at issue? 
9 MR. ADAMS: Objection, form. 
10 A. 1 can't answer that question. 
11 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) You don't tb.in.k that --you 
12 can't answer that that information would be helpful in a 
13 subdivision process? 
14 A. No, I can't. 
15 MR. ADAMS: Objection. 
16 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Why can't you? 
17 A. Because it depends on a lot of things that are 
18 going on. 
19 Q. Okay. Would it depend on whether or not that 
20 problem got fixed? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Would it depend on whether or not that issue 
23 was studied adequately so it was understood why there 
24 was a landslide that occurred there? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. What would it depend on? 
2 A. I think, in my opinion, it depends on where 
3 this is in relationship to other developments. It could 
4 be thirty years later. I don't know. I can't go back 
5 forty years and look at what's going on. I mean, 
6 that -because of staff time and everything else that 
7 we do, we're limited to what we can do. 
8 Q. What if it was six years before a subdivision 
9 was approved? 
10 A. I couldn't answer that. For me, if it was 
11 myself, no. 
12 Q. It wouldn't be, it wouldn't be indicative of 
13 information that you would want to be considered in a 
14 subdi'\>jsion --
15 A. lfl --
16 Q. -process? 
17 A. --knew about it, yes. But if I didn't, how am 
18 I supposed to know to go back. 
19 Q. So if you knew about it at the time, that's 
20 what rrn asking, at the time a subdivision application 
21 was made for this site, wouldn't this information have 
22 been helpful to an understanding of, of how that site 
23 should be developed? 
24 A. It's possible. 




















































looking at other factors at that site, too, would you 
not, including things like the grade of the slope? 
MR. ADA.M.S: Objection, fmm. 
A. It's possible. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And you'd probably be ing 
at other issues at that site, including things like 
existing drainage improvements? 
MR. ADAMS: Same objection. 
A. I guess, rm sorry, I wouldn't be looking at 
them. 
Q. (BY 11R. LANDECK) Would the City of Lewiston in 
its subdivision review process be well advised to be 
looking at them in order to better understand the 
potential slope stability questions at that site? 
MR. ADAMS: Same objection. 
A. No. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) You don't think so? 
A. No. 
Q. So, they should ignore it then? 
A. No. 
Q. I mean, it's not important, is that what you're 
saying? 
A. No. 
MR ADA.M.S: Object to form. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Well, what are you-- I don't 
Page 19 
understand what you're saying. 
A. I'm answering your question. 
Q. What is the importance of that information in a 
subdivision review process, timely --let's say a 
six-year sequence from the time of the occurrence that 
is reported in that document to the application that's 
made to subdivide property for residential use? 
11R. ADAMS: Objection, fonn. 
A. I would, ifl knew about this document or a 
document like it, I would pass it on to a potential 
developer. ¥ 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Okay. And in the -- I think ~ 
in the subdivision review process, there is a portion of 
that process where the City is to review and discuss 
with the developer the need, the potential need for 
special studies, and I'm reading from the Lewiston code, 
which is section 32-9(E). The need for special studies, 
which may include but are not limited to slope 
stability. Wouldn't you say that that information would 
be the type of information that this code section states 
should be discussed between the City and the developer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has anyone explained to you why that document 
did not get disclosed to the developer? 
A. No. 
Page 20 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT oP PJiAjN5ftFF~ 7 to 2 0) 
cleariwater R~fJj.blON TO RECONSIDER MEMO~-<~})JJ4Whl48>PINION AND ORDER ON Lewiston, ID 83501 
ofWA&ID DtECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT bud@clearwaterreporting.com 
9o6-#ir 



















































Q. Have you asked anyone on your staff to explain 







Q. Do you think it's not important that you know 5 
why that did not happen? 6 
MR ADAMS: Objection, fom1. 7 
A. It wasn't an issue for me. 8 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Wouldn't it be an issue if 9 
you felt something like this could occur again? 1 0 
MR. ADAMS: I'm going to object as to possible 11 
remedial measures. 12 
MR DAVIES: I'm sorry, could you repeat the 13 
question? 14 
Q. (BY 1v1R LANDECK) Well, just in general terms, 15 
for the City's sake and the developer's sake, any 1 6 
developer's sake, wouldn't it be important to try to 1 7 
rectify a situation like this, where an important bit of 18 
information was not passed on to a, a developer? 1 9 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, fonn, foundation, 2 0 
remedial measures. 21 
A. Generally speaking, I would say that if we know 2 2 
information, we should tell people about it. That's our 23 
job. 24 
Q. (BY MR LA:NUECK) I guess what I'm asking about 2 S 
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is sort of the recordkeeping system here. It appears 1 
that the record that is being kept by the City was kept, 2 
but it was kept to itself So, I'm suggesting, I guess, 3 
that the problem that would need addressing is, are you 4 
going to let this happen again? 5 
MR ADAMS: Objection, fonn, foundation. 6 
A. That's your opinion that it's being kept to 7 
itself. I can't answer that question. 8 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) So, you're not aware of any 9 
involvement by the engineering, the city engineer in the 1 0 
processing of grading and filling permits, is that what 11 
you said earlier? 12 
A. I can't answer that. I have to go back You'd 13 
have to.... 14 
Q. Well, do you know -- I'll ask it again then, in 15 
case I've missed this question. Does your department 16 
have any role in the processing of grading and filling 17 
permits ·within the City ofLe\viston? 18 
A. No. 19 
Q. Does your department have anything to do with 2 0 
grading and filling ofland within the City of Lewiston? 21 
A. I believe so, yes. 2 2 
Q. And what, what do you have in that regard? 2 3 
A. I can't answer that. I know that we overview 2 4 
it and oversee it. 2 5 
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Q. Oversee "it", meaning grading and filling by 
developers? 
A. With respect to public right of way. 
Q. And not with respect to grading and filling on 
private property? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you aware of the decisions that are 
presc1ibed, that the Lewiston City Code prescribes be 
made by the city engineer as to whether or not a 
subdivision review will be by administrative plat or 
full plat? 
A. No. 
Q. If the city engineer, in fact, is responsible 
for that, do you - would Mr. Stubbers be the person to 
ask about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you aware of the Lewiston City Code 
provision that allows the engineer, city engineer to 
make decisions as to whether or not special studies are 
done for slope stability when slopes succeed ten percent 
in grade? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you oversee any mapping work that's done by 
your department? 
A. I'm not-- you would have to define mapping. 
Q. Mapping flood planes. 
A. No. 
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Q. Mapping site, special site conditions, hazards? 
A. No. 
Q. Mapping drainage, natural drainage ways? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And what is that, what occurs there in 
your, within your department as to that? 
A. I can't answer that. 
Q. Who does that? 
A. Shawn Stubbers would know. 
Q. Do you know of specific examples in which Sha\•m 
Stubbers has mapped natural drainage ways? 
A. No. 
Q. It's just something you know that he's done, is 
that what you're saying? 
A. It's under his purview. 
Q. Is that done in connection with any particular 
activity such as subdivision applications, building 
permit applications or other? 
A. It would be under storm drainage, and then for 
no other purpose than that that I'm aware of. 
Q. And what would be the purpose of the mapping in 
regard to stom1 drainage? 
A. To identify where our existing system is and 
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1 working on is here but tl1e entire ground is all greater 1 
2 than ten percent You see, so there was those kinds of 2 
3 two extremes. 3 
4 Q. Okay. 4 
5 A. And not - and I know there's been discussions. 5 
6 I was involved in some of those discussions. The terms 6 
7 slope and ten percent, right, you're trying to match up 7 
8 slope and ten percenl Is it-- is it true slope in the 8 
9 sense of- it's an engineering term again. But people 9 
10 use slope as referring to let's say like, like let's use 10 
11 this case here, they use slope and to talk about the 11 
12 portion of, of Canyon Greens that's on the north side, 12 
13 right, it slopes do\vn into the, the drainage area, okay. 13 
14 That is a tenn for slope. Slope is also just rise over 14 
15 mn in the mathematical sense and but it gets used 15 
16 differently when it's the entire ground is sloped, okay, 16 
17 w:ith a, like I want to put a D on the end, it's sloped, 17 
18 right. So it's sloped, and that was some of the 18 
19 discussions. I recall having some of those discussions. 19 
20 So in some of those other projects r think you can go 20 
21 see them. It's where the entire ground was sloped 21 
22 greater than ten percent and where we had just small 22 
23 little ditches and things were over ten percent. Now to 23 
24 get those specific examples I'd have to go, you know, 24 
25 into files. You see what I mean. 25 
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1 Q. That's fine. What I'm trying to figure out is 1 
2 whether you believe the City engineer has discretion to 2 
3 require a slope stability analysis if the slope is 3 
4 greater than ten percent or if they do not? 4 
5 MR. LANDECK: fm going to object to form in 5 
6 that this talks about average slope not just slope. 6 
7 A. I would answer your question, yes, the City 7 
8 engineer has discretion as to whether to ask for it or 8 
9 not ask for it, and the reason I say that, it has not 9 
1 0 been uniformly applied. 1 0 
11 Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. Thank you. Do you know 11 
1 2 if there was anybody at the City when the Sunset 12 
1 3 Palisades number eight plat was in the process of being · 1 3 
14 approved that had knowledge of the slope failure within 14 
15 the area of Sunset Palisades number eight at the time it 15 
16 was-- the approval process was going on? 16 
17 A. No. 17 
18 Q. Same question for Canyon Greens. 18 
19 A. At the time the plat was being processed. 1 9 
20 Q. Right. 20 
2 1 A. No. I mean, L. 2 1 
2 2 Q. And same question for the building permits for 2 2 
2 3 153, 155 and 159 Marine View Drive. 2 3 
2 4 A. Yeah. I mean, no one has brought that forward 2 4 
2 5 No one had any discussion with me, and so rm not-- 2 5 
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I'm just -- r don't know of anybody. 
Q. Okay. Why should the City have had knowledge 
of the 1999 slope movement at the time of the approvals 
of Sunset Palisades number eight, Canyon Greens, the 
building pennits7 
A. Oh. 
MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn. 
A. The reason I think they should, when I read the 
article that John brought to me and it said in there, 
and it has the City engineer being quoted; it has the 
public works director being quoted. LAnd they say, and 
we'll see that this doesn't - something to the effect, 
we'll see that this doesn't get built upon or we'll see 
that - there's some connotation in that artkle of 
recognition of the issue and that they would take care 
of it in the future. 
Q. (BY MR .• ADAMS) All right. Do you know if 
either of those two people was employed by the City at 
the time of the approval process for Sunset Palisades 
number eight, Canyon Greens or the building pennits for 
153, 155 and 159 Marine View Drive? 
A. Going in time frame, they may have been there 
at Sunset Palisades eight but certainly not the rest of 
them, and I wouldn't know without looking back at their 
dates of employment. 
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Q. Okay. Now, do you know if those people had 
authority to bind the City to future acts? 
MR. LANDECK: . Object to fonn. "Those people." 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Sony. Either the City 
engineer who made the comment, and do you remember that 
person's name? 
A. I think it was Tim Richards. 
Q. Okay. Do you know if Tim Richards had the 
authority in 1999 or at the time he made the comment to 
bind the City to a future act? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
A. I don't know the City's exact rules and what 
they live by but he let me tell you tllis, we're talking 
about something that's life safety. We're talking about 
public welfare, and it's a licensed engineer working for 
the City of Lewiston. I think he has an obligation to 
bring forward those things that have potential harm or 
cause of harm to -- that would be in conflict of public 
welfare and safety. So in that regard, both Bud Van 
Stone, another licensed engineer, and Tim Richards, it's 
a responsibility that I tllink, yes, they do have that 
responsibility. 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. And do you know if they 
put information regarding that slope movement in the 
Sunset Palisades number four file? 
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MR. LANDECK: I object to form. 1 what happened here. But why wouldn't they? Why 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Let me ask it a more specific 
question. If this document was in the Sunset Palisades 
number four file --
2 wouldn't you try to find all available infonnation? 
3 You're creating things in a file. No one can predict 
4 where the future is going. You're asking us to crystal 
:MR. LANDECK: What document is that? 5 ball a little bit with infonnation we know today. Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Sorry. Exhibit No. 29, I 
apologize. Thank you. What responsibility does the 
City have to look at Sunset Palisades number four file 
when dealing with are-subdivision of Sunset Palisades 
number four? 
6 But, if, in fact, you are re-subdividing property, why 
7 not look back to see if there's any issues in there. 
8 Why not look for all available infom1ation. You carmot 
9 get to a good conclusion, a good solution without having 
10 all available information, without putting that all 
A. I would answer that in the antonym. Why put a 
note in the file? \Vhy say that there's a hazard? Why 
even put it in the file? You're putting it in the file 
for-- we do work for a purpose, right. We do-- we 
create things for a purpose. And so, why was it put in 
the file? You see. It becomes the question of trying 
to answer that I think they're putting it in there, 
11 together and saying, is there anything in there that 
12 makes me want to study it further, go deeper into the 
1 3 problem, look more into it. It's a - in that sense, 
14 this work is, it's very tedm.ical, and-- and requires 
15 that due diligence to go find those answers. 
1 6 Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) I don't know if that answers my 
1 7 question, so I'm going to ask it another way. In making 
and as I can only-- I can only look at tllis document, 
and l can only read the newspaper. And when they say to 
deal with it in the future kind of thing. So I can only 
conjecture. So it seems to me that Tim being-- and 1 
like Tim. 1 think he's a very reasonable thinking 
18 the detemlination whether or not to look at an old fiie 
19 when doing a re-subdivision, would the City have to deal 
2 0 or address concerns and 12ke into account considerations 
21 regarding available manpower to do that? 
2 2 MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn. 
person. I think he thinks very well engineering-wise. 2 3 A. Certainly. Everyone has limitations. 
If Tim was to say, I'm putting a note in the file to be 2 4 Q. (BY MR ADAMS) Okay. 
dealt with in the future, I would say that Tim 2 5 A. But they should at least-- they should review 
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unden>tands how the system works and he's doing that so 1 
that it can be taken care of or dealt with. So he has 2 
the unden;tanding that-- that that file is used by 3 
somebody, that this will come back up. TI1at this will, 4 
as he says, deal with it in the future. 5 
Q. Is it within the City's discretion to detennine 6 
whether or not to review an existing subdivision file 7 
when creating a new file for are-subdivision of the 8 
sameland? 9 
MR. LANDECK: Can you restate that question? 1 0 
MR. ADAMS: Can you read it back? 11 
THE REPORTER: Sure. 12 
(Whereupon, the court reporter read back the 13 
previous question.) 14 
A. You know, and the reason that is -- 1 5 
MR. LANDECK: I'm going to object to the form. 16 
A. The reason I have some difficulty having some 17 
clear discussions of this in the sense of this, I take 1 8 
great care to see that we have dug out all available 19 
infom1ation to come to the right conclusion, okay. And 2 0 
sometimes, sometimes it's a little bump in the road. 21 
Sometimes it's a big bump in the road, okay. So, the 2 2 
part that, that is kind of- the part that is, is maybe 2 3 
missing, you're saying or is not there is, everybody 2 4 




Q. And that's fine. But the answer is, yes, that 
would be a consideration? 
A. To determine the amount of available manpower? 
Q. To look at an old file. 
MR. LANDECK: Object to the form. 
Q. (BY :MR. ADAMS) Well maybe l unden;tood your 
answer. I thought you said certainly. 
A. Here's how I understand your question. Your 
question was, should the City in trying to determine 
\Vhether to review an old file on a subdivision, on a 
re-subdivision plat consider the man hours that it takes 
to do that. 
Q. No. There's a difference between man hours and 
manpower, and I'll try it a different way. In dealing 
with are-subdivision or re-subdivision process, is it a 
consideration for the City in detem1ining how much 
research can be done including looking at old files 
whether or not there's sufficient manpower available or 
man hours? And we'll just use your word, man hours 
available. 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
Q. (BY :MR. ADAMS) Is it a consideration? 
A. In my world or the City's world? If you're 
asking me in my world, I would tell you, I haven't seen 
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Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you the same questions 1 
with regard to a couple of other considerations. Do you 2 
bdieve tl1at there is a consideration, that the City has 3 
a consideration with regard to searching background 4 
infonnation about a subdivision with regard to training 5 
of city employees, whether or not they have sufficient 6 
training to look through the files? Do you know? 7 
A. Do I know if the City trained the personnel? 8 
Sorry, rmjust.... 9 
Q. That's not my question. Let me try again. 1 0 
A. Yes. 11 
Q. Is there a consideration with regard to l 2 
availability of sufficient trained personnel to research 13 
all the available infonnation? 14 
MR. LANDECK: Object to the fom1. 15 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) With regard to a subdivision? 16 
A. Is there consideration; I would say yes. I 1 7 
think part of them being hired for that specific 18 
purpose. 19 
Q. Do you know if iliere are any budgetary 2 0 
considerations that ilie City has to deal with when 21 
making the decision of, related to bow much background 22 
searching it can do v-rith regard to a subdivision? 2 3 
MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn. 2 4 
A. l know the City has budgetary concems. I know 2 5 
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that the-- that there has been discussions about how 
much engineering time fue corwnunity development uses. I 
do not know specifically about budgetary concerns with 
respect to researching documents or doing the background 
checks. I, I don't know what ilie City does to true up 
their business, right Their business that, of what it 
is iliat they do here, has to have decisions made, and 
they make those internally. 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) But you don't know whether or 
not -- you have no personal knowledge of whether or not 
there are budgetary concerns with regard to decisions 
about how much background information can be searched? 
A. Right 
Q. With regard to a subdivision? 
A. Right 
Q. Okay. Is it your opinion- rm looking at the 
last sentence of your, of your report-- the flrst 
paragraph of your report. 
A. Yes. 
Q. \Vhich is Exhibit 275. Is it your opinion that 
the City should disclose every bit of information wiili 
regard to a piece of property before approving a 
subdivision or a building permit? 
A. I think the City should disclose every piece of 



























development of that property. 
Q. Okay. \Vho makes the decision what is relevant 
to the orderly and safe-- and l apologize ifl get it 
wrong-- development offue property? 
A. It's City persormeL 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's doing that. And, and we get judged by 
the future, I mean, right? 
Q. So, so the decision about what is relevant to 
the orderly and safe development of property is based 
on, what do you mean by the future? 
A. \Vell, let me say it this way, in this case 
specifically we have in the article Tim Richards saying, 
I'm going to put something in the file, right, to deal 
with it in the future. 
Q. And was it put in the file? 
A. I- what 1 hear from John is, yes, and he 
found something in ilie file. 
Q. Okay. So it's not that it wasn't put in the 
file, correct? 
A. No. 1 think your question was, how will we be 
judged in the future. 
Q. Righl 
A. Right And I fuink, I think we all can say 
what has happened here on this property should not have 
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happened, and I would say that. It should not have 
happened. 
Q. Was it foreseeable that it would happen? 
A. Looking at this article it certainly appears 
that it was, iliat they had knowledge, that they tried to 
document it, iliat they tried to preserve this 
infonnation for people to be able to use it in the 
future. 
Q. And that's not my exact question. J guess I 
should be more specific. It was foreseeable in 1999 
that John Block would have three houses on the property 
tl1at would be damaged due to slope movement? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn. 
A. No. That's why it's even more important, 
because every city, every city in America- Lewiston is 
going to be some size bigger than what it is. We're 
going to continue to develop and grow and become bigger. 
We, we be1ieve that. We plan for iliat. And I think-
and I think that is what he's talking about here. This 
is of, of great enough importance, right, but we're not 
talking about, hey, the curb has an issue, has a little 
chip in it and needs to be replaced. We're not talking 
about, oh, it's missing a water service that you're 
going to find out in the future. It's talking about 
something more detrimental. So in that sense, yes, he's 
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A. Let me say it a little differently. J was part 
ofthe decision process to put the detention pond down 
near the bottom, yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any reason to believe that 
the subdiv1sion plan for Canyon Greens was not prepared 
in substantial conformance with engineering or design 
standards at the time? 
A. Canyon Greens? 
Q. Canyon Greens, not Sunset Palisades number 
eight, Canyon Greens itself. 
A. Not Canyon Greens two? 
Q. I'm talking specifically about Canyon Greens. 
A. Okay. Was in conformance with .... 
Q. I'll reread it. It should be the exact same 
question. Do you have any reason to believe as you sit 
here today that the subdiv1sion plan for Canyon Greens 
was not prepared in substantial conformance with 
engineering or design standards at the time? 
A. No. Nothing leads me to believe that Canyon 
Greens was, now, not constructed, surveyed, right, the 
survey portion, right. 
Q. I'm talking about the subdivision plan. 
A. Yes. 
Q. TI1ere were--
A. Just want to make sure that we're clear on the 
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difference between when you -- when you create a 
subdivision that does not require engineering, right, 
when, when it's just surveying, our scope of work was to 
do the surveying, right. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That is the mathematical solutions of lots, 
putting that on the plat, putting pins in the ground, 
filing a map with the county. That's our scope of work 
There's not engineering, and, yes, I believe tl1at was in 
confonnance with the city. 
Q. With the appropriate standards at the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Is it your opinion, and I'm- I think 
this is part of paragraph number seven and maybe 1'11 
need to fmd which paragraph it is. I'm just wonde1ing 
if it's included within the opinions you've stated today 
whether the City should not have approved the 
subdivision plan for Sunset Palisades number eight? 
A. No. I think, I think the City's, the City's 
role is to approve them. The City's role is to bring 
fo:ward c.oncems, as the process works. You -- the City 
is going to develop - in order to develop there, there 
are- there are issues and things that need to be taken 
care of. Whether that is solving boundaries insofar as 
land discrepancies between adjacent landowners, if that 
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1 is all the way through engineering issues that may 
2 facilitate the orderly development of the City. 
3 Q. So, do you have any reason to conclude that the 
4. City should not have approved the plan as it ended up, 
5 the one that was ultimately approved for Sunset 
6 Palisades number eight? 
7 A. As we know today? 
8 Q. Yeah. 
9 A. I would say they should not have approved it or 
1 0 they should have put conditions, conditional approval. 
11 Q. Based on what we talked about earlier? 
12 MR LANDECK: I'll object to form. I don't 
13 !mow what that is. 
14 Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Sorry. Based on what we talked 
15 about earlier with regard to the detention pond? 
16 A. No, you're saying today. 
17 Q. Right. 
18 A. Today what we know is that there is slope 
19 failure occurring there, okay. So, today, as we know 
2 0 it, and if this plat was to come in to the City, let's 
21 just submit it today, I would expect to see, they would 
2 2 say slope failure is occurring on this property, please 
2 3 show us your remedy to take care of that as a note from 
2 4 them. TI1at's what I would expect today, using today's 
2 5 knowledge as if we were going to go out there and 
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1 subdivide it as we did Sunset Palisades number eight. 
2 Q. Okay. Using today's knowledge. Now what about 
3 using the knowledge that was available at the time 
4 Sunset Palisades number eight was approved? 
5 MR. LANDECK: Object to form. Available to 
6 whom? 
7 MR ADA.1\1S: Okay. I'm going to withdraw the 
8 question. 
9 Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Do you have any reason to 
1 0 believe that the City should not have approved the 
11 subdiv1sion plan for Canyon Greens? 
12 A. The thing that today? What I know today you 
13 mean? 
14 Q. The same question as ,,_cith regard to Sunset 
15 Palisades number eight. 
16 A. I would say this, knowing what 1 know that the 
17 City knew and that it was in their files, tl1ey had some 
18 infom1ation that a landslide has occurred, they should 
19 not have approved it or approved it-- well, they can 
2 0 approve it, approve it with conditions, okay. And those 
21 conditions would be to take care of the issues. And the 
2 2 issue I think that they knew or it was knovm was the 
2 3 landslide issue, and as a -- and as I have come to 
2 4 understand is in a note in a file in the City. 
2 5 Q. Okay. With regard to approving the Sunset 
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Palisades number eight subdivision, is it your opinion 1 
that the City acted with deliberate indifference to the 2 
harmful consequences that arose in this case? 3 
MR LANDECK: Object to form. 4 
A. Sorry. I don't quite understand that question. 5 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Do you have any opinion, and 6 
maybe I -- 1 didn't see it in your opinions so I'm 7 
asking you if you're going to provide an opinion with 8 
regard to whether the City acted \vith deliberate 9 
indifference to the harmful consequences, particularly 1 0 
the injuries that arose to Mr. Block, the damages, when 11 
the City approved the Sunset Palisades number eight 12 
subdivision? 13 
A. I think my answer to that is-- is this: When 14 
the Sunset Palisades subdivision was approved by the 1 5 
City, the City had a major issue regarding that property 16 
in a file in the -- in the City, which is the same place 1 7 
going to get the approval, that had concerns that should 18 
have been addressed to overt -- or to protect the public 1 9 
welfare and safety. To that end, yes, they should have 2 0 
brought that issue out. Okay. And so, they should not 21 
have approved Sunset Palisades number eight with having 2 2 
that knowledge. You know what I mean, with having that 2 3 
piece of paper in their file. 2 4 
Q. Let me ask a more general question, because it 2 5 
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1 might speed this up. Are you giving an opinion with 1 
2 regard to whether the City acted with gross negligence 2 
3 toward Mr. Block? 3 
4 MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 4 
5 A. Okay. Now, I have a tough time with the "gross 5 
6 negligence" part of that. But I would say this, the 6 
7 City has a piece of paper in a file thai's --that's 7 
8 registered to that property. It's their ftles. It's 8 
9 their information. It's information that would have 9 
1 0 been very helpful to me, very helpful to Mr. Block, very 1 0 
11 helpful to everyone that's sitting in this room today 11 
12 had it come known. They knew it prior to the approval 12 
13 of the subdivision, and all they would have to do is 13 
14 bring it out. I'm not sure what we would call that. 14 
15 Because, see, I don't have enough knowledge of who, 15 
1 6 where, and why it didn't happen or how it could have 16 
1 7 happened. But it seems to me where the City has the 17 
18 information, the City is doing the approval and it's in 18 
1 9 the City files and it's a major issue, enough so that 1 9 
2 0 they even put a letter in the file regarding it for the 2 0 
2 1 property, it just seems to me that, that they-- they're 21 
2 2 the ones of keeping it. They're the ones -- they're the 2 2 
2 3 ones that possess it. There isn't anyone else to go get 2 3 
2 4 it. It seems like they should have done something, yes. 2 4 
2 5 Q. (BY MR.. ADAMS) Okay. Now, you keep saying that 2 5 
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there wasn't-- well you don't keep saying it. I 
apologize. You just said there wasn't anyone else to go 
get it, and I think we've talked about this in the past 
TI1e City did not prevent anybody from finding this 
document, did they? 
A. It is-- it is under- it is under a 
restricted area. And now, I say that by the means of 
this, it is not open and fully available to the public. 
The City could, could take their files and they couid 
put them in a place and say, when you're coming in l 
would like you to go over those files and look thwugh 
everything that you can find about it and some cities do 
that. I worked for the City of San Diego. You can go 
research files. The public could come in and do that. 
The City of Lewiston does not do that. So these are 
files that are under the control of the City, and if you 
have to fill out a piece of paper asking for a specific 
document that seems a little restrictive to me, right. 
It's not free and available in that sense. So, so 
it's -- do they -- do they absolutely tell you, you 
cannot see that; no. They say, fill out a fonn, ten me 
exactly what you'd like to see, we'll go get that 
document. 
Q. And, hypothetically, could that request say, I 
would like to see the Sunset Palisades number four 
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subdivision file? 
A. 1 don't know. I don't know if they would al!ovi 
tbat if it wasn't that specific. I can just tell you 
this, from all of the work that I have done and going 
and getting infonnation from the City, I have never been 
able to look at any of those files. 
Q. Have you asked to look at tbe whole file? :1 
A. I recall one incident where, where Charlie 
Borcich brought the file out and he was looking in it 
but I was not able to look in it 
Q. And when was that? 
A. 1 don't remember, '93, '94. Could have been 
'96. Charlie was here for some time in there. 
Q. Okay. And I think you've answered my question 
so I'm going to move on to a new topic. 
Are you providing any opinion with regard to 
whether the City or it's employees intentional1y and 
knowingly created an umeasonable risk ofhann to Mr. 
Block or his properties? 
A. Boy, I would I would hope they would not ,1 
knowingly do that, but I don't have any information to 
tell me that they knowingly. But it would be -- other 
than tbe fact that that-- I would say this, they know 
it's in there and they're not going to tell me. They're 
going to review and they're not b1inging it up. They're 
Page 570 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPO!:?¥OF Pt<A~TIFP% to 57 0) 
ClearwaterRe~tiON TO RECONSIDER MEM~NJP-~OPINION AND ORDER ON Lewiston, ID 83501 
WA & ID LLcSECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT christya@qwestoffice.net 
1//p !!£51 
.0/28/2011 FRI 16:58 4593 
EXHIBIT 5 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
917~· 
-0/28/2011 FRI 16:58 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JuviCifi~ DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, 
JACK STREIBICK, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY 
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation 
of the State of Idaho, and its 
employee/ LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, City of 
Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
DEPOSITION OF TIMOTHY J. RICHARD 
SEPTEMBER 12, 2011 
REPORTED BY: 
MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 0 /2 8/2 0 11 FRI 16: 58 FAX 2 0 8 
Page 2 
Timothy J. Richard 9/12/2011 
1 THE DEPOSITION OF TIMOTHY J. RICHARD was taken 
2 on behalf of the Plaintiff at the offices of Anderson 
3 Julian & Hull, 250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700, Boise, 
4 Idaho, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on September 12, 2011, 
5 before 1'1onica M. Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
6 and Notary Public within and for the State of Idaho, in 
7 the above-entitled matter. 
8 
9 APPEJ:...RANCES : 
10 For the Plaintiff: 
11 LANDECK & FORSETH 
12 BY : MR . RONALD J. LANDECK 
13 693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
14 P.O. Box 9344 
15 Moscow, Idaho 83843 
16 
17 For the Defendants: 
18 ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
19 BY: MR. STEPHEN L. ADAMS 
20 C.W. Moore Plaza 
21 250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
22 P.O. Box 7426 




MCWIOOWSKECONSIDE~MEN1er&'NJ5~R(5PffutM'A:Nb OIU)ER ON 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
10/28/2011 FRI 16:58 FAX 208 883 4593 
Page 10 (Pages 34-37) 
Timothy J. Richard 9/12/2011 
Page 34 
photograph provided by Terry Howard, P.E., of Strata 
2 showing slope movement in Sunset Palisades No.4 
3 Subdivision. This photo was received from Terry Howard 
4 on 3-26-99." 
5 ls that information that you put on this 
6 document? 
7 A. r have no reason to doubt that. 
8 Q. Is that consistent with your recollection of 
9 those events? 
10 A. Yes, sir. 
11 Q. What was your purpose in placing this 
12 memorandum and this photograph in the file of Sunset 
13 Palisades No.4 Subdivision? 
14 MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 
1 s THE WITNESS; The files or the system was used 
16 by the city to pass along institutional knowledge, 1 
17 guess. So it just seemed appropriate to include a copy 
18 of that in the file for future reference. 
19 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) So it was your intent then 
20 to pass along to those that came after you, or to 
21 anyone, that this important information would be 
22 available; is that correct? 
23 MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
25 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Wbat constitutes the-- what 
Page 35 
is contained in the Sunset Palisades No. 4 file? 
Page 3 6 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Would you have allowed this 
2 property to be developed without- if you were the city 
3 engineer at the time an application was made to 
4 subdivide or develop it, would you, with this 
5 information known to you, have allowed a project to be 
6 subdivided or developed without addressing this slope 
7 movement circumstance? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 
9 Calls for speculation. 
10 THE WITNESS: At that time l would have sought 
II the advice of probably the city attorney, as well as 
12 experts in the field of geotechnical engineering to help 
!3 make a recommendation as to how we would proceed. And 
!4 what was contained in the city code at the lime. 
15 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Did you require Mr. 
16 Streibick in April of I 999 to do anything to remedy the 
17 slope movement problem on that lot? 
18 A. I did not. 
19 Q. And why not? 
20 A. Could you restate that to make sure l 
21 understood the question? 
22 (Record read.) 
23 THE WITNESS: My recollection is that based on 
24 the opinion of Terry Howard that the public road and the 










A. I don't recall the specifics. 2 
not in any imminent danger. And that the slide was 
located on private property and not under my 

















Q. What would be in any subdivision file for the 3 
City of Lewiston? 4 
A Information about the -- s 
MR. ADAMS: Before you answer I'm just going 6 
to object a:s to form. Are we talking about a specific 7 
time period? 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) During the 1999 time frame. 9 
"What information would be contained in a city 10 
subdivision file at that point in time? 1 1 
A. l don't recall the specifics. But information 12 
regarding the development or platting of a subdivision. 13 
Q. Was it your intent that before this particular 14 
property was developed, upon which the slope movement 15 
was observed, that the slope movement issues that you 16 
had observed and documented be dealt with by the City of 17 
Lewiston? 18 
MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 19 
Calls for speculation.. 20 
THE WITNESS: I don't think I had formed any 21 
specific course of action or intent It was to relay 22 
information on so others can make a decision in the 23 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) You don't think this 
property was within your jurisdiction as a city 
engineer? 
A. The public right-of-way or the utility that 
was in here. 
Q. You don't think you have any responsibility or 
rights as a city engineer to require property owners to 
deal with slope movement issues on their property? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 
Calls for a legal conclusion. 
THE WITNESS: I have no opinion on that. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) When would be the proper 
time for the city to deal with the slope movement issue 
on this property after April 9 of 1999? 
MR. ADAMS; Objection. Form and foundation. 
Calls for a legal conclusion. And speculation. 
THE WITNESS: 1fthe slope movement 
jeopardized a city road right-of-way or facility they 
would definitely have an interest in mitigating that. 
Or a reason to make sure that that was corrected. 
\Vhat if i~y<j!P,a;dized the 
efi~ i\f&!~they 
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THE WITNESS: I don't. 
2 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) So you don't know that the 
3 landslide reoccurred at that vety site after 
4' construction ofhomes on it? 
5 MR. ADAMS: Same objection. 
6 THE WITNESS: Mr.--
7 MR. ADAMS: Off the record for a second. 
8 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
9 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) So 1 guess I asked you 
10 whether or not you knew as to whether or not this 
ll property was developed over this area of the landslide 
12 without the city having dealt with it? 
!3 A. I was aware from Eric Hasenoehrl when he 
14 contacted me two years ago that some homes had been 
15 built on it and that they were damaged by continued 
16 slope movement. We did not discuss and he did not share 
17 with me anything that the city had done with regard to 
18 that issue. 
19 Q. I would like you to look at Exhibit 229, 
20 Mr. Richard. This appears to be similar-- in fact, I 
21 think the wording of the narrative below the line is 
22 identical to Exhibit 310. Would that be correct? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. And the caption at the top, however, differs, 
25 does it not, in that it references that the memorandum 
is to the address file. Do you see that Sunset 
2 Palisades No.4, Block 3? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. Is this a different file maintained by the 
5 city than the Sunset Palisades No. 4 file that is listed 
6 on Exhibit 31 0? 
7 A. I don't recall the specifics of that file. 
But generally the addresses are tied to individual 
9 parcels. While the subdivision files are for the entire 
10 subdivision. If that makes sense. 
11 Q. Do you recall determining tllat this particular 
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12 infonnation, the memorandum and the photograph, would be 
13 placed in the two files? 
14 A. I don't recall doing that. 
15 Q. ls an address file usually a street address 
16 type file? Is it noted by street address as opposed to 
17 lot, block description? 
JS A. TI1e system as I recall at the time that the 
19 city had was, yes, by street address. 
20 Q. Would there be a street address for the 























A. 1 don't recall specifically. Bu1 sometimes in 
the address files there was a-- well, i don't re:call. 
Q. 1t just seems there were no homes on this 
site. 
A. Cotrect. 
Q. So there was no address; con·ect? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Was your intent to make sure by having this in 
two places that this infonnation would be available at 
the time of development? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection. Forrn and foundation. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe that is con·ect. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) At the time of your 
inspection or your visit to the property with Mr. Howard 
and Mr. VanStone following the notification by 
Mr. Howard that there had been slope movement, do you 
recall noting any difference in the topography on that 
site than the topography of that site when you departed 
in 1993? 
A. I don't recall that 
Q. So there is nothing that alerted you lo the 
fact that a 40-foot ravine had been filled in the 
interim? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection. Misstates prior 
testimony. Forn1 and foundation. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall that. 
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2 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Mr. Howard in the article-
3 I guess I'm back asking you a question on Exhibit 29 
4 again. A portion of29. The newspaper article. 
Mr. Howard states in that article-- and I'll quote 
6 him -- "Something needs to be done about the water that 
7 is pouring into the hillside. And the cracks created by 
the slips should be closed up." 
9 That is in the second paragraph. Do you see 
10 that? 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 Q. Did Mr. Howard ever say anything of that kind 
13 to you? 
14 A. I don't recall. 
15 Q. And then i.n the second column, it looks like 
16 the fourth full paragraph, begins, "Jt likely has 
17 happened since the street was built" Howard said, 
18 quote, "That subdivision caused the landslide." 
19 Do you see that? 
20 A. I do. 
21 Q. Did Mr. Howard ever state anything of the kind 
22 Mr. Howard? 22 to you in 1999 or at any time regarding his opinions as 
23 A. No. 23 to the subdivision having caused that landslide? 
24 Q.:ffi~faHt'ftf.rA>FF£~~iFit0:19 R~.N<AtiiiD J. L NDEcK !N~tm.tr OF PLAINTIFF'S 
25 the cifM@q?if(lJN TO RECONSIDER MEMO DUM OP.fM!~~~~ffcuned during 
208-345- rrcE, INC. 
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THE WITNESS: lfl was aware ofil J wouldn't MR. ADAMS: Same objection. l 
2 1gnore it. But being on private property I guess I 2 THE WITNESS: The intent was that the I 
J would probably consult with the city attorney about what 3 information be passed along so that \Vhatever applicable 
4 \ve should do. 4 codes or conditions existed at the time, that all 
5 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And I guess I'll just ask 5 parties were aware that this had occurred. 
6 you the same question in regard to if you had knowledge 6 MR. LANDECK: I don't have any more questions. 
7 of unpermitted, unengineered, W1inspected fill in that 7 MR. ADAMS: Let's go talk for a moment. 
8 same ravine in excess of 60,000 cubic yards of fill 8 (Recess.) 
9 overlaying the drainage pipe, would that infonnation 9 MR. ADAMS: No questions. 
10 have caused you as city engineer to take any action to 10 (Deposition concluded at 12:00 p.m.) 
11 deal with it? 11 (Signature waived.) 
i2 MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 12 
J3 Improper hypothetical. Calls for speculation. 13 
J4 THE WITNESS: I did not have knowledge ofthat 14 
15 or don't recall that. And, again, l would probably 15 
16 consult with the city attorney and determine if there is 16 
!7 a course of action that we should take. 17 
18 Q. (BY MR LANDECK) Would those situations have 18 
19 raised a concern in your mind about the stability of 19 
20 that slope? 20 
21 MR. ADAMS: Same objections. 21 
22 THE WITNESS: I would have probably consulted 22 
23 with Mr. Howard on that since he is the geotechnical 23 
24 expert 24 
25 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Mr. Richard, in reference to 25 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE the newspaper article and your comment there about "If 
2 plans for that property are submitted the city will deal 
3 with it at that time." 
I, MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR No. 471, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, certifY: That the foregoing 
4 What part of the process of development allows 
5 the city to deal with it? 
6 MR. ADAMS: Objection. Fonn and foundation. 
7 THE WITNESS: I don't recall the specifics of 
8 the city code that would provide that mechanism to deal 
9 with it. Whether that is subdivision or building code. 
10 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Could it be both? 
11 MR. ADAMS: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
12 THE WITNESS: It could be both. But I would 
13 have to review those to make a detern1ination. Although, 
14 I didn't deal with the building codes specifically. 
15 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) So at the time that you made 
16 that statement you obviously had something in mind about 
17 the city's ability to deal with it Would that be 
4 proceedings were taken before me at the time and place 
therein set forth, at which time the witness was put 
6 under oath by me; 
7 That the testimony and all objections made were 
recorded stenographically by me and transcribed by me or 
9 under my direction; 
10 That the foregoing is a true and correct record 
11 of all testimony given, to the best of my ability; 
12 1 further certify that I am not a relative or 
13 employee of any attorney or party, nor am 1 financially 
14 interested in the action. 
15 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal this 
J 6 16th day of September, 2011. 
17 
18 correct? 18 
19 MR. ADAMS: Objection. Form and foundation. 19 
20 He testified he doesn't recall making any statement. 
21 THE WITNESS: I don't recall the specifics 
n that I bad in mind when I made that statement A 
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causing further damage to properties that haven't been 1 
considered in my figures or my consideration. 2 
Q. Okay. But again, you don't have any 3 
infonnation about that and you're not aware of that 4 
situation? 5 
A .. No. 6 
Q. Okay. Okay. Is it fair to go to your report 7 
now? I think we've kind of gotten a background. So it 8 
looks-- 9 
A. Yes. 10 
Q. --as though we can kind of divide- or what 11 
I'm going to divide up today because these are numbers 12 
I've seen, I think we covered the hundred and eighty 13 
thousand dollar figure? 14 
A. Right. 15 
Q. You know, the additional expenses. I'm going 16 
to cover the three other areas. And as I understand it, 17 
one of them is the, the damage, the property damage, if 1 8 
you will, to the three homes that were at issue and the 1 9 
other lots that he owned around the area, right? 2 0 
A. Right. 21 
Q. And that would be kind of his economic damage 2 2 
to his business. I mean, he was a builder building 2 3 
homes to resale, right? 2 4 
A. Right. 25 
Page 50 
Q. All of this damage is kind ofhis lost profits, 1 
if you will, and his expenses that he incurred along the 2 
way; correct? 3 
A. Correct. 4 
Q. And then we have his future damages as kind of, 5 
I'm going to call it area two, and that's his business 6 
loss for again his construction business going from this 7 
point kind of forward, is that fair? 8 
A. True. 9 
Q. And then we've got this four hundred thousand 10 
dollar figure which you came up with today as we sat 11 
here which is kind of, you haven't really firmed up that 12 
opinion yet, but that has to do with additional expenses 13 
that he's incurred through his business as a result of 14 
this jncident, correct? 15 
A. Yes. 16 
Q. Again, would that be kind of expenses and lost 17 
profit? I guess kind of expenses, right, the four 1 8 
hundred thousand; is that right? 19 
A. I think that's what we had here, yeah. 2 0 
Q. All right. Well let's talk about each one of 21 
those areas if we can, Mr. Rudd, and again I'm going to 2 2 
use your, your report. And like you said, the numbers 2 3 
for-- for that first area, which I, I'm calling his 2 4 




Q. Okay. That's kind of part one of it. And I've 
got these numbers. Maybe these numbers are a little bit 
different. I'm looking at these numbers do,.vn the ·~ 
side--
A. Sure. 
Q. -of Exhibit 293. You've got the 153 Marine 
View Drive house at eight hundred and twelve thousand, 
five hundred. How did you- how did you calculate that 
number? 
A. Okay. In Exhibit 294 .... 
Q. Right. 
A .... .the ftrst page past the appraisal salient 
information- you know, I didn't make you a copy. Do 
you want--
MR. LA..'l\JDECK: Can we go off the record for a 
second? 
(Whereupon, the deposition was in recess at 
10:11 a.m. and subsequently reconvened at 10:15 a.m.; 
and the following proceedings were had and entered of 
record:) 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) Okay. Mr. Rudd, are you ready 
to go back on the record? 
A. 
Q. So we can get done with this today? 
A. Okay. 
Q. The exhibit, we just made copies of Exhibit 294 
that you brought with you today. 
A. Okay. 
Q. This is, it's entitled, John block Landslide 
Estimates. 
A. Yes. 
Q. \Vhat- just tell me what appraisal salient 
infonnation, why do you have that there? What is that? 
V.'hat's that mean? 
A. The law in appraising in the state which was 
promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation in Washington 
DC. .. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. .. .. concentrated on how appraisals should be 
done, and they call them USP AP requirements. And, I 
addressed most of them here because in arguments, 
particularly with the state, they will go through all of 
these items. If there's, if this case, for instance, 
gets turned over to the state that I did a bad 
appraisal, I was off base or you get mad at me or 
whatever, they'll go through all of this frrst. So, 
most appraisers like myself have simply come down to 
addressing all of these items so that they were 
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THE REPORTER: I'm sony, added up to what? 
Two hundred grand? 
MR. CASEY: Right. 
THE REPORTER: And then .... 
A. Two wal1s were constructed. 
Q. (BY MR. CASE\') Okay. 
A. With all the foundations, the railing, 
engineering, t1ying to stop the subsidence. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And there was three places involved but 1 
attributed half to this property since this--
Q. I'm with you. 
A. -- and the other property beside it were the 
ones that fronted. 
Q. And that would have been the 159 lot? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. No, 153. Oh, the other house, yeah, right. 
Q. So you added a hundred thousand to the 153 Jot? 
A. Right. 
Q. And the hundred thousand to the 159 lot? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. I'm with you. 
A. Okay. 




























A. There was. 2 
Q. The six hundred sixty -- let me ask the 3 
question, though. so we make sure we're on the same 4 
~~ 5 
A. Okay. 6 
Q. So we've got a --we've got a damage which is 7 
essentially the destruction and -- complete destruction 8 
of the building that was valued at six eighty-two five? 9 
A. Right. 10 
Q. We have twenty thousand dollars of salvage 11 
value which would be recoverable because it was taken to 12 
storage so we've got a loss of six sixty-two five, and 13 
then we go to -- we add a hundred thousand to that which 1 4 
was expense for attempts to fix this subsidence? 15 
A. Right. 16 
Q. Right. And then that adds to seven eighty-two 1 7 
five, seven sixty-two five, right? 18 
A. Yeah. 19 
Q. How do we get to eight twelve? What else is 2 0 
included? 2 1 
A. There's an additional storm water pond which is 2 2 
half of fifty thousand. 2 3 
Q. Okay. 24 
A. That went against this property, twenty-five 2 5 
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thousand, which is twenty-five thousand. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then the additional railing, pilings, et 
cetera, of a hundred thousand. And then there was fifty 
thousand in demolition. 
Q. Do we attribute all hundred thousand for the 
railings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To this lot or .... 
A. Right. And the pilings. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And demolition ten thousand dollars, and 
fifteen thousand, two hundred of lost landscaping. 
Q. How did you come up with that figure, just out 
of curiosity, fifteen two? 
A. Estimated ten thousand an acre, which is a 
fairly well-known landscaping estimate. 
Q. Okay. So this lot was one point five two 
acres? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. And that's 153? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. All right. 
A. So--
Q. So we add up all those figures, those are the 
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components, if you ·will? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That add up to the eight hundred and twelve 
thousand, five hundred, which is the estimated damage to 
his business as a result of the damage and destruction 
of153? 
MR. LANDECK: I think that misstates his 
testimony. You said loss to his business. 
MR. CASEY: Right. 
MR. LANDECK: I think it's loss to the real 
estate. 
MR. CASEY: What business is he in? He's a 
constructing-- he's a contractor, right 
MR. LANDECK: Well, I believe his testimony is 
about loss to real estate is one factor in damage and 
loss to business would be another. It's just a, I guess 
I'm trying to draw the distinction because I think it's 
important in his testimony. 
MR. CASEY: Okay. Because of the two different 
areas he testified to? 
MR. LANDECK: Right. 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) But John Block was a builder 
who was building 153 Marine View Drive to sell to 
someone else; correct? 
A. Correct. 
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Q. That was his business, Block Group, or they 1 
were contractors who built- he actually designed and 2 
built his OVll1 homes for resale, correct? 3 
A. Con·ect. 4 
Q. Okay. 5 
A. But 1 did not value any damage to business in 6 
any of the properties involved in Exhibit 294. 7 
Q. Right. 8 
A. Per se. 9 
Q. Those are just straight out property damage? 10 
A. Real estate. 11 
Q. To real estate? 12 
A. Uh-huh. 13 
Q. Okay. 14 
A. Correct. 1 5 
Q. All right. 159 --well, let's-- yeah. We can 16 
go to 159 since it's next on Exhibit 295. 159 Marine 17 
View Drive you've-- you have a total-- you have a 18 
total appraised value that you came up with as ofMay of 19 
2009; correct? 2 0 
A. Correct 2 1 
Q. And this, again, would have been prior to the 2 2 
damage to the property? The appraised, the appraised 2 3 
value of the property prior to it sustaining damages, 2 4 
correct? 2 5 
.~ 
a trade of a home at 181 Marine View Drive which he had ! 
paid three hundred and eighty-one thousand, nine hundred l 
for in 8 of '06 and received four hundred and thirty 1 
thousand dollars in the trade. l 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) So are all of those components j 
in your calculation of the six hundred and four 
1
J 
thousand, eight hundred dollar appraised value of 159 lJ.• 
Marine View Drive as ofMay of2009? t 
A. They were in there. But, as well are three ·~ 
comparable sales we used in the FNMA appraisal of J 13 It 
Marine View Court; which was six hundred and fifty ~~ 
thousand dollar sale. 
Q. Ub-huh. 
A. 3431 Fifteenth Street in Lewiston also which 
was seven hundred and ninety-five thousand dollar sale. 
Q. Ub-huh. 
A. And 566 Crestline Circle which sold for six 
hundred and twenty-five thousand. So --
Q. Who was it that selected the comparables? 
A. Two parties. Myself and my son, Mark Rudd. 
Q. Okay. Are you comfortable with those 
comparables in the use of your appraisal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Where is 566 Crestline Circle in 
proximity to this structure at 159? 



























A. Yes. 1 
Q. And what was that number? 2 
A. Six hundred and four thousand, eight hundred. 3 
Q. Okay. And what's the basis for that number? 4. 
What components went into it? 5 
A. The-- 6 
MR. RUDD: Shall I just turn these over like 7 
that? 8 
.MR. LAJ\TDECK: Yeah, that's good. Let's put it 9 
on the bottom. 10 
MR. RUDD: Okay. 11 
A. That valuation is based on the home at 159 12 
which was sold to Scott Broyles on April 30 of 2007. 13 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) And the sale price to Mr. 14 
Broyles was six hundred and seventy-five thousand? 15 
A. Yes. 16 
MR. LANDECK: No. I think it says something 17 
different. You said six seventy-five. Is it six? 18 
MR. RUDD: Well that was -- it was listed-- 19 
MR. LANDECK: Oh, I'm sorry. 2 0 
MR. RUDD: For six hundred and ninety-five 21 
thousand. Sold to Scott Broyles -- 2 2 
MR. LANDECK: Sorry. 23 
lv1R. RUDD: -- for six hundred and seventy-five 2 4 
thousand on 4-30 of '07 with conventional financing and 2 5 
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A. Yeah. It's about a mile and a half away. 
Q. Where? Which direction, if you will? 
A. North and east. 
Q. Okay. Okay. 
A. I'll see if there's a map in here. 
Q. Okay. So you- you were telling me how you 
came up with a value of six zero four, eight hundred, 
and I asked you if the information that was contained on 
Exhibit 295 with regard lo the sale to Mr. Broyies then 
the buyback and trade with Mr. Broyles, if that was the 
only factor in your appraised value as May of '09 and 
you said, no, we also did some comparables. What other 
factors went into the appraised value of 159 Marine View 
Drive as ofMay of2009? 
A. Okay. I did a study of the-- oh, I need to 
see my backup stuff .... 
THE REPORTER: I'm sorry? 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
A. In attempting to bring all the figures in all 
these cases that we're talking about, you know we talked 
cost and things today, yesterday, and the day before, 
when the slide started, l think, I moved that all to the 
date of May of '09; isn't that correct? 
Q. (BY MR. CASEY) Yes. 
A. Well, in doing that, 1 built a table which you 
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1 MR ADAMS: We'll get it to you. 1 
2 ~ Y~. 2 
3 MR. ADAMS: Yeah, we'll get it to you. 3 
4 Q. (BY MR LANDECK) Okay. Do you know if that 4 
5 report is being used in any way in connection with the 5 
6 City's review of development activities? 6 
7 A .. No. 7 
8 Q. You don't know if it is or not? B 
9 A. I'm not involved in that process. 9 
1 0 Q. And that would be, what, the subdivision 1 0 
11 process? 11 
12 ~ Yes. 12 
1 3 Q. That's where it would be used? 13 
14 A. Yes. 14 
15 Q. Okay. So, you don't really use it in your 15 
16 work? 16 
17 A. No. 17 
18 Q. On that list that I read of areas unsuitable 1 B 
19 for development, in addition, are there any other 19 
2 0 reports, maps that the City maintains that identify 2 0 
2 1 areas of wetlands, hillsides, excessive slope or 21 
2 2 unstable land than what you've just mentioned? 2 2 
23 A. No. 23 
2 4 Q. Do you as a building official have the 2 4 
2 5 authority to issue a residential building permit that 2 5 
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1 would permit construction on a lot that is w1Suitable 1 
2 for development? 2 
3 MR. ADAMS: Objection, fonn. 3 
4 A. No. 4 
5 Q. (BY MR LANDECK) And why not? 5 
6 A. The requirements of the code would say that 6 
7 prior to construction you'd have to meet those 7 
8 requirements. I would not be-- I'd be negligent il1 my 8 
9 duty to issue a permit. 9 
1 0 Q. For an area on a, a lot that is unsuitable for 10 
11 development? 11 
12 A. Yes. 12 
13 MR. ADAMS: Same objection. 13 
1 4 Q. (BY 1\.1R LANDECK) And is that a building code 14 
15 requirement that you referred to? 15 
16 A. Not a single requirement but the requirement of 16 
1 7 the code in whole. 1 7 
18 Q. Okay. Do you have authority to issue a 18 
1 9 residential building permit for a lot that the City 1 9 
2 0 knows is within an area oflandslide activity? 2 0 
21 MR ADAMS: Objection, form. 21 
22 MR. CASEY: Ijoin. 22 
23 A. No. 23 
2 4 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And why not? 2 4 
2 5 A. Because you didn't tell me where on that piece 2 5 
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of property that landslide zone that structure would be 
placed. 
Q. So if the area, if the, the improvement was to 
be placed over the area ofthe, specific area of the 
landslide activity, would you have authority to issue a 
permit over that, on that specific area of the lot? 
MR. ADAMS: Same objection. 
A. No. 
Q. (BY MR.. LANDECK) And, why would you not be 
able to issue that permit? 
~ Without meeting, without you telling me if it 
meets my current codes for site stability, geotechrllcal 
reporting, compaction reporting, if they even had 
knowledge of the slide being there, the answer would be 
no. 
Q. What code requirements are you aware of that 
deal with soil stability reporting? 
~ The compaction of the footings is what is 
required by code. 
Q, So when you refer to soil stability, you're 
referring to the compaction code requirements? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are there any City of Lewiston requirements 
applicable during the building permitting process that 
specifically deal with soil stability? 
Page 20 
A. Other than what we discussed, no. 
Q. Are you aware of any City of Lewiston code 
requirements or code provisions - strike 
requirements - code provisions that deal with soil 
stability analysis during the subdivision process? 
~No. 
Q. That's not within your area, either, is it? 
So, is that. ... 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. If the City ofLewiston is aware of a 
lot that is unsuitable for development, and I guess I'll 
use the example, for the reason that the proposed 
improvement would be constructed over an area of 
landslide activity, does the City have an obligation to 
let the potential developer know of the City's awareness 
and knowledge of that condition? 
MR.. ADAMS: Objection, fonn and improper 
hypothetical. 
A. I know of no legal requirement for that. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) How would you react to that 
situation as a building official? 
A. I have reacted where there's been site issues, 
and in the mechanism to help the developer come up with 
solutions for abilities to build on that site. 
Q. You've already talked about how you wouldn't 
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1 Q. The letter references an investigation of 1 
2 foundation damage; do you see that? 2 
3 A. Yes. 3 
4 Q. Who -- if you know, who undertook that 4 
5 investigation? 5 
6 A. There was -- me, along v.<i.th some fire 6 
7 department people. Let's see, which property was this? 7 
8 Q. I think- 8 
9 A. 155. That would have been me. 9 
1 0 Q. What event or events triggered this 1 0 
11 investigation? 11 
1 2 A. A leaking gas line. 12 
13 Q. And how did you obtain infonnation about the 13 
1 4 leaking gas line? 14 
1 5 A. I was contacted by the fire department after 15 
1 6 they had secured the scene that the gas line had 1 6 
1 7 separated because of the movement of the foundation, or 1 7 
1 8 at least that was their belief. 18 
1 9 Q. Do you recall when you obtained that 19 
2 0 infonnation? 20 
21 A. No. 21 
2 2 Q. Was it, can you - do you know whether or not 2 2 
2 3 it was in May of 20097 2 3 
2 4 A. Not off the top of my head, no. 2 4 
2 5 Q. What did you -- what did you fmd upon your 2 5 
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1 investigation of the foundation damage, at 155 Marine 1 
2 View Drive? 2 
3 A. There was -- this structure was the property 3 
4 just up the hill from where the gas leak was at, and 4 
5 this structure had cracking in the western wall of the 5 
6 ~~~ 6 
7 Q. Did you first investigate the, the residence at 7 
8 which the gas leak had occurred? 8 
9 A. Yes. 9 
1 0 Q. We have them a little out of order here. How 1 0 
11 about looking at Exhibit 234, please? 11 
12 MR. CASEY: Can you just identify it by the 12 
1 3 Bates number, please? 13 
1 4 MR LANDECK: With Bates number BLOCK 0253. 14 
15 MR CASEY: Thank you. 15 
1 6 Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Is this also a letter that 16 
1 7 you wrote or someone wrote at your request? 1 7 
18 A. Yes. 18 
1 9 Q. Do you know whether or not this is the property 19 
2 0 that suffered the gas leak? 2 0 
21 A. No. 21 
2 2 Q. Do you recall, did you look at all three 2 2 
2 3 properties on the same day? 2 3 
24 A. Yes. 24 
25 Q. Make it a little easier here. 25 
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A. Okay. 
Q. So you went out on one pmticular day to the 
site, then you-- and who else went with you? 
A. I'm not sure. I can't remember who else was 
there, but Mr. Block was there and escorted us through. 
Q. Was, was there one investigation, one event and 
one day in which you went to these properties which 
resulted in these letters being prepared? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So, you and someone accomp<nried you and 
Mr. Block, the three of you, correct? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. But you -- did you then look at all three of 
these residential units? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And following that made some detenninations 
about what-- as the building official about what, how 
you were going to react to what you saw? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then did that result in you writing these 
letters to Mr. Block? We've already looked at Exhibit 
230 and Exhibit 234; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then, if you might look at Exhibit 232, 
which is BLOCK 0251. 
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MR. CASEY: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) 1s that the third letter that 
was written following your investigation on that day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And, Exhibit 232, is that also a letter 
that you had written at-- that was written at your 
request? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, with reference to Exhibits~ well, I'll 
take them one by one. So, what did you detennine to do 
in regard to 155 Marine View Drive, which is referenced 
in Exhibit 230? 
A. I had sent letters, sent the letter in regards 
to that property, and it comments in here that Mr. Block 
had already detailed us what his work plan was for that 
property. So, we were allowing him to proceed forward 
at his, you know, recommendations. 
Q. Do you recall what his letter said he was going 
to do? 
A. No, not specifically. 
Q. Had you had any conversations with Mr. Block 
before writing these letters about what he would have to 
do with regard to the properties? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did that occur on the day you investigated at 
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Q. You pretty much made a detennination while 
viewing the properties that day that something was going 
1 to have to be done, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you advised Mr. Block of that? 
IvlR ADAMS: Objection, fom1 and foundation. 
A. Yes. 
MR. LANDECK: Stephen, do you have a -- did we 
put the May 15 or May 12 letter? 
MR. ADAMS: Yeah. It's Exhibit 222. It was 
marked yesterday. 
MR. LANDECK: Yes. rm looking for it. 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
Q. (BY MR. l.A]\.lDECK) So you referenced, Mr. Smith, 
that Mr. Block had already sent you a letter regarding 




















that the land movement actually caused the gas line to 
separate. 
Q. Did you observe evidence of land movement on, 
at the time of your investigation? 
A. (No response given.) 
Q. I'm not talking about was the land moving while 
you were there. Did you observe evidence that land had 
moved, of that land movement had occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you observe? 
A. Again, the, the breaking, the movement of the 
building, the cracking of the foundation, the retaining 
wall were- cracked or moved, all indicating that there 
had been movement of the soils that put pressures 
against those. 
Q. Did you observe the soils themselves in any 
places on those three lots? 
A. No. 
19 letter? 19 Q. Didn't see any cracks or obvious shifting of 
2 0 A. It appears so. 2 0 soils? 
21 Q. He references in that letter that 153 and 159 21 A. There were cracks in the -- on the surface of 
2 2 had been posted as unsafe to occupy. Is that your 2 2 the, the yard and the driveways and, but, no, I didn't 
2 3 recollection that by May 12 the properties had been, 2 3 see, didn't investigate the soils themselves to see what 
2 4 those two properties had been posted as unsafe to 2 4 they were composed of. 



























A. Yes. 1 
Q. Did you post those 153 and 155 --excuse me, 2 
153 and !59 as unsafe to occupy on the day that you 3 
investigated? 4 
A. No. 5 
Q. When did you do that? 6 
A. I never did. 7 
Q. Oh, who did? 8 
A. JeffWolf. 9 
Q. Do you know what day he did it? 1 0 
A. I believe it was on the day we investigated the 11 
gas leak. 12 
Q. And, and looked at a11 three prope1ties, 13 
correct? 14 
A. I believe so. 15 
Q. Did you instruct h.im to post the properties as 1 6 
unsafe to occupy? 1 7 
A. Yes. 18 
Q. 'What was it that you obse1ved that caused you 1 9 
to determine that 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy? 2 0 
A. There was severe foundation damage. The 2 1 
buildings had structural cracks inside sheetrock, floors 2 2 
were warped, walls were moved away from the, the plates, 2 3 
windov.'S had broke out of them because of movement of the 2 4 
walls and, and such, to the extent that it was believed 2 5 
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linear in fashion? Did it follow a line or a pattern, 
as best you could detennine? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, form, foundation. 
A. Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Okay. And in that regard, 
what, what did you observe? 
A. The cracking was consistent throughout the 
buildings, all heading in a westerly direction. 
Q. 155, which I think is reflected in Exhibit, 
your- is commented on in your Exhibit 230 letter, what 
did you determine, if anything, needed to done with 
regard to 155 Marine View Drive? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, foundation, fom1. 
A. In my recollection. my conversation with Mr. 
Block was the same, they would have to be made secure or 
they needed to be repaired or they needed to be removed. 
Q. (BY MR LANDECK) Is it true that you did not 
determine that 155 was unsafe to occupy? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you treat- why did you treat that house 
differently than the other two? 
A. It was, had a Jesser amount of damage to it, 
and it was mainly to just one portion of the foundation, 
not the entire structure. 
Q. Now, your Exhibit 230 says that you determined 
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Q. What did you do with the infonnation he 
provided to you regarding the plan to abate, the Exhibit 
222 information? How did you respond to that? 
A. We would have made copies and placed them in 
the property files. 
Q. Did you have any discussion with him regarding 
the plan to abate that he set forth in Exhibit 222? 













A. But past that point, no, I don't have. 11 
Q. Was the abatement essentially up to him as 1o 12 
what he chose to do? 13 
A. Yes. 14 
Q. What was the City's interests, then, in the 15 
plan that he proposed? 1 6 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, form and foundation. 17 
A. I'm not sure where you're going. 1 8 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Well, I guess, what did the 19 
City have to, what did the City require of him in regard 2 0 
to abating the unsafe conditions that you observed in 2 1 
those three properties? 2 2 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, foundation. 2 3 
A. We would have required a permit for the 2 4 
demolition of the structures and the capping of the 2 5 
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utilities, at which point the bond would have been given 1 
back to Mr. Block. I'm not sure under the 2 
circumstances, if that was required or not because of 3 
the circumstances and exigency of the-- 4 
THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, the circumstances and 5 
I didn't hear you. 6 
A. Exigent -- sorry. I probably can't say it now 7 
that I'm thinking of it. 8 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Exigency. That's a tough 9 
word. 10 
A. Apologize. Sometimes we don't require full 11 
permitting for a demolition of a structure if it's 12 
something that's in the best interest of everybody just 13 
to have it happen. 14 
Q. After you'd investigated and made your 15 
detennination regarding the unsafe conditions, under the 1 6 
code requirements that you enforce, including abatement 1 7 
of dangerous structures code, whatever that's referred, 1 8 
you referred to it in your letters. 1 9 
A. Uh-huh. 2 0 
Q. I guess the International Property Maintenance 21 
Code, what did-- what options did he have in regard to 2 2 
satisfying the City's code requirements? 2 3 
A. I routinely give the same three options to 2 4 
somebody that has a structure. TI1ey can make it safe by 2 5 
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boarding it up so it doesn't become-- attract a 
nuisance. They can repair it. That is an option of 
theirs, or they can demolish it and make it safe, or, 
you know, reclamate the property. 
Q. Mr. Block, in his May 12 letter-
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. --to you advised that the 153 house will 
undergo salvage and den1olition as soon as possible. Do 
you see that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Okay. So that was, that if he did that 
properly, I guess through permitting, correct.... 
A. (Witness nods head.) 
Q . .... then that would, would satisfy the City's 
concerns, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, then he also, as to 159, indicated that 
the main floor of the house wi11 be attempted to be 
moved and the balance of the house demolished as soon as 
the house, 153 house is gone, do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Was that also a satisfactory resolution, 
as far as you're concemed, as long as he got the proper 
permitting for what he intended to do? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Okay. And of course on May 12, he didn't quite 
know what he was going to do with 155, did he? 
A. No, and it was being studied. 
Q. Okay. And, you're aware that ultimately he, he 
did repairs to 155 that were satisfactory to the City, 
is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you look at Exhibit 237, please, 
which is BLOCK 0256. And, do you recall receiving this 
letter from Mr. Hasenoehrl? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what does this letter deal with? 
A. It is the dovrohill retaining walls of that, of 
those properties, and essentially the engineer is saying 
that they want to leave them in place and watch to see 
if there's any more instability of those soils. 
Q . .And do you know what the ultimate resolution of 
all of that, that concern about the retaining walls was? 
Or was -- has there been an ultimate resolution of that? 
A. No. 
Q. What is the current status of those retaining 
walls? 
A. To my knowledge, they're still watching and 
seeing if there's any movement. 
MR. CASEY: I'm sorry, did you say they're 
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the process on are-subdivision? 1 
A. I believe so, yes. 2 
Q. Okay. Were-- do you have a recollection of 3 
the subdivision process that took place in Sunset 4 
Palisades number eight? 5 
A. No, I do not 6 
Q. Okay. Do you recall who was responsible for 7 
ili~ B 
A. I do not. 9 
Q. Did you have any input into the subdivision 1 0 
application for Canyon Greens subdivision? 11 
A. Which one? 12 
Q. Well, we'll start with Canyon Greens. I think 13 
it doesn't have a number. It's just the first one. 14 
A. Yeah. I don't believe I was involved in Canyon 15 
Greens one. 1 6 
Q. Okay. Is your recollection the first time you 1 7 
were involved in Canyon Greens was Canyon Greens two'/ 18 
A. Yes. 19 
Q. And what do you recall about your involvement 2 0 
in that subdivision process? 2 1 
A. I was working under Lowell Cutshaw as city 2 2 
engineer, and we did that as we would typically of any 2 3 
other review. I would review the subdivisions, 2 4 
fom1alize my comments, he would look over my comments, 2 5 
Page 13 
look over the plans, add to them, and then we would 1 
submit them for the developer, his engineer to address 2 
comments. 3 
Q. Was the Canyon Greens two an administrative 4 
plat? 5 
A. I don't believe so. 6 
Q. Do you know why it wasn't an administrative 7 
plat? 8 
A. It had new street improvements, I believe new 9 
water lines, new sewer lines. 10 
Q. And, do you recall referencing any other 11 
subdivision files in your work on Canyon Greens two? 12 
A. I do not. 13 
Q. Are you-- were you aware at the time that 14 
Canyon Greens two was a re-subdivision of Sunset 15 
Palisades number eight? 16 
A. I don't remember. 17 
Q. Were you aware that Canyon Greens number two 18 
was part of an original PUD? 19 
A. I don't remember that either. 20 
Q. So, you have no recollection in the Canyon 21 
Greens two reviews of going back and looking at any of 22 
the former subdivision files that encompassed Canyon 23 
Greens two? 24 
A. That is correct. 25 
Page 14 
Q. Do you know if anyone did? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Do you remember any pre-application stage of 
review for Canyon Greens two? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Do you ever remember meeting with Mr. Block 
regarding, well, let's say this infonnal subdivision 
review process? 
A. 1 don't remember that either. 
Q. Does public works department have any role in 
regard to grading and filling activities in the City of 
Lewiston? 
A. No. 
Q. There's no engineering oversight or inspection 
of grade and fill that is vested in public works? 
A. No. We have the ability within the subdivision 
code to request geotechnical work, but, no, to my 
knowledge, no mandate. 
Q. And under what circumstances do you have the 
authority to require geoteclmical reports? 
A. I believe it's under professional knowledge. 
Q. There is actually a Lewiston code section that 
talks about that, isn't there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, when you say professional knowledge, are 
Page 15 
you saying it is, you think it's the, the city engineer. 
that makes a determination as to, based on professional 
knowledge, as to whether there is a geotechnical study 
required? 
A. Well, it's a multiple, multiple iliings. I 
think he'd look at past history, your background, your 
professional background and yourlevel of comfort with 
the site. You know, we can use, talk to other 
professionals in the field about, about the site. I 
mean, I guess there's just a lot of things that I would 
use. 
Q. Did you use any of those things in evaluating 
the Canyon Greens two subdivision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you take into account? 
A. To me it didn't look like a difficult 
subdivision, because it was in a ve1y flat area. 
Q. Did you know anything about the history of that 
very flat area that.. .. 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you ever look at any topographical 
infonnation for that area? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you ever review any records of fill 
permitting or fill inspection for that area? 
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infonnation of past slides. Using that infmmation, I 1 
would get in contact with the engineer of record that 2 
worked on the subdivision and have some conversations 3 
about what's going on with their project. 4 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Okay. And would you have 5 
done more research, then, as part of that process to 6 
find out more history? 7 
A. Yes. 8 
Q. Okay. Were you aware of the detention pond 9 
that failed in the area of Canyon Greens? 1 0 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, foundation. 11 
A. I was not. 12 
Q. (BY MR.. LANDECK) Okay. Would that be another 13 
factor that you would consider, if that information had 14 
been known to you? 15 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, foundation, form. 16 
A. Canyon Greens one and Canyon Greens two, 1 17 
don't know if I would have drawn any relationship to 18 
those two things to, to use that as information I would 19 
use to require a geotechnical report. 2 0 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Isn't one of the purposes of 21 
the subdivision review process to discuss with the 2 2 
developer, potential concerns, site specific concerns in 2 3 
their proposed development? 2 4 
A. Yes. 25 
Page 45 
Q. The fact that Mr. Block was allowed to build 1 
three homes over an area in which slope movement was 2 
detected, did the City fulfill its obligation to Mr. 3 
Block to advise him about that potential problem? 4 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, form, foundation, calls 5 
for legal speculation. 6 
:MR. STUBBERS: Can you restate your question? 7 
Q. (BY :MR. LA}..l])ECK) Did the City fulfill its 8 
obligation under the subdivision ordinance to discuss 9 
with and advise developers about potential site issues 10 
in failing to let Mr. Block know of this information in 11 
the file regarding the slide activity? 12 
A. I don't -- 1 3 
MR. ADAMS: Same objections. 14 
A. I don't think the City's review guarantees that 15 
any piece of property i.s not going to have problems 16 
associated with it down the road. 17 
Q. (BY :MR. LANDECK) That wasn't my question. My 1 B 
question was, didn't the City have an obligation to let 19 
Mr. Block know of the information that was contained in 2 0 
its files regarding the slide activity on the property 21 
that it pennitted him to develop? 2 2 
:MR. ADAMS: Same objections. 2 3 
A. I mean, we have an obligation, in my mind, to 2 4 
bring forward all the information we know on the site 2 5 
Page 4 6 
ourselves. All documents that are contained within the 
file are documents of record that are available to the 
developer or his engineer upon developmenL 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) Oh, okay. So you're saying 
that Mr. Block has the duty, then, as a developer to go 
through every single piece of information in your files 
to determine whether or not that development is suitable 
for him? 
A. fm not saying he has the duty. I said he has 
the ability to do that if he so chooses. 
Q. But do you have a duty to the developers to 
advise them about infom1ation which you know of? 
:MR. ADAMS: Objection, form and foundation, 
calls for legal conclusion. 
A. Ofthe infonnation I know of, I should bring 
that fOJward to the engineer of record and the 
developer. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And this information, Exhibit 
125, was not brought forward to :M:r. Block, was it? 
A. I did not know about this document in my review 
of Canyon Greens two. 
Q. Do you know if Mr. Cutshaw knew of the, of 
the - of this document in his review of Sunset 
Palisades number eight or his review of Canyon Greens? 
A. I do not know. 
Page 47 
Q. Were you involved at all in the reviews of any 
building pennits for Mr. Block on 153, 155 and 159 
Marine View Drive? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Wereyou-
A. Sherri, Sberri Kole works under me, and I can't 
remember if she reviewed those while she was working 
under Lowell Cutshaw or she was working under myself. 
Q. And were you involved at all in any reviews of 
building permit applications that centered on retaining 
walls for that same area? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. In your opinion, was the land upon which this 
slide occurred that's depicted in Exhibit 125, land that 
was suitable for residential use? 
MR. ADAMS: Objection, calls for legal 
conclusion. 
MR. LANDECK: No, I don't think so. 
MR. ADAMS: Yeah, withdrawn. But I am going to 
object to form. 
MR. STUBBERS: Can I answer? 
MR. ADAMS: Yeah, you can still answer that. 
A. There's areas in there that I think are 
suitable for residential use. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And would there be areas in 
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? What ~ 
the onlY thing that I found. 
Q okay. I need to know what documents you relied 
· on to reach the ~pinion that the city had a hands-off 
approach. 
A The lack of documents. 
Q What documents have you reviewed to refer-- to 
conclude that there is --
A I've -- okay. Sorry --
Q -- to conclude that there is a Jack of 
supervision and inspection? 
A The information provided by the city for this 
case through discovery, I looked through all that. And 
there was really nothing that, like I said, showed that 
they were very hands-on when it came to anything having 
to do with the grading of the site or -- with the 
exception of -- anything else with the exception of what 
1 had mentioned. 
Q How many documents did you review from the 
city? 
A I think everything that-- I can't telf you the 
number, each -- you know, a specific number. But I 
believe it was everything that was supplied to me. 
Q Do you have a list of COL documents, with the 
Bates number COL, that you have reviewed? 
Page 226 
A I would have to summari2e that. 
Q Well, it's kind of important because you're 
claiming based on your review of documents you've 
concluded that the city is hands-off because of a lack 
of documents. But we don't know what documents you've 
reviewed. Do you agree with that? 
A Yes. I've reviewed everything with City of 
Lewiston's code that was provided by Mr. Landeck, and 
I'm assuming that that was everything that they had. I 
mean they--
Q Do you know if you've reviewed 3,000 documents 
from the city? 




; going ~ It would be less than a hundred. Q 2,000? 
2 MR. ADAMS: Q And I'm asking for your-- what you 
3 base that opinion on. 
4 A Okay. It all go-es back to having no 
5 geotechnical evaluation. If geotechnical evaluation 
6 would have been performed, then steps could have been 
7 taken to mitigate any landslide, The city would have 
8 known about it through the process that we've discussed 
9 previously, and if those steps were not being taken, 
10 then the city could have red tagged the project. 
11 Q I want to make sure I understand. Are you 




























other source of authority, the city had the power to 
require a property owner to do something specific with 
their property, including abating a landslide? Is that 
your opinion? 
A As far as statute or code goes, no. 
Q Okay. Just with regard to had there been a 




-- specific recommendations or requirements. 
And I don't see any difference between that and 
red tagging the houses, which I believe they did after 
they became unsafe. Because it's an unsafe condition. 
Because I believe they red tagged two houses which were 
P13ge 228 
then demolished? 
Q You don't see a difference between red tagging 
two houses In which people were living as opposed to 
requiring certain actions be taken on vacant property? 
A Vacant property that could impact neighboring 
property. Landslides go downhill. Could go onto the 
adjoining properties. Could adversely affect the health 
and safety of anyone working on the vacant property 
doing development. 
Q Do you have any opinion as to which neighboring 
properties would have been affected by the landslide? 
A In this particular case with what has happened 
so far, it doesn't appear that neighboring properties 
have been affected. 
he l Q Okay. So all right. So if there are more Q Moving down in paragraph 5, are you claiming that the city had a duty to prevent development in the 
area of Sunset Palisades No. 8 or Canyon Greens, the when it J documents, that may change your opinion. 17 
really saW~ A Yes. Could. 18 153, 155 and 159 Marine View Drive houses? 
1ew what ~ Q Your next statement is that "the City's failure 19 MR. LANDECK: Object it calls for a legal 
I to require proper abatement of a landslide ... 20 conclusion. 
referring i contributed to instability." 21 THE WITNESS: I don't say that they had a duty to 
d 1 
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Q. Yeah. Let me hand you Exhibit 125. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Have you ever seen --
A. Man, that is just about three weeks before I 
retired. 
Q. Do you recall any discussions with Tim Richard 
about Terry Howard having provided the photograph that 
he did? 
A. No. I don't recall any specific discussions 
with Tim, but I'm sure I had them. But I don't recall 
them. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's asking an awful lot, you know. 
Q. I know that Well, it's what we're talking 
about here in this --
A. Right. 
Q. --case. 
A. I understand. 
Q. Do you ever recall seeing this memo? 
A. No, I don't remember it, but I'm sure I did. 
You know, when I read this where it says, attached to 
the photograph provided by Terry Howard, I --that, 
that - I vaguely remember this when I read that. 
Q. Did you ever go up and look at this site on or 



























!>1R. ADAMS: Objection, form. 
A. Well, yeah, it's infom1ation that should be 
available to the City for future use. \Vhether that 
happens or not is another question. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And why is that a question? 
A. Well, because if you've ever worked around a 
bureaucracy like that, we aren't totally efficient. We 
try to be. 
Q. Could you look at the last paragraph ofthat, 
not of- of Exhibit 170, the newspaper article. I just 
wanted you-- the last paragraph reads, Lewiston city 
engineer, Tim Richar~ said no --
A. Right. 
Q. - action is called for at this time to deal 
with the earth movement. The City will document the 
information, and if plans for that property are 
submitted, will deal with it at that time. Do you see 
that? 
A. Right. That would be typical -
Q. Would that be a correct approach to this? 
A. That would be typical. 
Q. Okay. And it appears that he did document it? 
A. Right. 
Q. In Exhibit 125. And, are you aware of any, of 
the City ever dealing with it at any- I mean, dealing 
Page 45 Page 47 
l--------------------------------------~----~----------------------------------~----~1 
1 A. I'm sure I did. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. It's the kind of thing that would interest me. 
4 Q. And, you don't have any remembrance about 
5 having, or asking Tim to put something in the file to 
6 memorialize, memorialize this? 
7 A. I don't remember doing that, but it's something 
8 I would probably have done. I don't know. 
9 Q. Well, why would you have done it? 
10 A. Well, that's, that's my way of doing business, 
11 you know. 
12 Q. What do you think-- I mean, Tim put this in, 
13 looks like he put it in a file of Sunset Palisades 
14 number four. Do you see that --
15 A. Right. 
16 Q. -memorandum addressed to the file? 
17 A. Right 
18 Q. So what -- would that be in the normal course 
19 of his business as city engineer to document this? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And what would be the purpose behind doing 
22 that? 
23 A. Just for future reference. 
24 Q. Okay. So this is some information that the 



























with this information? 
:MR. ADAMS: Objection, fonn. 
A. No. Typically you wouldn't until a need arose 
to address it, you know. 
Q. (BY MR. LANDECK) And would that need involve a 
development plan for the property that was effected? 
A. Absolutely should have. 
:MR. LANDECK: Okay. I have no further 
questions. 
MR.. CASEY: Mr. Van Stone, my name is Clint 
Casey. I introduced myself before the deposition. 
MR.. VAN STONE: Yes, sir. 
MR.. CASEY: And before you leave today, I want 
to get your phone number so I can get it to Jack Fisher 
for you. 
MR.. VAN STO:f\.TE: Okay, appreciate it. 
EXAMINATION 
BY :MR. CASEY: 
Q. You were just discussing Exhibit 149? 
A. Right. 
Q. That's an August- or, 1 mean, October 31st of 
'94 exhibit, and you were talking about what the, your 
signature meant on-
A. On the review? 
Q. Yeah. On this one, 149, yeah. It's on page 
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1746 of that exhibit. At this point in time, what has 
the City done in their, you know, PUD review process? 
1 interest in that development. 
2 Q. Right. 
A. When you say at this point in time, you mean on 
the date here? 
3 MR CASEY: Okay. I don't have any other 
4 questions for you, sir. Thank you very much. 
Q. Yeah. l11e date that you're going to sign that 
A. All of the, the departments that are involved 
in a development like this would have had the 
opportunity to review it and comment on it, and this 
document says that I reviewed that. 
5 MR VAN STONE: You're welcome. 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 BY t1R. ADAMS: 
8 Q. Mr. Van Stone, I can't remember your answer to 
9 this. I'm sure I have it in my notes, but did you 
Q. And, then, you've reviewed it, and you've found 
that it's meeting the requirements of the City that you 
were there to enforce, right? 
1 0 personally deal with review of any documents related to 
11 subdivision or re-subdivision of properties? 
12 A. Yes. 
A. Correct. 13 Q. Okay. What-
Q. And then you sign it and say, we give the 14 
Citfs blessing? 15 
A. Right. 16 
Q. Right? And I know as we sit here-- 17 
A. Well, actually, I'd have to clarify that 18 
somewhat. 19 
Q. Sure. 20 
A. I sign it and give the public works department 21 
blessing. 22 
Q. Okay. 23 
A. The conununity development would have then taken 2 4 
that to council, and they would have blessed it 2 5 
Page 49 
Q. Okay. So, at this point in time you were not 1 
over community development? 2 
A. No. 3 
Q. That had been split out from your job? 4 
A. That would be my recollection, yes. 5 
Q. Okay. And that's fair enough. And I'm not 6 
asking you to recall specifically what you reviewed, but 7 
I'm just, in general, that's what this document 1746 of 8 
Exhibit 149 is telling us? 9 
A. It should testify that I reviewed the 1 0 
infonnation, and I had no problems with it and signed 11 
~ 12 
Q. And that's what it would have told the 13 
developer, Mr. Streibick, at the time you signed it 14 
also? 15 
A. That's correct. 1 6 
MR. LANDECK: Object to the form of the 17 
question. 18 
Q. (BY t1R. CASEY) And that's the reason you sign 1 9 
it, right, is really to tell the developer? 2 0 
A. Well, also the counciL 2 1 
Q. Right. But that's one of the reasons, right? 2 2 
A. Right 23 
Q. Okay. 24 
A. That I was satisfied with the public work's 2 5 
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A. But maybe not in every case, but I think in 
general, yes, I personally reviewed whatever the 
development was and the comments that were made by my 
staff concerning that development, yes. TI1at's my 
recollection. 
Q. All right. And, did I- did you say tl1at you 
couldn't review every single one? 
A. Well, I can't sit here and say that I did that. 
But I should have reviewed every single one, how's that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's as close as I can get. 
Q. And when you reviewed, did you review every 
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single document that was related to the development or 
subdivision or re-subdivision? 
A. Just as it relates to public works. 
Q. Okay. And you reviewed every single document 
that was relevant to the subdivision or re-subdivision? 
A. Ifi didn't, I should. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's my, part of my job, or that was part of 
my job. 
Q. Now, when I say every single document, we may 
be meaning different things. What did you review? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn of the question. 
A. I would--
MR. CASEY: Join. 
A. I would review the comments that my staff had 
made for all of the public works issues that would be 
involved in a development of a subdivision, and if I 
found things that I didn't agree with or things that I 
questioned, I would get together with that staff person, 
and we'd work out something either so that I fully 
understood what be was saying or that he would take into 
account any comments that 1 had, and then we would 
eventually end up with a document like this one where I 
signed it off as having reviewed it 
Q. (BY :MR. ADAMS) Okay. Were you the initial 
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reviewer of documents in the-- 1 
A. No. 2 
Q. -- subdivision process? 3 
A. No, huh-uh. It would come in, and I might, I 4 
might see it when it come in and give it a cursory 5 
review, but it would go to all the department heads and 6 
they would make their-- all of the people who worked 7 
for me, Eke sewer, water, streets and the city 8 
engineer, they would come back to me and I would see 9 
their comments. 1 0 
Q. Now, when the people in your department would 11 
review the subdivision or re-subdivision application, do 12 
you know what they would look at in preparing their 13 
comments for you? 1 4 
A. Yeah. They would, they would review any city 1 5 
code as it relates to that development to make sure that 16 
the development was in compliance with that code, and 17 
then they would sign off on that and then it would come 18 
to me. 19 
Q. Do you know if it was possible or practical for 2 0 
the people in your department to research, do extensive 21 
research regarding every development, subdivision or 2 2 
re-subdivision that came in? 2 3 
MR. LANDECK: Object to the form of the 2 4 
question. 2 5 
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MR. LANDECK: Object to the form. 
A. What I meant was that in the business of, of 
reviewing development plans, that's all I meant by the 
business activity. 
Q. (BY MR ADAMS) Okay, okay. Do you believe 
that developers have a responsibility for knowing about 
their property? 
A. To 811 extent, yes, but, you know, his -
sometimes the hlstory is not available. I don't know, 
you know, 
Q. Okay. Should they be able to rely on their 
engineers and the people that they hire to do research 
of the property? 
A. Should be able to. The engineer should stamp 
it, and the developer ought to be able to rely on it. 
Q. And should the City be able to rely on the 
infom1ation provided by the developer's engineer? 
A. Should the City be able to? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. Absolutely. 
MR. ADAMS: Thank you. No more questions. 
MR. LANDECK: I have no more questions. 
MR. CASEY: I don't have any either. 
(Deposition concluded at 9:38 a.m., Witness 
excused; Signature reserved.) 
Page 5 
A. I would say that if they didn't do that, they 
wouldn't have been doing their job, let's put it that 
way. And, again, you know, we're all humans. 
1 CERTIFICATE OF WITNESS 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. 
A. So .... 
Q. At one point earlier in your testimony you said 
that -- and I'm not going to recall your testimony 
exactly, and I apologize-- but something -- when we 
were discussing the specialized maps of geologic 
hazards, such as slope instability, that that should be 
dealt with during the, I believe you used the word, the 
business of the development process. What did you mean 
by, and 1 apologize again, I may be misquoting you, but 
I was wondering what you meant by the business activity 
I believe is the word you used. 
A. I remember saying that. I'm trying to remember 
how it-- what it related to. I don't recall 
specifically. But, say again now. 
Q. Well, I'm going -- it's a long way back. I 
don't think we can have the court reporter go all the 
way back, but what I had written down was that in 
discussing the specialized maps, you had mentioned that 
it was dealt with as part of the business activity of 
the development process. 
A. Well, what I meant was--
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I hereby certify that this is a true and 
CDrrect CDpy of my testimony, together with any changes 
I have made on this and any subsequent pages attached 
hereto: 
Dated this day of , 2010. 
BUD VAN STONE, DEPONENT 
Sworn and Subscnbed before me this 
day of , 2010. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR Til.ESTATE OF IDAHO 
Residing in , Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 
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approving or disapproving a large embankment. TI1at was 
the huge shopping center we have up there called Nez 
Perce Plaza. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I think Mr. Seubert was on board with Mr. 
Cutshaw when I brought the plans in for the developer, 
the owner. 
Q. Okay. Sorry, Mr. Seubert or Mr. Stubbers? 
There's two employees that have similar names at the 
City. 
A. Stubber [sic], I'm sorry. I said Seubert? 
Q. Youdid? 
A. Sorry. I used to work for a Seubert, so it's a 
little confusing. Stubber [sic] and Cutshaw. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Were involved with me on the Nez P ercc Plaza at 
which I proposed stability of the slopes based on 
something steeper than the building code pennitted. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And 1 had to provide information to him, so in 
a sense that's slope stability. And then the second one 
was more recently for Medley. 
Q. Okay. So, how many subdivisions have you been 
involved in for, within the City limits? 
A. Well, probably about six or eight through my 
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time. 
Q. Okay. And only two of those have required 
slope stability analysis? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. Should the City be able to rely on a 
builder's knowledge about the property with regard to 
placement of the homes? 
A. Well, the builder has to submit a plot plan. 
Is that what you're getting at? 
Q. No. 
A. Okay. Just knowledge? 
Q. Well, does the City-- is the City responsible 
to know everything about the property before it approves 
a building plan? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
A. I would-- no, they wouldn't know everything, 
no. 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. Are they required to know 
every potential problem with a property before they 
allow a building pennit? 
A. Oh, that's a broad statement 
MR. LAN"DECK: Object to form. 
A. You know, what problems are you talking about? 




















































A. I know you --
Q. --intentionally. 
A. -- are. Again, if a settlement is called a 
sore thumb out there that's had some issues of slippage 
and sliding, they ceJtainly should be conscious of it 
and make the builder aware of it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And maybe require some additional analysis 
before they issue and approve a building permit. 
Q. Is it your opinion that the City bas a duty to 
make sure absolutely nothing can go wrong with a 
property before it issues a building pennit? 
:MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn. 
A. I would think not, not to that extent 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. 1s it your opinion that 
the City is to ensure, make sure that properties a:re 
prepared for building? 
MR. LAJ\TDECK: Object to form 
A. Insured? 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Ensure. 
A.. Would you ask that question again? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to fonn. 
MR. ADAMS: Let me try that again. Well, could 
you read it back? 
(Whereupon, the court reporter read back the 
Page 
previous question.) 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
MR. ADAMS: Let me try again. 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Is it your opinion that the 
City has a duty to ensure that the property is prepared 
for building before a building permit can be issued? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
A. You know I, to answer that I'd have to clarify 
it 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. 
A. It's my opinion that the City should relay on 
any infonnation that is known on land that wants, 
somebody wants to develop. \Vhether it's, you know, 
whether it's proper zoning, whether it's got some 
conditions on it or unstable, or whether it might effect 
a neighbor, certainly I think the City should-- that's 
what they're here for is to safeguard the health and 
safety of the people of the community. They should be 
able to, or should be required as part of their duty to 
relay that infonnation on to whoever might want to build 
on it 
Q. Okay. You said any information during your 
answer. What information specifically, or is it all 
information? 
A. We're talking about unsafe conditions and 
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1 unstable land. 1l1ere might be, you know, we couldn't 
2 gather everything that the City may or may not know. 
3 But if they know, if it's known in tl1e area that mere's 
4 a piece ofland out there that may be unstable to build 
5 on, ilien there's a mechanism for the City to exercise 
6 their responsibility to make the developer aware of it 
7 and the builder. You could eiilier deny it or you could 
8 put restrictions on it. I've seen that before. They 
9 make people aware, hey, if you're going to build on iliis 
10 lot, you better get a geotech report or you better 
11 analyze it or whatever. And I think that's-- in those 
12 realms, I think the City, again, the people in the City, 
13 have that responsibility. 
14 Q. Okay. So once again, when you say "known in 
15 the area", are you referring to general knowledge? 
16 A. General, basically. It could be however they 
17 might receive it. General to you might not be general 
18 to me or vice versa. 
19 Q. Well, that's again what I'm trying to get it. 
20 If, for example, Shawn Stubbers did not know there was a 
21 problem with the property, not a sore thumb as you used 
22 the term, would he be required to - well, is iliere any 
23 absolute requirement that he, under specific conditions 
24 require a slope stability analysis? 
25 MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
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1 A. I think there's language in ilie City's 
2 subdivision or some other documents that gives the City 
3 engineer the authority to request an evaluation from the 
4 developer if, if it's required. If ilie City engineer or 
5 anybody else at the City, being the planning department, 
6 feels there is a need to, to evaluate a piece of land 
7 before it's developed, then who else is going to let the 
8 person know? 
9 Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Is tl1at infonnation available to 
10 the developer? 
11 A. I, I suspect so. 
12 Q. Is it available to the builder? 
13 A. It might be available to him, yes. 
14 Q. Are City files open to review? 
15 A. I would iliink so. 
16 Q. Have you had any experience requesting 
17 information from the City? 
18 A. Have I personally? 
19 Q. Yes. 
20 A. Yes, I have. 
21 Q. Okay. Are you able to get documents that 
22 you're looking for from the City? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. Do you know if the information regarding 
25 this property was available to Mr. Block? 
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A. I can't answer that. I wasn't here. 
I 
Q. Okay. \Vhat if no employee cmrently working ~ 
for the City has knowledge about a specific site 
condition, what is the City's duty at that point? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to the form. .~ 
A.. Nobody is available, they're all gone? 1 
:i 
Q. No, no, not available. Has no knowiedge of the " 
site condition. :; 6 
A. I don't know how they could -- I'm sure they'd 11 
have records and files that would be open. I think it ~~.; 
would be prudent for somebody in the City, be it the , 
engineering department or planning department or [~.;.· 
building department to check the files. ~ 
Q. Okay. Which files should be checked? ~~ 
A. Whatever is available on that land. If 11 
there's, you know, test reports. ~ 
Q. Do you know how long the City has to approve a 1~ 
subdivision plan? 
A. How long do they have? 
Q. Yes, from once it's submitted. 
A. In the preliminary state? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to fom1. 
A. To me they have too long of a time, really. 
Q. Okay. 
A. They have --
Q. Let me ask it a different way. 
A. Goahead. 
Q. Is there a time limit placed on how long the 
City has to comment, accept or reject a subdivision 
plan? 
A. I believe there is. 
Q. Okay. And, do you know if the City has time to 
check every file that's related to the property at 
issue? 
A. I would think they would, yes. 
Q. Okay. When you were the City engineer, slash 
h 
l~ 
I~ ":0 I 
I~ 
} 
public works director, did you check every file and ~ 
every document related to a property when you were asked ! 
to comment on it? I 
A. If there was anything I was concerned, I would ! 
~~oo~ I 
Q. But you didn't check every time, did you? i 
A. Well, ifi didn't, somebody in the City did. 
Q. Do you know that for a fact? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Who was it at the City-- wait. I'm 
asking when you were ilie public works director? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Correct. When you said somebody at the City, 
you meant somebody else? 
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the-- I can't answer that 1 
Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Okay. Have you-- 2 
A. You said the building official. Are you 3 
talking about the engineering department or the building 4 
department? 5 
Q. I'm talking about- I'm sorry, what did you 6 
u~ 7 
A. Are you talking about the building official or 8 
the, or the engineering department? I lost you there. 9 
Q. I'm talking about the building officiaL 10 
A. The building officiaL 11 
Q. And my question is, do you-- in your 12 
experience, have you ever had a building official 13 
require a slope stability analysis? 14 
A. No, I haven't. 15 
Q. Is --do building officials have, in your 1 6 
experience, authority to require compaction testing? 1 7 
A. Yes. 18 
Q. Okay. And is that with regard to I think you, 19 
you made a comment regarding structural slopes, I might 2 0 
be slaughtering the word. 21 
A. Structural embankments. 2 2 
Q. Structural embankments, thank you. And also 2 3 
under footings? 2 4 
A. Yes. 25 
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stability. 
Q. And once again, is, is this b:~ck to Ll,e 
testimony you gave earlier about, because of the general 
knowledge regarding the condition of the property? 
A. Basically. 
Q. Okay. And was there any specific iu"lowledge 
regarding the condition of the property that should have 
prevented the City from approving the subdivision plan 
for Canyon Greens? 
A. Well, I think I answered that. I thought they 
should, should have been conscious of it and either 
rejected it or put some stipulations on it. 
Q. Yes. But I'm, I guess maybe my and I admit, 
I do ask poor questions. 
A. No, you're sharper than I am. 
Q. Well, thank you. What specific knowledge did 
the City have when it approved the subdivision for 
Canyon Greens that should have prevented the City from 
either approving the subdivision plan or alternately 
putting stipulations on it? 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
A. Well, again, I'm surmising they should have 
known, should have known there's been an embankment put 
on the property. You know, I think that should have 
been knowledge, general knowledge, of the City. 
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1 Q. Okay. Do you know-- have you ever had an 1 Q. Okay. So--
2 experience where a building official required a 
3 full-blown slope stability analysis? 
4 MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 
5 A. No, not a building official, no. 
6 Q. (BY MR. ADAMS) Do you know if the City 
7 engineer is involved in issuing a building permit? 
8 A. I don't know what the procedure in Lewiston is. 
9 I know when I was here what we did, but beyond that I 
1 0 can't answer. 
11 Q. Okay. Is it-- are you providing any opinion 
12 today regarding the design of the houses? 
13 A. The houses themselves? 
14 Q. The houses and the properties? 
15 A. I don't follow you on that. The house, no. 
1 6 Q. Okay. Are you providing any opinion with 
1 7 regard to the design or placement of other things on the 
18 property such as retraining walls or pools? 
19 A. No. 
2 0 Q. Is it your opinion that the City should not 
21 have approved the subdivision plan for Canyon Greens? 
2 2 A. It should not have unless they had stipulations 
23 on it. 
2 4 Q. And what are those stipulations? 
2 5 A. That it should have been analyzed, the 
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2 A. And then the knowledge that that area suspect 
3 of being unstable. Those two items should have been on 
4 the forefront of the City before they approved the plat. 
5 They should have required some geotech, be it compaction 
6 testing, whatever, some background on that land before 
7 they approved the plat. 
8 Q. And, once again, if the employees of the City 
9 who worked on the subdivision process have testified 
1 0 that they didn't know that there were issues with the 
11 property, what would have been their duty to require a 
12 geotech analysis or slope stability analysis or 
1 3 something similar? 
14 MR. LANDECK: Object to form, and asked and 
15 answered. 
1 6 A. It's hard for me to believe they didn't have 
17 some knowledge. If they went and looked at the site, 
1 8 they could have ascerta.ined there had been an embankment 
19 put on it. And then based on that, they should have 
2 0 required some information from the developer as to the 
21 stability of that embankment AU they had to do was 
2 2 review the site and see that 
2 3 Q. Do you know if an engineered set of plans is 
2 4 required for a subdivision plan? 
2 5 A. There is engineering plans required for the 
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utilities and the roadways, and ifthere's major grading 1 
performed by the developer, then that should be 2 
inCluded. 3 
Q. Do you know who the engineer was who worked on 4 
the administrative plat for Om yon Greens? 5 
A. No, I don't. 6 
Q. Do you know if it was Keltic Construction? 7 
MR. LANDECK: I think he said he didn't know. 8 
Q. (BY MR ADAMS) All right. Will you look at 9 
Exhibit 142, please? 10 
MR. LAJ\TDECK: What number was that? 11 
Q. (BY MR ADAMS) Exhibit 142, I believe. 12 
A. Yes, it is 142. 13 
Q. Okay. Have you seen this document before? 14 
A. You know, I think I did see this last page 15 
maybe late-- the other day. 1 6 
Q. Do you know who prepared that document? 1 7 
A. Well the name on it is Keltic Engineering. 18 
Q. Does the City have the right to rely on a plan 1 9 
prepared by a licensed engineer with regard to a 2 0 
subdivision plan? 21 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 2 2 
A. Yes. They have that, and they have the 2 3 
responsibility to check it out. 2 4 
Q. What if the, if the licensed engineer has 2 5 
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knowledge regarding slope movement on a specific 1 
property that he has prepared a subdivision plan for, do 2 
you think he has a duty to share that knowledge with the 3 
G~ 4 
MR. LANDECK: Object to form. 5 
A. If the engineer has knowledge? 6 
Q. (BY MR ADAMS) Yes. 7 
A. I'd have to speak for myself 8 
Q. Okay. Speaking for yourself. 9 
A. I'd certainly like-- I'd let them know. 10 
Q. May I have that back? Thank you. So, it's 11 
your opinion that if Eric Hasenoehrl or some other 12 
engineer from Keltic Engineering had knowledge regarding 13 
slope movement on the property, he should have let the 14 
City know? 15 
A. Yes. I know Eric. He's pretty thorough. I 1 6 
think he would have. 1 7 
Q. Okay. When should the City have required a 18 
slope stability analysis be done on this property? 1 9 
A. Whether they require it or not, I don't know if 2 0 
they went that far or not. V,.'hat they should have 2 1 
required, in my thoughts is to let the engineer of 2 2 
record know what they knew about the property and make 2 3 
him aware of it, and he'd probably take the bull by the 2 4 
homs and do it himself and do whatever had to be done 2 5 
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on the property. 
Q. So if the engineer of record was E1ic 
Hasenoehrl or Keltic Engineering, they could have used 
either, from what-- I'm taking from what you just said, 
either the City's knowledge or their own knowledge to 
detennine whether or not to require a slope stabil1ty 
analysis; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Should the City have required a slope stability 
analysis when the property was re-subdivided in 2005? 
A. I think we're getting off a little bit and 
talking slope stability now, and I'd like to go back and 
say the City should have required a geotech evaluation 
of the property, whatever it would take to satisfy the 
owner and the developer and the builder that it was 
stable. And, you know, whether a slope stability 
analysis, that would be somebody else's decision, not 
mine. Ifi was the engineer, I may or may not do it. 
I'd have to look into it. But that's one instrument by 
which, now in hindsight, would probably stipulate or 
show that that land is unstable. 
Q. Now, apparently I- I've been under the 
impression throughout this case that a geotech analysis 
and slope stability analysis are similar if not the 
same? 
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A. No, a geotech is more broad. 
Q. Okay. So, what is the difference between the 
two? 
A. Well, slope stability analysis is one tool that 
a geotech will use to evaluate a site. 
Q. Okay. 
A. A lot of them might be geology and might be 
slope steepness, water, density. 
Q. So, is it your opinion that the City should 
have required a geotechnical analysis or a slope 
stability analysis? 
A. Geotech evaluation, which they've done in the 
past. 
Q. Okay. So, your opinion is not with regard to a 
slope stability analysis? 
A. No. That came up, again, as being a tool that 
could have been part of the geotech evaluation. 
Q. Okay. So, is it your opinion that a 
geotechnical analysis should have been done in 2005? 
A. City should have required it. 
Q. Okay. Is it your opinion that a geote.ch 
analysis should have been done when the property was 
re-subdivided in 2006? 
A. The City should have required it. 
Q. Is it your opinion that the City should have 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, ) 
) Case No. CV 09-02219 
J 
Plaintiff, ) AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN 
.) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
vs. ) RECONSIDERATION OF 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J. ) ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the ) SU1\1MARY JUDGMENT 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF ) 
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of ) 
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20, ) 
Defendants. ) 
-------------------------------- ) 
PlaintiffJohn G. Block ("Block"), through counsel, hereby submits this Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 11 ( a)(2)(B), Block respectfully requests that 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MEMORANDUM 
OPINION AND ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 
ldjoo3/029 
11/ 0 1/ 2 011 TUE 12: 4 6 FAX 2 0 8 8 8 3 4 59 3 
this Court reconsider and withdraw its Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment that granted Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order"). 
In its Order this Court granted the Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's 
("City's") Second Motion for Summary Judgment based on its application of the economic loss 
rule and recognized exceptions from liability based upon provisions of the Idaho Tmi Claims Act 
("ITCA"). Block asserts that this Court's application of the economic loss rule to bar his 
negligence claims was in error. In addition, Block asserts that this Couri's recognition of and 
application of exceptions to liability based on provisions of the ITCA were also in enor. Further, 
Block asserts that there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding the City's negligence 
and/or gross negligence with respect to its actions and/or omissions. Block's arguments are more 
fully explained below. 
The background facts in their most basic sense are that (i) a landslide occurred on 
property contained within City limits and contained within a subdivision, Sunset Palisades No. 4 
("SP4"); (ii) the City knew and documented such landslide event in two separate file locations in 
City records with the intent of addressing such landslide when future development of the 
property occurred; (iii) the property at issue was proposed for development through various 
subdivision processes including Sunset Palisades No. 8 ("SP8") completed before Block 
purchased the property at issue, and Canyon Greens ("CG") and Canyon Greens No. 2 ("CG2") 
completed during Block's ownership of the property at issue; (iv) the City's subdivision 
ordinance required staff to meet with each developer and identify any unusual problems and 
determine if special studies were needed; (v) City staff met with Block and failed to warn or 
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advise of the landslide occunence either by not exercising ordinary care, or by failing to do what 
reasonable person(s) in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would recognize as his or 
her duty; (vi) Block developed the property exercising, at a minimum, ordinary care and in 
compliance with all of the City's requirements, (vii) in 2009 an almost identical landslide/earth 
movement event occurred that was the proximate cause of physical damage to Block's three 
homes and improvements constructed at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive and within CG, 
and Block was forced to demolish some of these structures at great monetary loss. 
Some additional basic facts related to the situation described above are (i) at no time did 
Block enter into a contract with the City either for the sale of goods or services; (ii) at no time 
did Block enter into a contract to purchase anything more than the bare land on which he 
constructed the homes and various other structures and that contract was with the Streibicks and 
not the City; (iii) at the time of the City's negligent actions, Block owned only unimproved real 
property; (iv) Block is seeking damages because this "other property," the homes and 
improvements he constructed were damaged because of the 2009landslide; (v) Block is not 
claiming compensation for damages to the unimproved real property he purchased from a third 
party; (vi) the real property is still there. 
The Court's application ofthe economic loss rule to bar Block's recovery of damages is 
enoneous. 
The facts of Block's case are distinguishable from the facts of the cases cited by this 
Court in its Order. The following cases were cited by the Court in its Order. 
In Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P .2d 
306 (1975) the issues before the court were limited to (i) "whether a plaintiff may maintain an 
6:2J005/ 029 
action against a manufacturer, with which it is not in privity of contract, to recover economic loss 
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on the ground of breach of implied warranty within the contract statute of limitations" and (ii) 
the effect of plaintiffs failure to give a defendant adequate notice of breach of warranty pursuant 
to the Uniform Sales Act.Id. at 352, 356, 544 P.2d at 310, 314. The court did not thoroughly 
consider the "economic Joss rule". 
The case of Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P.2d 848 (1999) is also distinguishable 
from Block's case. In 1995 Morris sold an airplane to Ramerth.Jd. at 195, 983 P.2d at 849. 
Ramerth later discovered that the airplane had certain defects caused by repairs improperly done 
in 1992 by Hart.Jd. at 195-96, 983 P.2d at 849-50. Ramerth and Monis sued Hart based on 
negligence, negligence per se and breach of contract and sought damages for repairing the 
defective airplane as well as lost profits. ld. at 196, 983 P.2d at 850. The district coUli granted 
summary judgment dismissing the negligence claims based on a finding that the alleged damages 
were purely economic. ld. The court cited Salmon Rivers stating "economic loss includes costs 
of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as 
commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Id. The court held 
that the transaction was a sale and purchase and that the subject of that transaction was the 
defective airplane, thus damages to repair the subject of that transaction, the defective airplane, 
as well as commercial loss of profits from use of that defective airplane, was economic loss.Jd. 
at 197, 983 P.2d at 851. Thus, boiled down to the basics, Rarnerth purchased a defective 
airplane; the airplane was the subject of the transaction; the costs to repair or replace the 
defective airplane were economic loss. 
Also distinguishable from Block's case and cited by this Court, is Blahd v. Smith, Inc., 
141 Idaho 296, 108 P .3d 996 (2005). The Blahds purchased a lot and house on a hillside. I d. at 
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298, 108 P.3d at 998. The ground underneath the house began to settle and caused damage to the 
bouse.ld. Peter and Kimberly Gysling had previously owned the Jot and constructed the home. 
!d. at 299, 108 P.3d at 999. The Blahds purchased the home from the Gyslings.Jd. The Blahds 
filed a complaint against several parties. Id. The district granted summary judgment on the 
ground that the Blahds' negligence claims were baned by the economic loss rule.Jd. 
On review, the Idaho Supreme Court stated "it is the subject of the transaction that 
detennines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being 
sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole .... [Therefore,] the 
subject of the transaction [wasJ both the lot and the house." Id. at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. 
Therefore, tbe damage to the Blahds' house caused by the house foundation settling was purely 
economic and their negligence claims were baned against the Smith Entities (who improved the 
lot) and Jones (who told the Gyslings that the soil was adequate for residential construction) by 
the economic loss rule. !d. at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. 
Also distinguishable from Block's case and cited by this Court, is Tusch Enterprises v. 
Co.[(in, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987). In Tusch, VanderBoegh was tbeprior ownerofthe 
land and constructed three duplexes that were completed in early 1976. !d. at 39, 740 P.2d at 
1024. In March 1979, Tusch Enterprises purchased the land and duplexes from Vander Boeghs. 
Jd. at 40, 740 P.2d at 1025. Thereafter, Tusch Enterprises noticed damage to the foundation of 
the duplexes. !d. Tusch Enterprises alleged negligence on the part oftbe Vander Boeghs and 
Coffin in tbe design and construction of the duplexes; however, because the only damages 
alleged were lost rental income from the duplexes and property damage to the duplexes and 
parking lot, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the negligence claim 
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because such losses were purely economic losses. TI1e court cited the Salmon Rivers comi's 
statement that "economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property 
which is the subject of the transaction as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and 
consequent loss of profits or use." I d. at 41, 7 40 P .2d at 1026. Thus, because Tusch Enterprises 
suffered no personal injuries and no damage to property other than that which was the subject of 
the sale and purchase transaction, being the land and duplexes, Tusch Enterprises' lost rental 
income and duplex and parking lot damages were deemed economic losses and non~recoverable 
in their negligence action. ld. at 40-41, 740 P.2d at 1025-26. 
Thus, all cases cited by the Court are inapposite to Block's case. Ramerth purchased a 
defective airplane, the airplane was the subject of the transaction, the costs to repair or replace 
the defective airplane was economic loss; the Blahds purchased a defective house and lot, the 
house and lot were the subject of the transaction, the costs to repair or replace the defective 
house and lot was economic loss; Tusch Enterprises purchased the lots, the duplexes and the 
parking lots, the lots, the duplexes and the parking lots were the subject of the transaction, the 
costs to repair or replace the defective lots, duplexes and parking lots were economic loss. TI1e 
facts in these cases cited by this Court are distinguishable from the facts of Block's case. 
Block purchased four unimproved lots from Defendants Streibick; those four unimproved 
lots were the subject of the transaction, any costs to repair or replace those four unimproved lots 
is economic loss. However, Block has not alleged any such damage. The damage Block has 
alleged is distinct from any damage to those four lots which were the subject of his transaction 
with Streibicks. At least one year after purchasing the lots, Block constructed homes, retaining 
walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks on a portion of those four lots. These 
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homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks are "other property" that 
has suffered damage. This "other property" was not part of the subject of the transaction. Block 
did not purchase the homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks like 
Ramerth purchased an airplane, Blahds purchased a home and lot, and Tusch Enterprises 
purchased lots, duplexes and parking lots. These four cases provide an incomplete analysis of the 
issue before this Court in this case. The facts ofBlock's case are different, distinguish Block's 
case from the cases relied upon by this Court and compel a different result. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently revisited the "economic loss rule" in Aardema v. 
US Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 215 P.3d 505 (2009) and Brian and Christie, Inc. v. 
Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22,244 P.3d 166 (2010). 
In Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 215 P.3d 505 (2009) plaintiffs 
tort claim arose out ofthe contract for a milking system.Jd. at 790,215 P.3d at 510. The Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that "damage to person or property when the property is not the subject 
of the transaction is recoverable under a negligence theory.', Id. The Court observed that "it has 
not defined the 'subject of the transaction,' instead relying on factual comparisons from previous 
decisions." !d. at 791,215 P.3d at 511, citing Blahd, supra at 301. Its "clear pattern" in these 
decisions has been to "implicitly'' define the "subject of the transaction" by the subject matter of 
the contract." I d. The court continued by recanting its prior statement in Blahd, to the effect that 
the word "transaction" refers to the "subject of the lawsuit," by clarifying that "if the subject of 
the transaction is defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every claim would be barred by 
the economic loss rule. Instead we read this overbroad language from Blahd to mean that the 
underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the transaction." !d. at FN2. 
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Thus, this CoUli' s recitation on page 6 of its Order that for purposes of the economic loss rule the 
word transaction means the subject of the lawsuit is in error. Further, the court in Aardema 
explained that the defendants' argument that the cows were the subject of the transaction was 
strained and that only the milking machines were the subject of the transaction because the dairy 
did not contract with any of the defendants for cattle. Therefore physical damage to the cows was 
not economic loss. 
Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010), 
the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent decision analyzing the "economic loss rule," clarified 
Idaho law and fully supports Block's right to pursue negligence claims against the City. In that 
case, plaintiff owned a restaurant and a subcontractor, hired to perform electrical work, 
connected signs that had been installed by a sign company to the restaurant building's electrical 
power withou·t inspecting the sign's wiring. The sign's wiring caused a fire that resulted in 
substantial damage to the building and its contents. Plaintiff sued the subcontractor for negligent 
perfonnance of electrical work. The district court held that the restaurant's cause of action was 
barred by the economic Joss mle. !d. at 171-72. 
In Brian and Christie, the Supreme Court drew the "distinction between tl1e recovery of 
damages in tort for physical injuries to person or property and the recovery of truly economic 
loss for breach of warranty or contract" as one which centers upon the "economic expectations" 
of the parties. It quoted from Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 
(1978) in noting that "[t]he economic expectations of parties have not traditionally been 
protected by the law concerning unintentional torts." !d. at 335, 581 P.2d at 793. This is the 
underpinning of the economic loss rule, which is that parties enter into a transaction, through 
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contract or warranty, concerning which a party's economic expectations are not met. That is not 
at all the situation in Block's case. There was no contract or warranty with the City. There was 
no economic expectation involved in the transaction involving Block and the City. The facts of 
the Block case do not fall within the ambit of the economic loss rule. 
As further support for this position, the Court in Brian and Christie states that the 
definition of economic loss stated in earlier Idaho cases "does not apply in cases involving the 
negligent rendition of services because such cases do not involve the purchase of defective 
property." Block did not purchase the houses he built. Block did not purchase any property 
from the City. Block had no economic expectations in connection with any transactions he had 
with the City. The Court goes on to say that "[d]amages from hann to person or property are not 
purely economic losses." Even though Block may have had aspirations for development when 
he entered into his real estate purchase with the Streibicks, his property damage occurred, as 
alleged in his Complaint, as a result of the City's failure to warn of the landslide. This Court has 
not concluded that Block has not properly alleged a common negligence claim against the City 
for its failure to warn of this condition. Block alleges that the City's failure to warn caused him 
damages. Under these circumstances, at the very least, Block's alleged economic loss "is 
recoverable in tort as a Joss parasitic to an injury to person or property." Id. citing Duffin, supra 
at 1007, P .2d at 1200. The Brian and Christie Court emphasized that their concern is "with the 
duties imposed by the law upon the defendant with respect to the plaintiffs business not with the 
duties imposed by the construction contract" Citing Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 
99 Idaho 462,468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978). 
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This then is the major en-or this Court has made by broadly applying the economic loss 
rule where, in reality, the rule is severely limited by circumstances of each case and those 
circumstances, in this case, do not give rise to the application of the rule. There is a duty 
imposed on the City of Lewiston under law to wam Block of the known dangerous condition on 
his properiy. The City of Lewiston did not use ordinary care and in fact was grossly negligent of 
its duty to avoid injury or damages to Mr. Block in his development of this property. TI1e City is 
liable for those damages and the economic loss rule does not bar recovery for those damages 
and, even if it did, because those damages are also recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to injury 
to property, all economic losses are recoverable in the negligence action. Brian and Christie, 
supra at 172. 
There is no further Idaho Supreme Court case law citing to either of these two very recent 
cases; however, the U.S. District Court ofldaho recently discussed the Aardema case in 0 Bar 
Cattle Co., v. Ovvyhee Feeders, Inc., 2010 WL 2652289 (June 30, 2010). The 0 Bar court 
addressed the issue of the economic loss rule in relation to jury instructions. The court explained 
that the economic loss rules operates to segregate damage claims between the tort law and the 
contract law and that "the Idaho Supreme Court has chosen to draw the line between these two 
potentially overlapping systems oflaw on the basis of (1) whether the loss claimed relates to the 
subject matter of the transaction and (2) whether the loss claimed includes property damage." Id. 
at *1. 
In regard to the subject of the transaction, the comi noted that the Idaho Supreme Court 
has interpreted the subject of the transaction by the subject matter of the contract. Id. at *2. In 
applying that definition the court found that the underlying contract was a bailment agreement 
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whereby defendants would keep, care for, feed, water and medicate plaintiffs cattle. As such, 
the subject of the transaction was the bailment agreement and the deceased cattle were property 
other than that which was the subject of the transaction.Jd. Thus, plaintiffs negligence claim 
was appropriate. Jd. 
In regard to the property damage, the court explained that even if the loss claimed related 
to the subject matter of the transaction, a plaintlff may still recover damages under a negligence 
theory if they have suffered property damage.Jd. at *2. The court relied on the Oppenheimer 
case in which the Idaho Supreme Court drew a distinction between property that had been 
destroyed and property that had been reduced in value. The court noted "[i]t is clear that the 
Idaho courts have drawn a clear distinction between property damage and economic loss based 
around the destruction of property (and that as] long as a plaintiff claims actual damage and not 
just loss of use or value, they may seek damages under a negligence theory." Jd. at *3. 
In Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 
(1987), Oppenheimer contracted with Bolen Cattle Co. to care for several head of cattle. Id. at 
424, 732 P.2d at 662. Bolen allegedly rebranded the cattle and sold them. Id. A state deputy 
brand inspector inspected the converted cattle prior to sale. Id. The tlial court ruled that 
Oppenheimer's claims against the State Brand Board failed to state a cause of action in toli 
because they were based upon economic damages. Id. at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. The Idaho 
Supreme Court noted that Oppenheimer was not alleging mere economic damage. I d. at 426, 732 
P .2d at 664. The court found that Oppenheimer suffered the loss of its property due to the 
negligence of the deputy brand inspector. Id. Thus, Oppenheimer had a cause of action against 
the deputy brand inspector. 
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There does not appear to be any Idaho case Jaw relating specifically to the facts of 
Block's case, where "other property" was added to real property that was the subject of a 
transaction and it is this "other property" that suffered physical damage. However, the United 
States Supreme Court has stated that for purposes of applying the economic loss doctrine the 
"product" is limited to that which the manufacturer originally placed in the stream of commerce 
through the product's sale to the initial user, but that equipment added to the product after the 
product was sold to the initial user was not part of the product itself but was "other property" and 
that physical damage the product causes to "other propetiy" is recoverable. Saratoga Fishing Co. 
v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S.Ct. 1783 (1997). If the land Block purchased is designated as the 
"product" and the "other property" not necessarily equipment, but homes, walls, garages, 
driveways, fences, etc. are added to that product, or land, and then that product or land causes 
physical damage to the other property such damage should be recoverable. 
Block clearly suffered physical damage to "other property" and therefore property loss. 
T]le City building official observed the following damage to 153 and 159: severe foundation 
damage, structural cracks inside sheetrock, warped floors, walls that had moved out of 
alignment, windows that had broken because of movement of the walls and a gas line separation. 
John Smith Depo. 39:19-25,40:1-2. Furthermore, Block had to demolish an entire house (153) 
and demolish the basement of another (159)~ which is complete property loss, property which is 
no longer in Block's possession. John Block Depo. 286:5-7,287:5-7,22-25, 288:1-25. 
Thus, Block asserts that this Court was in error in applying the economic loss rule to 
Block's tort claim against the City for failure to warn, a duty imposed by law not one imposed by 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MEMORANDUM 
OPINION AND ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 12 
any "transaction," and that at the very least there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Block suffered properiy damage other than that which was the subject of any "transaction."' 
This Court failed to apply the appropriate summary judgment standard in granting Defendant 
City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56( c). "Upon a 
motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-
moving party." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P2d 851 (1991). All 
reasonable inferences which can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P2d 1022 (1987) (emphasis 
added). An inference adverse to the nonmoving party may be drawn if it is the only reasonable 
inference. Christensen v. Idaho Land Developers, Inc., 104 Idaho 458, 660 P2d 70 
(Ct.App.1983) (emphasis added). Iftherecord contains conflicting inferences orreasonable 
minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment motion must be denied. G&J.1 
Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P2d at 854. "All doubts are to be resolved against the moving 
party[.]" Id. 
This Court failed to construe the exceptions set forth in the ITCA appropriately. 
Under the ITCA, liability is to be the rule with certain specific exceptions to be closely 
construed. Sterlingv. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211,214-15,723 P.2d 755,758-59 (1986); Rees v. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397, 143 Idaho 10 (2006). In addition, the purpose of the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) is to provide much needed relief to those suffering injury from the 
negligence of government employees. Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 137 P.3d 397, 
143 Idaho 10 (2006). This Court in its construction and application ofthe specific exceptions to 
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liability under the ITCA not only failed to construe the exceptions closely, rather it construed 
them broadly, placing the burden on Block to counter the City's assertions of immunity. 
Block's main argument is that the City should have told him, as someone with the status 
of a developer/builder on property within the City limits and over which the City had regulatory 
authority, that he was building on the site of a fanner landslide of which the City had knowledge 
and a duty to disclose. 
Given the City's concession that negligence is a recognized tort in the State ofidaho, the 
Court erred by failing to properly apply the 3-step analysis at the summary judgment stage and 
concluding that the provisions of the ITCA asserted by the City, including I. C. §§ 6-904B(3) and 
( 4 ), 6-904(1) or 6-904(7), provide inmmnity to the City for their negligent acts. Order at 13. 
The City's duty to Block. 
InRees v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) the 
Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and its 
employees could be liable for negligently investigating a reported case of child abuse. !d. at 13. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court explained that 
when reviewing a motion for summary it engaged in a three step analysis. First, whether to1i 
recovery is allowed under the laws ofidaho. Second, does an exception to liability under the 
ITCA shield the alleged misconduct from liability. Third, whether the merits of the claim entitle 
the moving party to dismissaL 
Under the first step, the court noted that the parties agreed that the Department owed no 
general duty to Tegan thus the issue was whether Idaho law recognized a special duty of care in 
this instance. "Determining when a special relationship exists sufficient to impose an affirmative 
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duty requires an evaluation of the 'the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the 
law to say that particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."' I d. at 15, 13 7 P.3d at 402 citing 
Coghlan, 133 Idaho 399, 987 P.2d at 311. The court cited to the "public duty rule" a rule of non-
liability and stated that an exception to this exists when a duty is owed to individuals rather than 
the public only and this approach accorded with Idaho law referring to Coghlan. I d. at 16, 13 7 
P .3d at 403. The Coghlan case involved the Idaho Supreme Court determining that a disttict 
court's grant of a motion to dismiss regarding duty was in eiTor and remanded for further 
proceedings because the court found sufficient inferences that the University of Idaho defendant 
and the sorority defendant had assumed a duty of care to the plaintiff. "A duty can be created if 
one voluntatily undertakes to perfonn an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to 
perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Jd. at 400, 987 P .2d at 312. The comt referenced 
allegations that supported an inference in favor of plaintiff that the university defendants 
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard the plaintiff from bad acts of which it 
had knowledge. Jd. And fmther the sorority defendants took actions which constituted 
undertakings sufficient to create a duty to act in a non-negligent manner. I d. at 402, 987 P .2d at 
314. 
In examining this, the court applied a fact-intensive test as set out in a Mirmesota case.Jd. 
There, the comi noted that a statute alone could not create a special duty and there had to be 
additional indicia that the government has undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular 
class of person from the risk associated with a particular harm. I d. It then considered four 
non-exhaustive factors: 
1. Whether the government had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition 
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2. W11ether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the government's 
representations and conduct (such reliance must be based on specific actions or 
representations which cause the person to forego other alternatives of protecting 
themselves) 
3. Whether an ordinance or statute set for mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a 
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole; and 
4. Whether the government used due care to avoid increasing the risk of harm. 
The court explained that these four factors need not all be met for the Court to determine 
that a duty exists and they do not create a bright-line test. 
Applying those factors in Block's case, the subdivision ordinance sets forth mandatory 
acts clearly for the protection of a pmiicular class of persons rather than the public as a whole. In 
regard to whether the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition (i.e. the 1999 
historic landslide), there is no question it had actual knowledge because two memos were placed 
in City records by the City Engineer. Regarding reliance, Block reasonable relied on City staffs 
statements and conduct in his preapplication meeting. Regarding the fourth factor, whether the 
City used due care to avoid hann to Block, clearly there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the City exercised due care in their actions as set forth in the affidavits of John Block, 
Eric Hasenoehrl, Bud Van Stone and John ("Hank") Swift previously submitted. The Court has 
erred by concluding that the City did not owe to Block a duty to competently perform its services 
as set forth in the subdivision code and to wam Block of the previous la11dslide on his real 
prope1iy because of the special relationship created once Block met with City staff as part of the 
subdivision process. 
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Idaho Code § 6-904B does not afford the City immunity for Block's claims which mise from the 
City's issuance ofpennits and/or failure to inspect because, at a minimum, there is a genuine 
issue of material fact whether the City acted with gross negligence. 
Idaho Code § 6-904B provides immunity to a govenunental entity and its employees 
while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal 
intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct for any claim which: 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order or similar authorization. 
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate 
inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of the 
govenunental entity performing the inspection. 
Gross negligence is defined as "the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable 
person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of 
contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and 
that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences of others." LC. § 
6-904C. Block admnantly disputes this Court's assertion that "[n]othing in the record before the 
Court establishes that the City acted with gross negligence." An examination of the following 
facts demonstrates that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the City acted with 
gross negligence. 
1. Eric Hasenoehrl, a licensed professional civil engineer, testified that the City did not act 
reasonably in approving the subdivision plan for Canyon Greens knowing that a landslide 
had occurred previously in that same area. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 566:9-24. 
2. Mr. Hasenoehrl also testified that the City acted with deliberate indifference to the 
hannful consequences of its ac6on by approving the subdivisions. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 
567:6-24. 
3. Mr. Hasenoehrl also testified that the City acted with gross negligence by failing to warn 
Block and approving the subdivisions. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 568:1-25. 
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4. Mr. Hasenoehrl testified in his deposition that a licensed engineer working for the City of 
Lewiston has an obligation to bting forward those things that have potential harm and to 
take action so that the infonnation is used and addressed in the future. Eric Hasenoehrl 
Depo. 462:8-22,472:1-5. 
5. Mr. Hasenoerhl also testified that the City should disclose every piece of information that 
is necessary for the orderly and safe development of property. Eric Hasenoehrl Depo. 
480:20-25, 481:1. 
6. Ch1is Davies, a licensed professional engineer, and the current City Engineer, testified 
that if the City knows information it ''should tell people about it. That's our job." Chris 
Davies Depo. 21:15-24. Mr. Davies also explained that if he had known about the Tim 
Richard Memorandum he would have passed it on to a potential developer. Cluis Davies 
Depo. 20:3-1 L 
7. Jolm Smith the current City building official has testified that issuance of a residential 
building permit on a lot unsuitable for development would be outside his authority and 
that he would "be negligent in (his] duty to issue a permit". John Smith Depo. 18:24-25, 
19:1-9. Mr. Smith further testified that he does not have authority to issue a residential 
building permit for a lot that the City knows in within an area oflands1ide activity. John 
Smith Depo. 19:18-23. 
8. Shawn Stubbers, a licensed professional engineer, testified that the City in reviewing a 
subdivision has a duty to bring information forward to a developer. Shawn Stubbers 
Depo. 47:11-17. 
9. Fonner City Public Works Director Bud Van Stone testified that the placement of Tim 
Richard's memorandum into the SP No.4 files was done in the normal course of business 
so that the City would use such for future reference. Bud Van Stone Depo. 46:12-25, 
47:1-8. 
10. By failing to wam John Block at time of subdivision of Canyon Greens and Canyon 
Greens No. 2 and upon issuance of building pennits for 153, 155 and 159 and the Canyon 
Greens No. 2 lots, the City acted unreasonably and failed to exercise reasonable care; It is 
part of City staffs job to review every single document that was relevant to a subdivision 
or re-subdivision. Bud Van Stone Depo. 52:4-9. 
11. If City staff failed to research every development, subdivision or re-subdivision 
submitted for approval then they "wouldn't have been do:ing their job[.]" Bud Van Stone 
Depo. 53:21-25, 54:1-3. 
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If this Court construes the facts most liberally in favor of Block, a trier of fact cou1d 
conclude that the City had a duty to warn Block of the landslide and that by failing to warn 
Block that he was about to develop and construct residential housing on the site of a fanner 
1ands1ide the City showed deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm that could result 
from such actions. It is not within the province of this Court on a motion for summary judgment 
to take this factual determination out of the jury's hands. The Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
this issue inS. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 16 P.3d 278 (2000) where 
it concluded that the district court had erred by granting summary judgment on an issue of gross 
negligence because genuine issues of material fact existed. 
This Court's language stating that the "innnunity language within this statute is broad 
enough to cover any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other 
permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue" is in 
error given the Idaho Supreme Court's direction that such exceptions must be construed closely 
or narrowly rather than broadly. Rees, supra. In addition, this Court's language stating that the 
"burden is particularly high for Block," in regard to Block proving malice or criminal intent is 
disconcerting. Block has never alleged malice or criminal intent and further, any "burden" 
imposed by the ITCA should not be "particularly high" for a plaintiff injured by wrongful act of 
the government and/or its employees. Rather, any "burden" must be construed in favor of Block 
as set forth in the appropriate summary judgment standard of review. 
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Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) does not afford the City immunity for all of Block's claims. 
Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) provides immunity from iiability for a governmental entity and its 
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent for any claim which: 
Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity 
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or perfonnance of a 
statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, 
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee 
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused. 
The regulatory function and discretionary function clauses ofi.C. § 6-904(1) represent 
two different types of actions that might be immune under the ITCA, but the same test applies to 
each. Rees, 143 Idaho at 20, 137 P.3d at 407. However, if a governmental employee fails to 
exercise ordinary care while carrying out either function then this exception would not afford 
immunity. I d. "Under Idaho law whether a government employee exercised ordinary care is 
nonnally a factual question best left to the jury." I d. 
The City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its regulatory function or at a minimum 
there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the City failed to exercise ordinary care. 
The Subdivision Ordinance states, in part, in Section 32-9 that "in canying out the 
purposes of the preapplication process, the subdivider and the city shall be responsible for the 
following actions: 
(1) Actions by the subdivider. The subdivider and/or his agents shall meet with 
the city at the preapplication conference ... 
(2) Actions by the city .... Inspect the site or otherwise determine its relationship 
to streets, utility systems, and adjacent land uses, and identify any unusual 
problems with regard to topography, utilities, flooding or other condition .... 
Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies, 
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability, wetlands, 
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions, 
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and the implications of the findings ofthose studies, ifrequired. The 
requirement of said special studies shall be determined by the city engineer. 
Lowell Cutshaw Depo., Exhibit 32. 
!Jj023/029 
Tim Richards, a licensed professional engineer and former City Engineer has testified 
that when the City memorialized the 1999 landslide in two separate files the intent was that such 
information would be available at the time of future development. Tim Richards Depo. 44:8-12. 
In addition, Mr. Richards has testified that "[t]he files or the system was used by the city to pass 
along institutional knowledge." Tim Richards Depo. 34:11-16. Warren Watts, a licensed 
professional engineer has testified that the City has a duty to review records and files as part of 
its subdivision process. Wanen Watts Depo. 92:2-16. The City conducted a preapplication 
meeting with Block regarding CG. Second Affidavit of Jolm Block p. 3-4, ~12. The City failed to 
search its records and locate the memorandums related to the landslide prior to attending this 
meeting and thereafter. Jd., Second Affidavit of John Block p. 2, ~7. In addition, Mr. Watts has 
testified that the City has a duty to warn or notify a developer of conditions or instability on 
property that the developer is planning to develop. Warren Watts Depo. 89:4-22. Eric 
Hasenoehrl, a licensed professional engineer has testified that at no time did the City notify or 
warn him of the information the City possessed in its files regarding the landslide in the area of 
CG and CG2. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl p. 4-5, ~12. John Block, the Plaintiff, who developed 
CG and CG2 has testified that at no time did the City notify or warn him of the infonnation the 
City possessed in its files regarding the landslide in the area of CG and CG2. Second Affidavit of 
John Block p. 2, 'i]7. Based on this evidence in the record there is certainly a genuine issue of 
material fact whether the City exercised ordinary care in conducting its regulatory functions. 
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The City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its discretionary function or at a 
minimum there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the City failed to exercise ordinary 
care, 
A failure to warn is a decision made solely by an individual and "does not require an 
evaluation of financial, political, economic and social effects. While it is hopefully not a routine, 
6;ZJ024/029 
everyday decision, it nevertheless involves the exercise of practical judgment and not planning or 
policy formation. Thus, the activity appears to be 'operational'." Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 
484, 488, 903 P.2d 73, 77 (1995). See also, Hunter v. State, Dept. of Corrections, Div. of 
Probation & Parole, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002) (The method in which the department 
warned the probationer's employer regarding his conviction did not involve consideration of 
financial, political, economic or social effects.) The City's failure to warn Block of the landslide 
was operational, just as in Brooks, the decision was made solely by individuals and did not 
require an evaluation of financial, political, economic and social effects. It involved practical 
judgment and not planning or policy formation. 
With respect to the issue of a geotechnical evaluation, although the primary decision to 
modify the Subdivision Code to allow the imposition of such a requirement to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis, in this case, this issue could still result in the imposition ofliability for the 
City's failure to exercise due care in the "operation stage" of this decision. See, e.g., October 4, 
1995, Idaho Attorney General Guidance to the Executive Director ofPERSI. (In regard to PERSI 
investment decisions the attorney general stated "The investment decision is still afforded the 
'discretionary function' immunity, but the negligence in failing to exercise due care in the 
'operation stage,' i.e., not conducting a title search or obtaining title insurance, may result in 
liability.") This is analogous to the City's decision regarding a geotechnical evaluation in this 
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case. The City's negligence in failing to exercise due care in the 'operation state,' i.e., failing to 
review the specific infom1ation related to this particular site which would have indicated that the 
proposed development was on the site of a recorded landslide and then failing to require 
additional studies, including a geotechnical evaluation, should result in liability. There is 
certainly a question of fact whether doing these things was a failure to exercise due care in the 
"operation state". Warren Watts, a licensed professional en!,>i.neer has testified that the City 
should have required a geotechnical evaluation when the property was subdivided in 2005. 
Warren Watts. Depo. 113:18-24. In addition, John "Hank" Swift a licensed professional 
geoteclmical engineer has testified that the City had a duty to prevent development in the area of 
a Jandsllde. Hank Swjft Depo. (September 14, 2011) 228:15-17. 
This Court's analysis and application ofl.C. § 6-904(1) makes the exceptions to liability set forth 
in I. C. §§ 6-904B (3) and ( 4) moot and is incorrect and overly broad. 
This Court states that: 
All of Block's claims against the City are based upon determinations made by city 
employees in the processes of approving subdivision plats or issuing building 
permits. These determinations are made in reliance upon or the execution of 
regulatory function. The actions of the City that Block complains of are those 
decisions which are contemplated within the ITCA as an exception to liability 
under the discretionary function exception. LC. § 6-904(1). Thus, the City is 
shielded from liability on all of Block's claims and the Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment is therefore granted on this alternative basis. 
This Court should have construed the statutes to give effect to the intent of the legislature 
and give effect based on the whole act and every word therein, "lending substance and meaning 
to the provisions." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 
(2006). 
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This Court's anplication of the exception to liability provided in Idaho Code 13 6-904(7) was 
enoneous because that exception cannot apply to Block's failure to warn claim. 
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) provides hmnunity from liability for a governmental entity and its 
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent for any claim which: 
Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, 
roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is 
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in 
effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of 
the construction by the legislative body of the govenunental entity or by some 
other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give 
such approvaL 
This Court states that the exceptions to liability provided in Idaho Code § 6-904(7) apply 
to Block's claim (vi). Order at 20. Claim (vi) states that the City and/or Cutshaw breached a duty 
of care by approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without notifying 
and/or warning Block that earth movement had occurred on 153, 155 and 159 in 1999 and had 
not been eliminated or properly abated. Again, the Court interprets Block's claim too narrowly 
and interprets the exception to liability broadly in contrast to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. 
· Block's claim (vi) is essentially a failure to wam claim. Block's claim is that neither the 
City nor Cutshaw notified or wamed him at any step along the way during the subdivision 
process related to Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 and prior to their approval, that on 
such property a landslide had previously occurred of which the City knew and had record of 
In addition, the Court's statement that the "approval or denial of a subdivision plat is a 
public project that is analogous to the development ofhighways, roads, streets, or other public 
property" is incredible. Order at 21. By its plain language, the application ofi.C. § 6-904(7) is 
restricted to "a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, 
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bridges, or other public prope1iy." Clearly, the Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens was not a 
plan or design for construction of highways, roads, streets, bridges or other public property. 
Keltic Engineeling prepared the Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens which was accepted by 
the City of Lewiston and recorded on February 15, 2006. Hasenoehrl Affidavit July 13, 2010, 
p.~ 6. In accordance with the Subdivision Code Section 32-7, Administrative Plats have "no 
public improvements required, ali property fronts upon an improved, publicly dedicated 
street[.]" Kar:i Ravencroft Affidavit. Canyon Greens was an Administrative Plat. Stubbers Depo. 
14:4-10. An engineered set of plans is not required for a subdivision, engineered sets of plans are 
required for utilities and roadways and major grading performed by the developer. Watts Depo. 
109:23-25, 110:1-3. 
Further, Black's Law Dictionary defines "public property" as "[s]tate-or community-
owned property not restricted to any one individual's use or possession." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 2nd Pocket Ed. at 564. Public property is exempt from taxation. Idaho Canst. Art. 
VII, § 4. There is no right to use public property for private purposes. Tyrolean Associates v. City 
of Ketchum, 100 Idaho 703, 604 P .2d 717 (1979). Former City Engineer, Tim Richards, testified 
that the property at issue was private property. Tim Richards Depo. 50:1-4. 
The plain language of this statute only provides immunity with regard to plans or designs 
for public projects (i.e., highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property). See, State v. 
Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 10 P3d 1285 (2000) (overruled on another point oflaw) ("Courts 
commonly construe statutory language by applying the legal maxim of noscitur a sociis, noting 
that a word is known by the company it keeps.") Idaho courts have considered this immunity in 
cases concerning public property. See Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P3d 1164 
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(20 1 0) (homeowner suffered damage from City road construction project and alleged negligent 
planning and design of a city road); Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P2d 330 
(1994) (negligent design of a city street intersection); Morgan v. State, Dept. of Public Works, 
124 Idaho 658, 862 P2d 1080 (1993) (negligent design of state office building where a blind man 
sustained injuries when he stepped backwards offloading dock located in state office building); 
Bingham v. Franklin County, 118 Idaho 318 (1990) (condition of public road). 
Therefore, Block respectfully requests that this Court reconsider and withdraw its finding 
that the exceptions to liability set forth in I. C. 6-904(7) apply to this case and in particular 
Block's claim (vi). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court withdraw its 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment and for the reasons 
set forth above, thereby issue a subsequent Order denying in full or in part the City's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 1st day ofNovember, 201 L 
LANDECK & FORSETH 
----~ 
/- I 
I t,iJ .... tH __ J. 
Ronald J. Landeck 
AttoJneys for Plaintiff 
t 
\ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
r-
Case No. CV 09-02219 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY 
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the 
State ofidaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and 
DOES 1 20, 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTON FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, the City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, and hereby 
submit this response to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. 
I. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTON FOR RECONSIDERATION- 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's lv1emorandum Opinion and Order on 
Second _Motion for Summary Judgment (filed October 14, 2011) (hereinafter referred to as 
"Memorandum Opinion"). In the Memorandum Opinion, the Court determined that summary 
judgment was available on two basic grounds: there was no duty owed to Plaintiff1, and the City 
was immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.2 Memorandum Decision, pp. 5 21. Though it 
was not discussed in the Memorandum Decision, the Court appears to have rejected Defendants' 
petitions for summary judgment on grounds of statute of limitations and failure to comply with 
the Idaho To1i Claims Act. 
Plaintiff now claims that the Court has made a mistake of law with regard to the 
application of the negligence standards. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Court has 
erroneously applied the economic loss doctrine. Amended Memo in Support, pp. 3 - 13. Plaintiff 
does not specifically address the negligence issue with regard to the duty owed by the City to 
him prior to his purchase of the property, and so it must be assumed that Plaintiff is not 
requesting reconsideration of the Court's ruling on this issue. 
With regard to the various immunities, Plaintiff contends that the Court improperly 
decided each of the immunity issues. Amended Memo in Support, pp. 13 - 26. 
2 
Defendants v.ill address below why the Court properly addressed and ruled on each of 
The negligence grounds for summary judgment encompassed both the economic Joss rule and contention 
that there was no duty owed to Plaintiff prior to his purchase of the property. The Court determined that the 
economic Joss rule prevented Plaintiff from prevailing on any of his claims. Memorandum Decision, p. 10. 
The ruling that the City owed Plaintiff no duty prior to his purchase of the property was not completely 
dispositive, and instead only resulted in dismissal of claims iii, iv, v, ix, x, and xi, all contained within'!! 55 
ofthe Complaint. Memorandum Decision, p. 10, 12. 
The Court ruled that the City was immune under I. C. § 6-904B(3) and 6-904B(4), discretionary immunity 
under l.C § 6-904(1), and design immunity under I. C. § 6-904(7). The 6-904B and discretionary immunity 
defenses were determined to be dispositive on all issues. Memorandum Decision, pp. 14, 20. Immunity 
under the design immunity was deemed to be applicable only to claim (vi) of'!! 55 of the Complaint. 
Memorandum Decision, p. 21. 




A. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT FOR THE COURT TO 
RECONSIDER ITS PREVIOUS OPINION. 
When a party files a motion for reconsideration, there is no requirement that the party 
provide the Court with either newly decided case law or new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 
Idaho 468, 4 72 - 73 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). However, a motion for reconsideration usually 
includes new or additional facts. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 
823 (1990). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the Court to "obtain a full 
and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice 
done, as nearly as may be." Jd. Even though no new facts are required when filing a motion for 
reconsideration, the burden is on the Plaintiff to bring to the Court's attention any new facts or 
reasons why the Court's previous decision should be reconsidered. See Coeur d'Alene Mining 
118 Idaho at 823 ("The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to 
the new facts. We will not require the trial court to search the record to determine if there is any 
new information that might change the specification of facts deemed to be established."); 
Johnson, 143 Idaho at 472 73 (absent new facts, the Court had no basis on which to grant a 
motion for reconsideration) (citing Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal 
Co., 126 Idaho 202 (1994) and Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586 (2001)). 
In this case, there are no significant new facts on which the Court could rely to overturn 
its prior ruling. The only new evidence submitted by Plaintiff that was not available to the Court 
at the time Defendants filed the Second Motion for Summary Judgment was the Deposition of 
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Tim Richards. See Fourth Affidavit of Ronald J Landeck, ~ 8 and Ex. 5. All of the other 
depositions attached to :Mr. Landeck's affidavit had been taken prior to Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and were available to present to the Court.3 Further, Mr. 
Richard's deposition is only discussed with respect to immunity4, and therefore does not provide 
any grounds for reconsideration of the negligence arguments. To the extent that his deposition 
constitutes new evidence, Defendants will discuss it with regard to the immunity arguments, 
below. 
B. RECONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE PLAL'\TTIFF 
HAS NOT SHO\VN THAT THE COURT MADE A MISTAKE OF LAW WITH 
REGARD TO THE COURT'S RULING ON THE NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS. 
Since there is no new evidence which would support reconsideration of the Court's ruling 
on the negligence arguments, the only reason for the Court to reconsider this matter would be if 
the Court misapplied the law to the facts as presented. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 73 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (errors of law may be basis for reconsideration). Defendants contend that 
the Court properly determined that the City and Lowell Cutshaw have no duty to protect against 
any economic loss which Plaintiff may incur. 
Plaintiffs primary argument is that while the economic loss rule may bar recovery of 
economic damages to the property at issue, it does not cover loss to the houses and other 
structures built on the property, as such constitute "other property", for which the economic loss 
rule does not bar recovery. Amended ]'vfemorandum in Support, pp. 3, 10 - 13. Plaintiff then 
engages in a significant discussion of the recent cases discussing the economic loss rule. 
However, none of the cases cited shows that the Court improperly applied the economic loss 
4 
A majority of the depositions previously taken had been submitted to the Court as part of Plaintiff's 
response to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment. See Second Affidavit of Ron Landeck 
(July 26, 2011 ), Exs. A through P. 
Amended Memo in Support, pp. 21, 25. 
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doctrine. 
Plaintiff seeks to expand the economic loss doctrine by expanding the definition of "other 
property" to include anything later (or previously) attached to the "defective property which is 
the subject of the transaction." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 
348, 351 (1975). Plaintiff seeks to convince the Court to do this by relying on an Idaho case in 
which there is no defective property at issue, and a United States Supreme Court case which is 
interpreting maritime law. See Amended Memorandum in Support, pp. 11 - 12 (citing 
Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423 (1986) and Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J 
lv1 Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997)). Neither of these cases is applicable, nor do they stand 
for the proposition that "other property" includes any improvements added to a defective 
property. 
In Oppenheimer Indust., the plaintiff had a contract with another party to care for cattle. 
Oppenheimer Indus., 112 Idaho at 424. That party then rebranded the cattle, and sold the herd. 
!d. The plaintiff then alleged that the State Brand Board should not have allowed the sale, as they 
didn't ask for proof of ownership. !d. The Court ultimately ruled that the economic loss rule did 
not apply and that the plaintiff could proceed with a claim for conversion. !d. at 425 - 26. 
However, the Court determined that the tort action could proceed because the plaintiff was "not 
alleging mere economic damage. Unlike the plaintiff in Clark, [plaintiff] is not still in possession 
of defective goods. Rather, [plaintiff] has suffered the loss of its property (i.e. the cattle) due to 
the negligence of the deputy brand inspector." !d. at 426. In other words, the plaintiff was 
allowed to proceed under a conversion theory because the property at issue (whether defective or 
not) was stolen. In this case, there is no such allegation. Plaintiff still owns the defective 
property, and has made no allegation that it was stolen. Further, there isn't even a discussion in 
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Oppenheimer Indus. regarding whether there is a defective property, and such defective property 
resulted in economic loss. The plaintiff in Oppenheimer was not alleging damage to "other 
property" as a result of the purchase of defective property; instead, the plaintiff was claiming that 
his property was stolen. Therefore, Oppenheimer provides no support for Plaintiffs contention 
that the houses and structures at issue constitute "other property". 
In Saratoga Fishing Co., the plaintiff was suing for loss of a fishing vessel. Saratoga 
Fishing Co .. 520 U.S. at 877. The vessel was built by J. M. Martinac & Co., who sold it to 
Madruga. Id. Madruga added numerous items to the vessel, including a skiff, seine nets, and 
spare parts. Id. Madruga then sold it to Saratoga Fishing Co., who owned it when it caught fire 
and sank. Id. Saratoga Fishing Co. then sued Martinac, and was allowed to recover for the cost of 
the skiff, nets, and spare parts as "other property". Id. at 884 - 85. Plaintiff contends that this 
logic should be adopted by the Court in this case to apply to the houses and other structures on 
the property. Amended Memorandum in Support, p. 12. However, Saratoga Fishing Co. has a 
number of important distinctions which do not support Plaintiffs argument. First, the case is 
based on maritime law, not Idaho nor any other state common law. Second, the improvements to 
the boat were made before Saratoga Fishing bought the boat, contrasting this case where the 
improvements were added after the purchase of the property. If the Saratoga Fishing Co. facts 
were applied to this case, that would be equivalent to Plaintiff purchasing the defective property 
with the houses already on it. The Idaho Supreme Court has already ruled in such cases as Blahd 
v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005) and Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 
40 (1987) that where a property is purchased with a defect on it, the economic loss rule prevents 
recovery. Therefore, the Saratoga Fishing Co. logic has been rejected by these cases. Third, 
Saratoga Fishing Co. is at its heart a product defect case, not a property case. In a product defect 
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case, the manufacturer can be sued; in a property case, there is no manufacturer. Finally, there is 
no governmental agency at issue in Saratoga Fishing Co., like there is in this case, Oppenheimer 
Indus., or Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002 (1995). Therefore, it does 
not help address the situation where an inspecting agency (not the manufacturer) is claiming that 
the economic loss rule is applicable. 
The Court correctly construed Idaho law with regard to the economic loss rule. Plaintiff 
purchased a property with the intent to build houses on it. This is the "defective property which 
is the subject of the transaction." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 97 Idaho at 351. Plaintiff has 
not presented any issue of fact showing that the intent of the contract was to do anything other 
than purchase the properties to build houses for resale. 5 Instead, Plaintiff attempts to argue that 
the damage was not to the properties at issue (i.e. the dirt), but is instead to the houses. Amended 
Memo in Support, p. 6. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has already 
decided, in Blahd, that where the defect in the property causes damage to the improvements to 
the property, the economic loss rule still applies. See Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 
296, 300-01 (2005). In Blahd, the plaintiffs purchased property and a house with a defect. They 
then repaired the property, and placed improvements in the basement, including slate tiles. 
Blahd, 141 Idaho at 299. These tiles were later damaged by the defect in the property. Id. 
Regardless, the economic loss rule barred recovery. Id. at 301. If Plaintiffs theory that any 
improvements to the property constitute "other property" is correct, then Blahd was decided 
incorrectly. Theoretically, the plaintiffs in Blahd should have been able to recover for damages 
related to improvements to the property, but they were not. 
The Court properly applied that rule in this case. The houses and other structures built on 
As Plaintiff is a developer, it would seem odd for him to make any other assertion. 
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the property are nothing more than a more grandiose version of the slate tile added to the 
basement of the house in Blahd. The defect in the property in Blahd caused damage to the 
improvement of that property, and the defect in the property Plaintiff purchased in this case 
caused damage to the improvements he added to the property. 
The "other property" concept is explained in Aardema v. US Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785 
(2009). In that case, the defective property was allegedly the milking machines. Aardema, 14 7 
Idaho at 788. The allegation was that the milking machines caused injury to the cows, thus 
resulting in decreased milk production. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the milking machines 
were the subject of the transaction. Id. at 791. The Court specifically stated "if the only damage 
that is produced is in the form of lost milk production, quality and profits and not actual physical 
damage to the cows then this is purely economic loss; that is, the failure of the milking 
equipment to produce the products and profits anticipated by Aardema Dairy." Id. at 791-92. In 
other words, in order to be "other property", the defect has to cause damage to something other 
than the defective property itself or its improvements. Clearly, the cows were not an 
improvement to the milking machines, as they existed outside and separate from the machines. 
The cows were also not like the slate tiles in Blahd or the houses in this case, in that they were 
not added to the defective property to increase its value. Theoretically, improvements to the 
milking machines would have included new paint, new milking cups, updated electrical systems, 
and not the cows on which the milking machines were used. Aardema shows that "other 
property" must be something separate and apart, and not designed to improve the value of the 
defective property itself. 
The "property damage" and "other property" exception is designed to allow a property 
owner to claim that defective property damaged something other than what the defective 
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property was planned to be used for. For example, if the slope movement in this case had been 
much more rapid, and buried Plaintiffs car, there is no doubt that such damage would have 
constituted "property damage" to "other property". A generic example makes this point even 
more apparent: imagine a hypothetical in which Company A sells 1000 rubber balls to Company 
B. Each of the rubber balls has a defect that causes it to split down the middle after a number of 
days. Company B paints each of the rubber balls, Vvith the intent of selling them. Two days after 
they are painted, Company B discovers that each ball has split in half, damaging both the ball 
and the paint. Under Plaintiffs theory, Company B gets to sue Company A for the damage to the 
paint and the rubber balls. This is a contract claim, which in this case, is the settled claim against 
Streibick. More applicable to this case, Plaintiff claims that Company B gets to sue a 
governmental entity (who inspected the rubber balls) for damage to both the paint and balls. As 
discussed above, this scenario has been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. Damage to the ball 
is a contract claim against Company A. Damage to the paint is nothing more than an 
improvement to the ball, which clearly falls in the realm of "loss of profits or use", i.e. higher 
value of the ball as a result of the paint. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 97 Idaho at 351. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that the houses and other structures constitute "property 
damage" to "other property". Improvements, including significant improvements such as houses 
and pools are the same as the slate in the basement in Blahd, or the paint on the ball in the 
hypothetical; they are just lost profits when Plaintiff intended to resell the property. 
The second reason Plaintiff's argument fails is that Plaintiff incorrectly alleges that the 
"homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks are 'other property' that 
[have] suffered damage." Amended Memo in Support, pp. 6 - 7. Under Plaintiffs theory, 
Plaintiff could sue for the damages to this "other property". However, Plaintiff has never made 
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any attempt to differentiate the damages for the "other property" from the damages to the 
property itself (the soil). Theoretically, every property has two values: the value of the land 
without the improvements, and the value of the land with the improvements.6 Plaintiffs own 
expert calculates damages not as the value of the improvements, but the value of the property 
with improvements.7 The fact that Plainti:ffs damages do not differentiate between value of the 
improvements and value of the defective property itself shows that Plaintiff considers the 
property with the improvements on it to be the subject of the transaction. If the "other property" 
that Plaintiff claims is damaged is only the houses, sidewalks, pools, etc., then he is merely 
complaining about the lost income on the property he would have obtained had he sold the 
property with improvements. These damages are not recoverable under the economic loss rule, 
and the Court did not incorrectly apply the law to the facts of this case. 
It should be noted that Plaintiff never attempts to differentiate Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002 (1995) from the facts of this case. Defendants contend that 
Duffin is applicable. In that case, the Supreme Court found that a governmental entity in charge 
of inspecting seed potatoes was not responsible for crop loss under the economic loss rule. 
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1 007. The Court further found that there was no special relationship 
between the plaintiff and the governmental agency in charge of inspecting the seed potatoes. I d. 
at 1008. The Court in this case agreed that no special relationship existed here. Memorandum 
Opinion, pp. 9 - 10. Defendants cannot find that Plaintiff asks for reconsideration of this issue, 
7 
For example, the Ada County Assessor allows each person to search a property by address, and when 
listing the appraised value of the property, lists the value of the property and the improvements (such as the 
house) separately. See, e.g., 
http:/ /\:v"w\v.adacountvassessor.org/propsysNiewParcel.do?vearParceJ=20 11 R5125520300 
(last visited November 15, 2011). 
See Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. L (Teny 
Rudd Dep., Exs. 293 and 294) 
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and so Defendants contend that there is no reason for the Court to reconsider its finding. 
C. THE CITY HAD NO DUTY TO AFFIRMATIVELY SEEK OUT AND DISCLOSE 
IN"F0Rl\1ATION WHICH \VAS FREELY AVAILABLE IN A PUBLIC FILE. 
A couple pages of Plaintiff's brief discuss the duty which Plaintiff believes the 
Defendants owed to him. Amended Memo in Support, pp. 14 - 16. It is unclear whether this 
argument applies to Plaintiffs discussion of immunities or negligence, as the Court did not rule 
on any issue of whether a duty was owed to Plaintiff after be purchased the property. 8 In any 
case, Defendants will address this issue briefly. 
Plaintiff contends that the City "bad knowledge and a duty to disclose." Amended Memo 
in Support, p. 14. However, Plaintiff can point to no statement by any City employee showing 
that said City employee bad specific knowledge of slope movement in the area of Canyon 
Greens at the time Plaintiff was developing the property. As a result, there is no issue of fact that 
any City employee knew of the alleged defects with the property during that time frame. 
Therefore, the only way that Plaintiff can state that Defendant City "had knowledge" of the slope 
movement would be to argue that the documents in the City file were imputed to the knowledge 
of the City employees.9 However, this argument cuts both ways. A person who purchases a 
property is on constructive notice of any defects to the property or title to the property when such 
facts are recorded in publicly available governmental files. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 7 
("Constructive notice is meant to protect innocent persons about to engage in lawful transactions, 
by encouraging diligence in protecting one's rights and preventing fraud. It is based on the 
premise that citizens have no right to shut their eyes or ears to avoid information and then say 
they had no notice."). 
With the exception of the economic loss rule. 
9 This appears to be what Plaintiff is alleging on p. 16 of the Amended Memo in Support. 
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In discussing the factors applicable as to whether a special duty arose, Plaintiff attempts 
to show that each factor is met. Amended ~Memo in Support, pp. 15 - 16. However, the first 
factor, "Whether the government had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition,"10 is the one 
that Plaintiff cannot actually show. A document in a publicly available file does not mean that 
government employees had actual knowledge of the file's contents or existence of any particular 
document in the file. Since Plaintiff cannot show that any City employee had actual knowledge 
of the landslide in the area, a duty to disclose could only arise if there were an additional duty for 
the City to search all available records relating to a property prior to allowing development of or 
construction on the property. Plaintiff does not argue that such a duty exists, nor does Plaintiff 
argue that the City assumed such a duty. Therefore, the argument that the City had a duty to 
disclose knowledge that no City employee actually had at the time Plaintiff was developing his 
property fails. 
D. PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY NEW FACTS SUPPORT 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE IMMUNITY RULINGS, NOR THAT THE 
COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW. 
1. The Court Properly Determined that Immunity Applies Under I. C. § 6-904B 
Because the Citv Could Not Have Acted with Gross Negligence. 
Plaintiff contends that it was improper for the Court to state that "nothing in the record 
before the Court establishes that the City acted with gross negligence." Amended Memo in 
Support, p. 17 (quoting Memorandum Opinion, p. 15). Plaintiff then goes on to list a number of 
factors that a jury could have considered in determining that gross negligence occurred. 
However, Plaintiff has misstated the law on this particular issue. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recently clarified that 
The requirement that an employee have acted "within the course and scope of 
10 See Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 16 (2006). 
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their employment" plainly applies to the act of the employee and not of the 
governmental entity. Therefore, the language "and without malice or criminal 
intent" that follows the statute's requirement that the employee have acted within 
the course and scope of employment, also by its plain language only applies to the 
employee. 
Hof(er v. City o(Boise, 257 P.3d 1226, 1228-1229 (Idaho 2011). Though Hoffer discusses the 
prefatory language of IC. § 6-904, the same prefatory language is contained in IC § 6-904B 
(with the addition of two more exceptions). Therefore, this analysis applies to the immunities in 
this case. In other words, Plaintiff would have to allege and prove that a specific employee acted 
with gross negligence, and then immunity would be denied to that specific employee. The gross 
negligence exception, though, only applies where a claim has been filed against a specific 
employee1\ and in this case, the only employee sued was Lowell Cutshaw. There is not a single 
allegation or issue of fact with regard to a claim that Mr. Cutshaw acted with gross negligence. 
See Amended Memo in Support, pp. 17- 19. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff contends a 
jury could find that Chris Davies, John Smith, Shawn Stubbers, or some other employee acted 
with gross negligence, such persons are not parties to this lawsuit. Therefore, the City is immune 
on this cause of action, because the immunity applies to the City unless Plaintiff can prove that 
an employee against whom a claim is brought acted with gross negligence. 
Plaintiff also argues that "a trier of fact could conclude that the City had a duty to warn 
Block of the landslide .. . "Amended Memo in Support, p. 19. Defendants contend that this 
statement is incorrect. The existence of a duty is a question of law. McDevitt v. Sportsman's 
Warehouse, Inc., 255 P.3d 1166, 1169 (Idaho 2011). Therefore, it makes little sense to argue that 
a jury could find that a duty exists. To the extent that Plaintiff claims a duty existed prior to his 
11 "If [Plaintiff] had included an employee as a defendant, his claims against that employee alleging malice or 
criminal intent would have survived under I. C. § 6-904(3) because an employee is only immune from suit 
for those intentional torts if there is no allegation of malice and/or criminal intent." Hoffer v. City o[Boise, 
257 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Idaho 2011) 
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purchase of the property, the Court has ruled that no such duty exists. To the extent that a duty 
existed aftenvard Plaintiff purchased the property, the Court has determined that no duty exists 
to prevent economic loss. Therefore no duty exists and the jury need not hear evidence to make 
such a determination. 
2. The Court Properlv Determined that Immunitv Applies Under I C. § 6-904(1) 
Because the City Counsel and City Engineer Properly Acted Within its 
Discretion. 
Plaintiff addresses both the regulatory function exception and discretionary function 
exceptions under I C. § 6-904(1). Amended Memo in Support, pp. 20-23. The Court's ruling did 
not address the regulatory function exception, ]'vfemorandum Opinion, pp. 16 - 20, and therefore 
Defendants will not address at length Plaintiffs arguments with regard to the regulatory function 
exception. Defendants only state that Plaintiff's discussion of the regulatory function exception 
is one of the places where Plaintiff discusses alleged new facts (specifically discussing the 
deposition of Tim Richard). As the Court did not rule on the regulatory function exception, these 
new facts are no basis for reconsidering the Court's decision. 
With regard to discretionary immunity, the Court determined that at least two 
discretionary decisions applied to this case. First, the Court detennined that the enactment of 
Lewiston City Ordinance 4177 was a discretionary decision, and that the ordinance does not set 
forth any mandatory language for slope stability analyses. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 17 - 18. 
Plaintiff essentially admits that this is a discretionary decision, but argues that liability could still 
result for "failure to exercise due care in the 'operation stage' of this decision." Amended Memo 
in Support, p. 22. Instead, Plaintiff simply ignores the discretionary decision of the City Counsel, 
and argues that the City engineer's discretionary decision to not require a slope stability analysis 
creates liability. Plaintiff cannot sidestep the discretionary decision of the governmental entity 
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elected for the purpose of making such decisions, particularly where there is no issue of fact that 
the City Council acted within its discretion. 
Plaintiff fails to show any difference between Lewiston City Engineer Shawn Stubber' s 
decision in this case and the sewage treatment plant supervisor's decision in Dorea Enters. v. 
City o[Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 426 (2007). Plaintiff instead claims that his expert, Warren 
Watts, states that the City should have required a geotechnical evaluation when the property was 
subdivided in 2005 (i.e. before Plaintiff owned the property). Amended Memo in Support, p. 23. 
This however, does not provide a basis for the Court to reconsider its ruling that Shawn Stubbers 
decision in requiring or not requiring a geotechnical evaluation is the result of "city ordinances 
which leave room for policy judgment in their execution." Memorandum Opinion, p. 19. It also 
does not show that there is a factual dispute as to what considerations Mr. Stubbers made when 
deciding whether a slope stability analysis would be required. Therefore, summary judgment 
was properly granted on this issue. 
Further, as discussed above, the immunity applies unless Plaintiff can show that a City 
employee against whom a claim is brought acted with malice or criminal intent. Hoffer v. City of 
Boise, 257 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Idaho 2011). Shawn Stubbers is not a party to this lawsuit, and 
therefore, the immunity must apply as to the City. Further, Plaintiff admits that he has never 
"alleged malice or criminal intent." Amended Memo in Support, p. 19. Therefore, the immunity 
was applicable, and there is no reason provided to the Court to reconsider its opinion. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden showing that the Court 
overlooked facts or improperly applied the law with regard to the discretionary function 
immunity. 
3. The Court Properly Determined that Immunitv Applies Under I C § 6-904(7) 
Because the Plans At Issue Dealt with Improvements to Public Propertv. 
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Plaintiff claims that the grant of immunity on the claim (vi) in~ 55 of his Complaint was 
improper, because such claim was "essentially a failure to warn claim." Amended Memo in 
Support, p. 24. Plaintiff, however, cannot plead around the immunity by calling the claim by a 
different name. See Coonse by & ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 806 (1999) 
(clever drafting of complaints in a way attempting to avoid immunities under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act is not permissible). Plaintiffs claim "arises out of a plan or design for construction 
or improvement to ... other public property." See IC. § 6-904(7). Therefore, the immunity 
applies, even if Plaintiff designates the claim as a "failure to warn". 
Next, Plaintiff claims that the immunity does not apply because "the Administrative Plat 
for Canyon Greens was not a plan or design for construction of highways, roads, streets, bridges 
or other public property." Amended Memo in Support, p. 25. Further, Plaintiff argues that 
"Administrative Plats have 'no public improvements required.'" Id. 12 This argument is does not 
follow the language of the immunity. The immunity applies to any "design for ... improvement 
to ... other public property." I C. § 6-904(7). There is no doubt that an easement is a property 
right, and when owned by a governmental agency, that easement is a public property right. Each 
and every one of the plats, whether or not an administrative plat, and whether or not resulting in 
actual construction, involved a design for an improvement to public property, which is all that is 
necessary for the immunity to apply. Further, it is undisputed that in almost every case there was 
construction on a public improvement. For example, Streibick had to move a public storm water 
detention pond when he subdivided Sunset Palisades 8. Plaintiff had to rebuild the public storm 
12 Plaintiff also contends that Tim Richard testified that the property was "private property". Amended Memo 
in Support, p. 25. Though this alleged opinion testimony by Mr. Richard appears to be an issue of fact, 
whether property is public or private is a matter of law. Mr. Richards is not qualified to testify as to the 
legal status of property, and therefore his testimony is not grounds for reconsideration of the Court's grant 
of summary judgment. 
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water detention pond when he subdivided Canyon Greens, and had to prepare designs for 
strengthened retaining walls that he built over public storm drain lines. Thus, there is no doubt 
that "other public property" was involved, if only an easement. None of the cases cited by 
Plaintiff indicates that "other public property" is limited to property owned outright by a 
governmental entity, or that easements and rights-of-way do not constitute "other public 
property". Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden showing that there is a reason for the 
Court to reconsider its previous ruling. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that the Court properly granted summary 
judgment. Plaintiff has failed to show any issue of fact which would be a basis for reconsidering 
the grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff also cam1ot show that the Court improperly applied the 
law. Therefore, Defendants request that Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration be denied. 
DATED this lG_ day ofNovember, 2011. 
ANDERSON, JULIA1'J & HULL LLP 
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
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JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK J. ) 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY OF ) 
LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the State of ) 
Idaho, and its employee, LOWELLJ. CUTSHAW, ) 




Case No. CV 09-02219 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, the above entitled Plaintiff, John G. Block, by and through his attomeys 
~003/012 
of record, Landeck & Forseth, and hereby submits this Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration ("Reply Brief'). 
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INTRODUCTION 
As Defendants have cited, the "purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the 
Court to 'obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be 
ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as may be."' Response to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration at 3 citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat 'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823 
(1990). Because John Block's Motion for Reconsideration, Memorandum, Affidavit and this 
Reply Brief have presented available facts and legal arguments for reconsideration, justice may 
now be done if this Court rethinks its Order and the patently unfair results of its Order under the 
circumstances of this case that have ruined Jolm Block financially and through no fault ofhis 
own. Jolm Block should be allowed, under law, to present his case to a jury. 
Block has sufficiently shown that the economic loss rule does not apply to this case because 
Block's damages, at least in part are not economic loss. 
Block and Defendants have cited and recited and analyzed and re-analyzed Idaho case 
law on the subject of the economic loss rule, and Block has asserted and shown that his damages 
are not "economic loss." The record before this Court clearly demonstrates that he suffered 
physical property damage as Block constructed three (3) homes that were physically damaged as 
a result of the City's negligence or gross negligence. 
Idaho courts have struggled with the economic loss rule while acknowledging that the 
circumstances of each case must be carefully analyzed to determine whether or not the rule 
applies. The City has consistently argued for an all-encompassing view of the rule and, to date, 
this Court has done that. However, this interpretation in this case has resulted in the Court's 
failure to carefully analyze important distinctions that are essential to a proper application of the 
rule. The J olm Block set of circumstances has not yet been ruled upon by an Idaho appellate 
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comi. Oregon courts, on the other hand, have been confronted with factual circumstances more 
akin to Block's and, in doing so, have refined the principles that distinguish economic loss from 
damage to property. The Oregon Supreme Couti, in addressing whether physical damage to a 
home is economic loss, has convincingly concluded that it is not. The Oregon Supreme Court 
has allowed negligence claims to proceed against defendant builders who were negligent. In 
Harris v. Suniga, 209 Or. App. 410, 149 P .3d 224 (2006) plaintiffs were trustees of a trust that 
owned an apartment built by defendants, discovered defects in the construction of the apartment 
building and brought an action against defendants for negligent construction.Id. at 413, 149 P.3d 
at 225. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of certain construction defects the apartments suffered 
significant dry rot. Jd. Defendants argued that the damage to the apartment buildings was 
economic loss to plaintiff's investment and that plaintiffs' negligence claim was bmTed by the 
economic loss doctrine. Id. at 414, 149 P.3d at 225, 226. 
In its consideration of the economic loss doctrine, the court explained that, although 
previous cases have defined such phrase to include financial losses to intangibles (e.g., lost 
profits, loss of expected proceeds resulting from negligent misinfonnation that property was 
buildable, loss of investment), such does not mean that the phrase is limited to such losses.Jd. at 
418, 149 P .3d at 228. However, the court concluded that "economic loss" did not refer to the sort 
of property damage that was involved in the case. Id. The comi explained that there appeared to 
be no consistent rationale for various decisions cited by the parties and recognized that the 
reason for the different treatment of economic loss and physical damage does not derive from the 
theory or the logic of tort law.Id. at 422, 149 P.3d at 230. Ultimately, the court determined that 
plaintiffs' negligence claim was not barred by the economic loss doctrine, because it was based 
on damage to property, not economic loss. Id. at 423, 149 P.3d at 230. 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION - 3 
;OtJO~ 
11/23/2011 \\TED 20: 14 FJl.X 208 883 4593 ~VVV/ V .L.G. 
In Bunnell v. Dalton Construction, Inc., 210 Or. App. 13 8, 149 P .3d 1240 (2006), 
plaintiffs appealed a judgment dismissing their negligence claim against defendant, the builder of 
plaintiffs' home, on the grounds that the claim was for purely economic loss that was not 
recoverable in the absence of a special relationship between the parties. !d. at 141, 149 P .33d at 
1240. Defendant had built a house in 1997 and sold it to the Evanses. In 2003, the Evanses sold 
the house to plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs were initially aware of some defects in the installation 
of the siding, plaintiffs discovered substantial damage caused by water leakage after they had 
moved into the house. Plaintiffs instituted an action against defendant for breach of warranty and 
negligence. As a matter of law, the court rejected defendant's contention that because the alleged 
negligence occurred before plaintiff acquired the property, the damage to the property either did 
not damage plaintiff or was not attributable to defendant.Jd. at 143. "Whether a plaintiff could 
have avoided harm might be a relevant consideration in detem1ining comparative fault or 
mitigation of damages. But defendant does not explain, and we do not understand, how that fact 
precludes recovery as a matter oflaw .... Moreover, none of the cases concerning the economic 
loss doctrine have identified a plaintiff's previous knowledge of the relevant facts as a 
consideration relevant to determining whether a given loss is "economic" as opposed to 
"property damage." The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendant's 
summary judgment motion and in entering judgment dismissing plaintiff's negligence claim.Jd. 
at 1242-43. 
Professor Anzivino, a prolific author regarding the economic loss doctrine, has authored a 
defensible and understandable definition of economic loss as (i) loss of product value due to the 
product's failure to meet its contractual promises or warranties; (ii) physical injury to the product 
itself or its integrated system; (iii) any incidental or consequential damages that flow from (i) or 
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(ii). Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss From 
Non-Economic Loss, 91 Marquette Law Review 1081 (2008). Non-economic loss is any loss 
that is other than that described above. Jd. at 1117. Non-economic loss is recoverable in tort. !d. 
Real estate can be considered a product when its use is analogous to the use of tangible personal 
property.Id at1087. 
Block's case is distinguishable from the particular facts of Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, 
Inc., 108 P.3d 996, 1000-01 (Idaho 2005). Professor Anzivino's explanation is thatBlahd is 
subject to the "integrated system rule". 91 Marq. L. Rev. at 1090. "The essence ofthe integrated 
system rule is that if the defective product at issue is a defective component in a larger system, 
the other components of the system are not regarded as 'other property' as a legal matter even if 
they are different property in a literal sense." !d. at 1092 (emphasis added). Therefore, tort 
theories are unavailable. The Restatement (Third) ofTmis illustrates the integrated system rule 
with a hypothetical. 
A company purchases a conveyor belt that is installed in its assembly line. The 
defective belt subsequently breaks damaging the assembly line. All the losses 
stemming from the defective belt are considered to be damage to the product 
itself. As such, all the damages are purely economic losses, not "other property" 
damages. Id. at 1089. 
Thus, Blahd 's placement of slate tile over a crack in the basement hallway and the addition of a 
door in the basement and their subsequent damage was damage to the product itself, the product 
being the house that the Blahd's purchased (and not a house the Blahd's had built), which was 
the subject of the transaction. 
Block's situation is distinguishable and not subject to the "integrated system rule" as set 
1Zioo7/ol2 
forth by Professor Anzivino. Block's damage is "'other property" damage and non-economic loss. 
Non-economic loss occurs when a defective product damages property other than itself or its 
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integrated system. ld. at 1102. "The leading case discussing what constitutes 'other property' 
under the economic loss doctrine is Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Martinac & Co." Id. at 1102-
03. Professor Anzivino has also cited to Afarshall v. Wellcrafl Marine, Inc., (lights in ship were 
defective and water damaged boat and owner's personal property within the boat, owner sued in 
tort, action was properly brought in tort because owner's personal prope1iy was 'other property') 
and to A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co1p., (fanner suffered the loss of 140,000 
chickens when defective ventilation switch failed, loss of chickens was loss of physical property 
and non-economic loss). 
Professor Anzivino noted that a court might disregard de minimis non-economic loss and 
disallow tort recovery because insufficient "other property" has been damaged to sustain an 
action in tort. Id. at 1106. In addition, a disappointed performance expectations test might apply 
even though the dan1age suffered by the plaintiff is to other property which would nonnally 
permit tort remedies. !d. at 1109. Block's facts, of course, differin that his loss was substantial 
and not based on profits or expectations but on the investment ofhis own capitaL These various 
theories or rules provide assistance in understanding Idaho case Jaw on the economic loss rule 
and also illustrate that Block's case is different from all Idaho cases cited by the City and the 
Court in this case. 
Finally, Defendants' assertion that the court in Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 
Idaho 785, 215 P.3d 505 (2009) showed that '''other property' must be something separate and 
apart, and not designed to improve the value of the defective property itself' is a misstatement of 
that case. Instead the court stated there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether other 
property (e.g., the cows) were injured and if so, the damage to property other than that which 
was the subject of the transaction would not be economic loss. !d. at 791,215 P.3d at 51 L 
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Block has set forth evidence in which this Court can determine there is a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the City's duty to warn Block. 
Defendant cannot make a good faith argument that a recorded document is the same as a 
memo placed in a private city file. Response at 11. Block does ailege and offer evidence that 
there is a duty to search records relating to a property prior to allowing development of or 
id]009/0l2 
construction on the property. Memorandum at 21, 23. In addition, the Oregon Supreme Comi has 
stated "[w]hether a plaintiff could have avoided harm might be a relevant consideration in 
determining comparative fault or mitigation of damages. But defendant does not explain, and we 
do not understand, how that fact precludes recover as a matter oflaw .... Moreover, none of the 
cases concerning the economic loss doctrine have identified a plaintiffs previous knowledge of 
the relevant facts as a consideration relevant to determining whether given loss is 'economic' as 
opposed to 'property damage."' Bunnell v. Dalton Construction, Inc., 210 Or. App. 138, 149 
P.3d 1240 (2006). 
Block has set forth evidence in which this Court can determine there is a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the City's and/or Cutshaw's gross negligence. 
Defendants seek to make something out of nothing by citing to Hoffer v. City of Boise, 
151 Idaho 400, 257 P .3d 1226 (20 11 ). In Hoffer, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the district court on the ground that "I. C. § 6-904(3) as a matter oflaw exempts government 
entities from liability for the intentional torts at issue here [Hoffer's claim of tortious interference 
with contract and defamation]." !d. at 1227. Idaho Code§ 6-904 states that a "governmental 
entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and 
without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
... 3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 
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On appeal, Hofler challenged the district court's ruling on the City's 12(b)(6) motion and the 
claims dismissed by the grant of the motion to dismiss.Jd. at 1227. The only issue the Supreme 
Comi affin11ed was the dismissal of Hoffer's claims of intentional torts because the plain 
language of the statute provided immunity for such claims. 
The City's citation and discussion of Hoffer is irrelevant to this action because Block did 
assert that the City and also Cutshaw acted with negligence and gross negligence with respect to 
all of his claims. Order at 3. In addition, the recitation of facts in Block's Memorandum in 
support of this asseriion certainly sets forth a genuine issue of material fact that the City and 
Cutshaw acted with gross negligence. Memorandum at 17. Cutshaw was the City Engineer and 
approved the Administrative Plat of Canyon Greens. See, Second Affidavit of Ronald J. 
Landeck, Lowell Cutshaw Depo. Exhibit 49. Again, the issue of gross negligence of the City and 
Mr. Cutshaw is for the jury and should not be taken away. 
Block has set forth evidence in which this Court can determine there is a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the City's and/or Cutshaw's failure to exercise ordinary care in canying 
out their regulatory and/or discretionary functions. 
If a governmental employee fails to exercise ordinary care while carrying out his 
regulatory and/or discretionary functions then the exception to liability provided in Idaho Code § 
6-904(1) would not afford immunity. Rees v. Idaho Dept. of Health and We(fare, 143 Idaho 10, 
20, 137 P.3d 397, 407 (2006). "Under Idaho Jaw whether a government employee exercised 
ordinary care is nom1al1y a factual question best left to the jury." Jd. 
Despite Defendants continued assertion, Block has never taken issue with the City's 
decision to enact Lewiston City Ordinance 4177. Block has and does assert that Cutshaw failed 
to exercise ordinary care in his approval of Canyon Greens and has offered evidence creating a 
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genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Cutshaw exercised ordinary care. The 
determination of this issue is for the jury. Memorandum at 21, 23. 
Block has set forth evidence in which this court can determine there is a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether the property at issue was private property thereby rendering the 
immunity set forth in Idaho Code § 6-904(7) inapplicable. 
First, Block's claim (vi) is essentially a failure to warn claim. Block's claim is that 
neither the City nor Cutshaw notified or warned him or his engineers at any step along the way 
during the subdivision and pennitting processes related to Canyon Greens that a landslide had 
previously occurred on such property of which the City knew and had maintained a record. 
Second, the property at issue was private property and the property damage at issue has nothing 
to do with public improvements. Memorandum at 25. Thus, the exception to liability set forth in 
Idaho Code §6-904(7) is inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court withdraw its 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment and for the reasons 
set forth in his Motion, Memorandum, Affidavit and in this Reply Brief, thereupon issue a 
subsequent Order denying the City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment and determining 
that Block's claims, as set forth herein, be tried to a jury. 
DATED tlus 23rd day of November, 2011. 
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Ronald Landeck ofthe flrm Landeck & Forseth. Defendants City of Lewiston and City 
ofLe\viston Engineer, Lowell Cutshaw, were represented by Stephen Adams, of the firm 
Anderson, Julian & Hull. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on November 29, 
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2011. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROTJND 
A detailed background of this case is located within the }.1emorandum Opinion 
and Order on Second ]tvfotionfor Summary Judgment, filed October 14, 2011 and 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 14, 
2010. No new facts were presented on the motion for reconsideration. The Plaintiff is 
seeking reconsideration of this Court's order which granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Defendants. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ST Al\'DARD 
On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), the court must 
take into account any new facts that may affect the correctness of the prior interlocutory 
order. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879, 884, 908 P.2d 572, 577 
(Ct. App. 1995), citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat 'l Bank of North Idaho, 118 
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The burden is on the moving party to bring 
the new facts to the court's attention; the court is not required to search the record to 
determine whether there are any new facts that would affect its earlier decision. Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. Finally, the decision to grant or 
deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). 
ANALYSIS 
There are two motions currently pending before the Court. First, is the Plaintiff's 
motion for reconsideration of the Court's recent memorandum opinion and order which 
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granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The second pending motion is 
the Defendants' requests for costs as the prevailing party in the action. Each will be 
addressed separately. 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
The Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration of several of the Court's determinations 
within the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed October 14, 2011. The main arguments will be addressed below. 
a. Economic Loss Rule 
The Plaintiff asserts the Court's application of the economic loss rule was 
erroneous based upon the facts of the case at hand. Block asserts that only the four 
unimproved lots that he purchased from Streibick were the subject of the transaction, thus 
only costs to repair or replace the lots equals economic loss. Block asserts that damage to 
homes, retaining walls, driveways, swimming pools, fences and decks is damage to 
"other property" that was not part of the subject of the transaction. Block refers the Court 
to Aardema v. US. Daily Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) and Brian 
and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010) in 
support of his argument. 
In Aardema, the Plaintiff filed suit against US. Dairy Systems for the negligent 
design, installation, and maintenance of an automated milking system at a dairy farm. 
The system caused decreased milk production, quality and damage to the dairy cows. Id. 
at 788,215 P.3d at 508. The Aardema Court determined the milking machines, not the 
cows, were the subject of the transaction. The economic loss rule barred the plaintiffs' 
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recovery unless the plaintiffs could show damage to the cows which amounted to more 
than the failure of the milking equipment. 
U.S. Dairy argues that the cows are the subject of the transaction; 
however, this argument is strained. Based on the preceding case law, the 
milking machines are the subject of the transaction. Aardema Dairy did 
not contract with any of the defendants for the cattle, but for the purchase, 
installation and operation of the milking system. In this case, the subject 
matter of the contract is the milking system and not the cattle that are 
milked. Therefore, on remand the inquiry is whether there is sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that there is damage to 
the cows which amounts to more than the failure of the milking equipment 
to meet Aardema Dairy's expectations. 
I d. at 791, 215 P .3d at 511. The Aardema Court explained the evolution of Idaho case 
law addressing the economic loss rule, and discussed the subject of the transaction, which 
has not been specifically defined, but instead determined by making factual comparisons 
to prior cases. 
Economic loss is distinguishable from property damage, which would 
be recoverable under a tort claim. "Property damage encompasses damage 
to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction." 
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196, 983 P.2d 848, 850 (1999) (emphasis 
original) (quoting Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc., 97 Idaho at 351 
544 P.2d at 309). This Court has not defined the "subject ofthe 
transaction," instead relying on factual comparisons from previous 
decisions. Blahdv. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,301, 108 P.3d 
996, 1001 (2005) (finding that the house and the lot are the subject of the 
transaction and, therefore, constitute economic loss where the allegation is 
damage to the house from the settling foundation); Ramerth, 133 Idaho at 
197, 983 P.2d at 851 (finding that repair of the engine is the subject of the 
transaction ifthe allegedly negligent repair subsequently causes need for 
further repair to the engine); Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200 
(fmding that no property loss, other than property which is the subject of 
the transaction, existed when delivered and certified seed is found to 
contain bacterial ring rot); Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41,740 
P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) (holding that allegations of negligent design and 
construction of a duplex is barred by the economic loss rule); 
Oppenheimer Indus., Inc., 112 Idaho at 426, 732 P.2d at 664 (holding that 
tort action may be maintained when the plaintiff alleged that his cattle 
were sold without his permission because the cattle brand inspector failed 
to verify cattle ownership prior to the sale). This line of cases delineates a 
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clear pattern that this Court has implicitly defined the "subject of the 
transaction" by the subject matter of the contract. 
The most recent case in Idaho which has discussed the economic loss rule is Brian 
and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010). In this 
case, the owners of a Taco Time sued a subcontractor alleging that the subcontractor's 
negligently performed electrical work caused a fire which damaged the building. The 
Brian and Christie Court held the claim was not barred by the economic loss rule. !d. at 
29, 244 P.3d at 173. 
The Brian and Christie Court provided detailed analysis of the economic loss 
rule, starting with the definition of economic loss from Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). Further, the Court 
emphasized that the facts present in Brian and Christie involved a rendition of services, 
as opposed to defective property as the subject of the transaction. 
In Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 
Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975), we provided a definition of economic 
loss. The issue in Salmon Rivers was whether one could recover damages 
against a manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty in the absence of 
privity of contract. While deciding that issue, we stated that the difference 
between property damage and economic loss was: "Property damage 
encompasses damage to property other than that which is the subject ofthe 
transaction. Economic loss includes costs of'repair and replacement of 
defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as 
1 This analysis was accompanied by the following footnote, which clarified that the definition of subject of 
the transaction, as set forth in Blahdv. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 196, 301, 108 P.3d 996, 1001 
(2005), is overly broad: 
In Blahd this Court stated that the case law "indicate[s] the word 'transaction,' for purposes of 
the economic loss rule, does not mean a business deal-it means the subject of the lawsuit." 
Blahd, 141 Idaho at 300, 108 P.3d at 1000. However, if the subject of the transaction is 
defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every claim would be barred by the economic 
loss rule. Instead we read this overbroad language from Blahd to mean that the underlying 
contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the transaction. 
Id. at fu. 2. 
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commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or 
use." Id. at 351, 544 P.2d at 309. 
We have since applied that definition to cases involving the purchase of 
defective personal property and real property. See Tusch Enterprises v. 
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41,740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) (purchase ofthree 
defective duplexes); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 
1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995) (purchase of defective seed potatoes); 
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196,983 P.2d 848, 850 (1999) (purchase 
of a defective airplane); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 
300, 108 P .3d 996, 1000 (2005) (purchase of a defective house); Aardema 
v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,790,215 P.3d 505,510 (2009) 
(purchase of an allegedly defective milking system). In reaching its 
decision, the district court used this same definition, even though Taco 
Time's claim against Subcontractor did not involve the purchase of 
defective property. The district court's attempt to apply this formulation of 
the rule to a case involving the rendition of services illustrates why it does 
not apply to such cases. 
First, the Salmon Rivers definition states, "Economic loss includes 
costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject 
of the transaction .... " 97 Idaho at 351, 544 P.2d at 309. In applying that 
defmition to this case, the district court held that "the subject of the 
transaction with which [Subcontractor] was involved was the remodel 
project" and that it was "the restaurant/building, not the services provided 
via remodeling, that was the subject of the transaction." In doing so, it 
misquoted the Salmon Rivers definition of economic loss. 
It is the restaurant/building, not the services provided via remodeling, 
that was the subject of the transaction; and it was the building, its contents, 
and the profits derived from the building's use that were damaged by the 
fire ..... 
Correctly quoted, that definition states, "Economic loss includes costs 
of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the 
transaction .... " I d. (emphasis added). In its analysis, the district court 
omitted the word "defective." Taco Time did not contend that it suffered 
economic loss because Subcontractor sold it a defective restaurant. The 
restaurant was not defective property. It did not spontaneously combust. 
Rather, Taco Time's claim is that Subcontractor's negligence in connecting 
the signs to electrical power caused a fire that extensively damaged the 
restaurant and its contents. In this case, there was no defective property 
which was the subject of the transaction. 
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Brian and Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho at 26, 244 P.3d at 170.2 The 
Court compared and contrasted cases involving rendition of services with cases which 
involved the purchase of defective property as the subject of the transaction. 
In Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 
423, 426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (1986), we rejected the contention that the 
loss of cattle due to the negligence of the deputy brand inspector was 
merely economic loss. In doing so, we stated, "It is also black-letter law 
that a cause of action in negligence is available for one whose chattel is 
lost or destroyed through the negligence of another.'' Id. The damage to 
Taco Time's restaurant and its contents was no more economic loss than 
was the loss of the cattle in Oppenheimer. 
The district court's analysis shows the confusion that can occur by 
attempting to apply the Salmon Rivers definition of economic loss to a 
transaction not involving the purchase of defective property. The 
definition of economic loss stated in Salmon Rivers and utilized in Tusch 
Enterprises v. Coffin; Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n; Ramerth v. Hart; 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc.; and Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 
does not apply in cases involving the negligent rendition of services 
because such cases do not involve the purchase of defective property. 
Id. at 27, 244 P.3d at 171. Next, the Court discussed Just's Inc. v. Arrington 
Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978) as an example of a case wherein the 
Salmon Rivers definition of economic damages was not applicable. 
For example, in Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 
P .2d 997 (1978), we did not use the Salmon Rivers definition of economic 
2 The Brian and Christie Court stated the trial court misunderstood what economic loss is and explained 
that economic loss is not simply damages that can be measured monetarily. 
Second, the district court misunderstood what economic loss is. In its decision 
denying reconsideration, it wrote, "All of [Taco Time's] damage claims arise from restaurant 
property damaged by the fire, and such damages constitutes economic loss." It therefore held 
that Taco Time could not recover for damage to "the building, its contents, and the profits 
derived from the building's use that were damaged by the fue." Economic loss is not simply 
damages that can be measured monetarily. "Economic loss includes costs of repair and 
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial 
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman 
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975). It includes 
costs to repair and replace the" defective property which is the subject of the transaction." As 
discussed above, the restaurant and its contents were not defective property. 
ld. at 26-27, 244 P.3d at 170-171. 
MEMORA.NDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND DEFENDA.c"NTS' 
MEMORA.NDUM OF COSTS 
7 
damages when deciding whether a contractor performing a construction project 
in a business district could be liable for economic damages suffered by a 
business allegedly due to the contractor's negligence. The contractor and a city 
had entered into a contract for an extensive construction project that included 
removing and replacing the streets, sidewalks, sewer and water lines, electrical 
services, and traffic control devices in the dmvntown business district. The 
contract required the contractor to take certain actions to minimize the 
disruption to the businesses within the project area. A business brought an action 
contending that it was a third party beneficiary of the contract and that it was 
entitled to recover lost profits resulting from a decreased flow of customers 
allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence. The business did not contend 
that contractor had harmed the business's property. 
We characterized the business's claim as follows, " The damages claimed by 
the plaintiff, lost profits, are purely economic losses allegedly suffered as a 
result of the defendant's negligent diversion of prospective customers of the 
plaintiff." !d. at 468, 583 P.2d at 1003. We then stated, "As a general rule, no 
cause of action lies against a defendant whose negligence prevents the plaintiff 
from obtaining a prospective economic advantage." !d. The reason for that 
general rule is that "a contrary rule, which would allow compensation for losses 
of economic advantage caused by the defendant's negligence, would impose too 
heavy and unpredictable a burden on the defendant's conduct." !d. at 470, 583 
P.2d at 1005. We noted that if the business could recover such losses, so could 
"not only all the other businesses in the area, but also their suppliers, creditors, 
and so forth, Ad infinitum [sic]." !d. We concluded: "Ifthe [contractor's] 
liability were extended to all those who suffered any pecuniary loss, its liability 
could become grossly disproportionate to its fault. Such potential liability would 
unduly burden any construction in a business area." !d. Although Just's was 
decided three years after Salmon Rivers, we did not use the Salmon Rivers 
definition of economic damages. Because Just's did not involve the purchase of 
defective property, such definition did not apply. 
!d. at 27-28, 244 P.3d at 171-72. 
Brian and Christie sets forth a clear delineation between cases involving the 
purchase of defective property, and those which involve the rendition of services. The 
Brian and Christie Court explicitly stated that the Salmon Rivers definition of "subject of 
the transaction" is only applicable to those cases involving the purchase of defective 
property. The Plaintiff contends this case is a rendition of services case, however, there 
is no dispute within the record that this lawsuit arises from the purchase of property that 
was to be developed, and was later discovered to be defective. 
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the case may not be identical to Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 108 P .3d 
996 (2005) and Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987), 
these cases provide the best guidance regarding the application of the economic loss rule 
to the case before the Court. Therefore, the Court's prior ruling on this issue stands. 
b. The City owed no duty to Block for events which occurred on the 
property prior to Block's purchase. 
The Plaintiff contends the Court failed to construe the exceptions set forth in the 
ITCA appropriately. Within this argument, the Plaintiff contends the Court erred when it 
determined that the City did not owe Block a duty of care with respect to actions which 
occurred on the property prior to Block's purchase. The Complaint sets forth six 
allegations of negligence which occurred prior to Block's purchase ofthe property. 
Complaint,~ 55 (claims designated (iii), (iv), (v), (ix), (x), and (xi)). 
It must be noted that the Court's determination on these six claims was made 
without consideration of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The existence of a duty is a question 
oflaw. Turpin v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999). This Court 
concluded that the City did not owe a duty to Block for allegations of negligence which 
occurred prior to Block's purchase of the property. Absent a duty, Block's burden to 
establish negligence cannot be met. Thus, the Court's prior ruling with respect to claims 
(iii), (iv), (v), (ix), (x), and (xi) stands. 
c. Exceptions to the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
In the alternative, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted 
based on the determination that more than one exception to the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
was applicable to the case at hand. The ITCA "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 9 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
negligent acts or omissions." Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 
330, 334 (1994). "The purpose of the ITCA is to provide 'much needed relief to those 
suffering injury from the negligence of government employees.' The ITCA is to be 
construed liberally, consistent with its purpose, and with a view to 'attaining substantial 
justice."' Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397, 
406 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
The Plaintiff contends the Court erred in the application ofLC. § 6-904B, which 
provides immunity to a governmental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without 
gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct 
This statute reads in pertinent part: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and 
without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as 
defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim 
which: 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order or similar authorization. 
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an 
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the 
property of the governmental entity performing the inspection. 
I. C. § 6-904B(3),( 4). The ITCA defines gross negligence and reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct 
For the purposes of this chapter, and this chapter only, the following 
words and phrases shall be defined as follows: 
1. "Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a 
reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar responsibility 
would, \Vith a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to 
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recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty 
shows deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. 
2. "Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person 
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of 
probability that such harm will result. 
I. C. § 6-904C(l ),(2). Further, for purposes of the ITCA, "it shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that any act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of 
his employment is within the course and scope of his employment and Vv'ithout malice or 
criminal intent." LC. § 6-903(5). 
A plain reading of the statute requires the Plaintiff to set forth facts to establish 
the City employees acted with malice or criminal intent and either gross negligence or 
reckless, willful and wanton conduct. This statute establishes that the standard of care is 
more difficult to prove than the "ordinary care" standard. See Crown v. State, Dept. of 
Agriculture, 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995). The Plaintiff has not presented new 
facts to this Court to establish a material question of fact on this issue. Therefore, the 
prior ruling on this issue stands. 
The Plaintiff also asks this Court to reconsider the determination to grant 
summary judgment based upon I.C. § 6-904(1) and 6-904(7). Upon review, this Court 
finds that no facts or presentation of law which would alter the Court's prior decision on 
these matters. Having reviewed the _Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment in its entirety, and having considered the arguments of counsel, 
the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied. 
2. Defendant's Memorandum of Costs 
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I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A) states that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the 
prevailing party ... unless otherwise ordered by the court." The definition of prevailing 
party is set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B): 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled 
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine 
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and 
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in 
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Based upon the fmal result of this action, the Defendants are the prevailing party in the 
matter, and thus, are entitled to costs as a matter of right. 
The following costs as a matter of right are awarded: subpoena fee- $40.00; 
deposition fees $9,291.15; and witness fees -$140.00. The total award for costs as a 
matter of right is $9,471.15.3 
In addition, the Defendants are seeking an award of discretionary costs in the 
amount of$14,736.90. This sum is comprised of photocopy charges and request for fees 
charged by experts. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) permits the Court to award discretionary fees. 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of 
that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said 
costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. The 
trial court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained 
in the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such 
specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the 
absence of any objection to such an item of discretionary costs, the court 
may disallow on its own motion any such items of discretionary costs and 
shall make express fmdings supporting such disallowance. 
3 The Court notes that the Plaintiff objected to the amount requested for deposition costs as a matter of 
right. l.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C)(9) allows for "Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in 
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action." The Court 
does not find the requested amount for depositions to be unreasonable or outside the confmes of the rule. 
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LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The Plaintiff objects to the Defendants request for discretionary 
fees. 
"A court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the 
nature of the case." City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,588-89, 130 P.3d 1118, 
1126-27 (2006). 
In reviewing a grant or denial of discretionary costs, the key issue is 
whether the record indicates express findings by the district court as to 
whether a cost was necessary, reasonable, exceptional and should be 
awarded in the interests of justice. The district court does not have to 
engage in a lengthy discussion of these factors. 
Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347,354-55,256 P.3d 755,762-763 (2011). The 
Court does not find that the requested discretionary costs are the type of expenses which 
fall within the framework ofi.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The photocopy and expert costs may 
have been necessary and reasonable to the defense of the case, however, the Court is not 
persuaded these costs were exceptional based upon the subject matter ofthe litigation. 
Therefore, the Defendants' motion for an award of discretionary costs is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration of this Court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants. Having considered the file as a whole, and the 
Plaintiff's additional arguments, the motion for reconsideration is denied. The 
Defendants have filed a motion to recover both costs as a matter of right and 
discretionary costs. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Defendants' motion is 
granted with respect to costs as a matter of right; however, the Defendants' request for 
discretionary costs is denied. 
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Based upon the foregoing analysis, the City's motion for summary judgment is 
granted. 
ORDER 
The Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. IT IS FURTHER 
ORDERED THAT the Defendant's motion for costs is hereby GRANTED in part, and 
DENIED in part, consistent with the foregoing analysis. 
Dated this '-1 -t<--day of January 2012. 
~; (~~ 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L4 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: The above-named Respondents City of Lewiston, a municipal corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employee, Lowell J. Cutshaw, City of Lewiston Engineer, and their 
attorneys of record, Brian K. Julian and Stephen L. Adams of Anderson, Julian & Hull, 
LLP, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court: 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, John G. Block ("appellant" or "Block') appeals 
against the above-named respondents, City of Lewiston and its employee Lowell J. Cutshaw 
(collectively "respondents" or "City'') to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered on 
February 1, 2012, inclusive of the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment entered October 14, 2011, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration and Defendants' Memorandum of Costs entered on January 4, 2012, 
and/or other related orders, Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, presiding. 
2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, from the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above, under and pursuant to Rules 4 and ll(a)(l) 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, as currently identified, provided 
any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, 
is that the district court erred by: 
a) Failing to find and conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 
whether the City acted negligently in failing to perform required services 
under City code, including its failure to warn Block of a previous landslide on 
Block's real property that was memorialized in the City's records; 
b) Failing to find and conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 
whether the City acted with gross negligence by approving plats and issuing 
building permits for development ofBlock's real property without inspecting 
City records and/or warning Block of a previous landslide on Block's real 
property that was memorialized in the City's records and by erroneously 
applying an exception to liability under Idaho Code§ 6-9043; 
c) Failing to find and conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 
whether the City failed to exercise ordinary care in carrying out its regulatory 
and/or discretionary function(s) and by erroneously applying an exception to 
liability under Idaho Code§ 6-904(1); 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 2 
d) Finding and concluding that Block's claim arose out of a plan or design for 
construction or improvement to highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other 
public property and by erroneously applying an exception to liability under 
Idaho Code § 6-904B; 
e) Erroneously applying the economic loss doctrine in dismissing Block's tort 
claim against the City for the City's failure to warn Block of a previous 
landslide on Block's real property and by failing to conclude that the City's 
failure to so warn is a duty imposed by law and is not the "subject of a 
transaction" that involved Block and the City; and 
f) Erroneously applying the economic loss doctrine in dismissing Block's tort 
claim against the City by failing to find and conclude that Block suffered 
property damage other than damage that was the "subject of a transaction" 
that involved Block and the City. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
S(a). Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
S(b). Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
Hearing on Second Motion for Summary Judgment held August 9, 2011. 
Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration held November 29, 2011. 
Appellant requests that the transcript be prepared in compressed format as specified in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 26. 
6. Appellant requests that the following documents be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules: 
a. Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 21, 2010; 
b. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 21, 
2010; 
c. Statement ofFacts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
May 21, 2010; 
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d. Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed May 21, 2010; 
e. Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support ofMotion for 
Summary Judgment filed June 23, 2010; 
f. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed July 13, 2010; 
g. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl filed July 13, 2010; 
h. Affidavit ofJohn Block filed July 13, 2010; 
1. Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 16, 2010; 
J. Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 24, 2011; 
k. Statement ofFacts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
June 24, 2011; 
L Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 24, 
2011; 
m. Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed June 24, 2011; 
n. Affidavit ofKari Ravencroft in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summayry [sic] Judgment filed June 27, 2011; 
o. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 26, 2011; 
p. Second Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Plaintiffs 
Objections to Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 
26, 2011; 
q. Second Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl filed July 26, 2011; 
r. Second Affidavit of John Block filed July 26, 2011; 
s. Affidavit of John R. ("Hank") Swift filed July 26, 2011; 
t. Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
August 1, 2011 ; 
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u. Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice of Defendant Jack J. Streibick, a 
Single Man and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Maureen F. 
Streibick filed August 3, 2011; 
v. Order of Dismissal of Defendant Jack J. Streibick, a Single Man and as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick filed August 
8,2011; 
w. Amended Order Setting Case for Trial and Pre-Trial Conference filed 
August 10, 2011; 
x. Notice of Citation of Additional Authority filed August 25, 2011; 
y. Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed October 28, 2011; 
z. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
October 28, 2011; 
aa. Fourth Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support ofMotion for 
Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed October 28, 2011; 
bb. Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed November 1, 2011; 
cc. Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration filed November 18, 
2011; and 
dd. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration filed 
November 25, 2011. 
7. I certify that: 
a. A copy of the Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
b. The clerk of the district court or reporter has been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the requested transcript; 
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record has been paid; 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 5 
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 8th day ofFebruary, 2012. 
LANDECK & FORSETH 
By: --+1-----V-~~-· '·_. · __ 
Ron 
Atto eys for Plaintif:£1 Appellant 
John G. Block 
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BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426 
NANCY TOWLER 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
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STREIBICK as Personal Representative of 
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municipal corporation of the State of 
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Case No. CV 09-02219 
JUDGMENT 
As the Court has granted Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw/s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
JUDGMENT- 1 )()33 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED on behalf of Defendant City of Lewiston 
and Defendant Lowell Cutshaw. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
Plaintiff's Complaint and claims against Defendants be, and the same hereby are, 
dismissed on the merits and with prejudice with costs and/or fees to be assessed 
and awarded to Defendants in the amount of $9,4 71 .15. 
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DATED this_/_ day of Ja.numv, 12012. 
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District Court Judge 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, 
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